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Abstract of thesis entitled: Understanding Children's Conceptual Development 
Through the Lens of the Representational Redescription Model 
Submitted by Cheung Chi Ngai 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong (July 2008) 
In the field of conceptual development, the importance of the explicit-implicit 
dimension has not received proper attention. This thesis utilized such a dimension to 
understand the conceptual development in the physics and probability domains, and 
this was achieved by applying the Representational Redescription model (RR model). 
Children belonging to groups of 4 to 5 year olds, 6 to 7 year olds, and 8 to 9 year 
olds were studied. Differences in performance between the implicit and explicit 
representation were found, with evidence of implicit knowledge being developed 
before explicit knowledge was provided. 
Study One investigated children's conceptual development in the 
block-balancing task. It was found that the behavioural success in block-balancing 
was a prerequisite for the discovery and verbalization of a more advanced concept: 
the naive version of the law of torque. Furthermore, this explicit concept served as 
the precondition for the occurrence of the behavioural pattern that reflected this 
concept. Study One also provided evidence for the existence of the implicit 
geometric-centre theory as well as empirical evidence for the existence of the 
level-El representation, which is the unique contribution of the RR model. Study 
ii 
Two investigated children's development in a probability-estimation task. It was 
found that intuitive estimation, which is sustained by implicit representation, 
coexisted with the explicit representation, and this implicit knowledge was better 
developed than the explicit knowledge among the participants of this experiment. 
More advanced explanations were not found in the group of 4 to 5 year olds. Some 
children in the group of 6 to 7 year olds and all of the children in the group of 8 to 9 
year olds used the half rule in their explanations. The most advanced type of 
explanation in this study involved the concept of division/fraction, which could only 
be found in the eldest age group. Both studies found that less advanced explanations 
were phased out only gradually after the discovery of the more advanced 
explanations. The two studies yielded different results for the question of whether 
more advanced explanations were first discovered in easier trials or more difficult 
trials. 
The application of the RR model in the physics and probability domains has 
provided the meaningful findings that are described in this thesis. The empirical 
results lend solid support to the RR model, and provide food for thought in the 
refinement of its content. These results suggest that the RR model can be applied to 
the study of conceptual development in new domains in the future. The results also 
strongly suggest that performance on the behavioural and verbal explanatory levels 
i i i 
should not be viewed as the same. This recognition should have important 
implications for any future experimental design. In the practical arena, this thesis 
shed light on the process of learning, teaching, and assessment. It was shown in this 
thesis that the verbalization of a correct concept does not mark the end of learning or 
development. A teacher's role, viewed in the light of the current findings, should not 
be limited to the presentation of explicit knowledge, but should also be extended to 
facilitate students' gaining a fuller insight into their own concepts and knowledge. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The beauty and sophistication of the world is definitely fascinating, but our 
concepts and knowledge about this world can be even more so. Throughout human 
history, the search for the origins of concepts has never ceased. People are curious 
about how humans change from infants, who seem to understand nothing, into adults, 
who possess a large body of complex knowledge. The most amazing thing is that 
many of these conceptual changes occur without conscious effort or awareness. 
Though we are the agents of our own concepts, we are puzzled by their existence. 
Philosophers and psychologists have tried hard to understand where concepts 
come from and how changes occur (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Locke, 1975; Prinz, 2002). 
"Nature versus nurture" is a classic question in psychology. Some hold that concepts 
come from nature and so people are bom with knowledge, some argue the opposite 
position that all knowledge is acquired, and some prefer a position midway between 
these two. This question is asking about the source of concepts. But the issue about 
the source is not the only question that concerns conceptual development. How 
development actually occurs is also an important question. Developmental 
psychologists have proposed numerous theories that try to explain what occurs in 
1 
conceptual development (e.g., Carey, 1991; Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997; Keil, 1989; Piaget, 1952, 1955; Vygotsky, 1934/1987). The contents 
of these theories are often very different; however, many of them share the same 
underlying dimensions. 
There are different approaches to investigating conceptual development. This 
thesis focuses on an approach that has not received much attention in the literature: 
the explicit-implicit dimension. Though only a few studies have been designed to 
investigate conceptual development using this dimension (e.g., Alibali & Meadow, 
1993; Clements & Pemer, 1994), it has given momentum to a great deal of research 
in other areas such as memory and learning (e.g., Cohen, Eichenbaum, Deacedo, & 
Corkein, 1985; Glisky, Schacter, & Tulving, 1986; Reber, 1967; Squire & Frambach, 
1990). In this study, I will consider conceptual development by applying a model that 
is built on the explicit-implicit dimension, namely the Representational 
Redescription model. 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1986, 1992) Representational Redescription model (RR 
model) is one of the most influential modem theories of cognitive development 
(Krist, Horz, & Sch6nfdd, 2005). Based on this model, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
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developed a developmental theory that avoided the extremes of both nativism and 
empiricism, and reconciled the conflicts between a strict modular view of the human 
mind and a domain-general view of development. The theory provided a third way 
that led out of these dichotomies. The RR model is also a framework that insightfully 
integrates views of cognitive psychology and developmental psychology, acting as a 
conceptual bridge between these two subfields in psychology. It is not surprising that 
the RR model is referred to in studies that use the paradigm in cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Meulemans, Van der Linden, & Pemichet, 1998). Nor is it surprising to find 
developmental researchers who use the RR model to integrate their theories with 
findings on implicit learning or implicit memory (e.g., Steffler, 2001). The model 
introduced a new dimension for understanding development, namely the 
explicit-implicit dimension, which encouraged later researchers to study the role of 
implicit understanding in the course of development (e.g., Alibali & Meadow, 1993; 
Clements & Pemer, 1994; Siegler & Stem, 1998). The basic assumption of the RR 
model is that explicitness and implicitness do not represent a dichotomy. The RR 
model classified representation into four kinds: Implicit, Explicit 1’ Explicit 2, and 
Explicit 3. This classification influenced successive researchers as they tried to 
construct their theories. For example, Dienes and Pemer (1986) acknowledged that, 
“In our framework there is no simple dichotomy between implicit and explicit 
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knowledge. This owes much to Karmilofif-Smith's (1986, 1992) insistence that the 
basic dichotomy should be embellished by further levels of explicitness" (p. 748). 
1.1 Overarching questions of the thesis 
When applying the RR model to understanding conceptual development, the 
following questions arise, which provide the main direction for the investigation 
throughout this study: 
1. Can the distinction between explicit representation and implicit representation be 
observed in this study of conceptual development? Do they have different roles, 
functions, and characteristics? Can implicit representation exist without explicit 
representation? 
2. What are the processes that take place in implicit representation and in explicit 
representation in the course of conceptual development? Is there a U-shaped 
performance curve in this developmental process? 
3. What are the dynamics between explicit and implicit representation? Is implicit 
representation replaced when explicit representation occurs, or do they coexist 
and perform different functions? 
4. Is this conceptual developmental process itself a domain-general process? 
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To answer these questions, two experimental studies were designed for two 
different domains. By comparing the developmental processes related to conceptual 
understanding in the domains of physics and probability, it is hoped that more insight 
can be gained, and that the patterns of conceptual development can be better 
understood. 
1.2 Study One: The block-balancing experiment 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) pointed out that the RR model is a domain-general 
model. She agreed that knowledge content in each domain is different because there 
are unique innate constraints in different domains. The RR model describes the 
development that occurs in different domains; the developmental process described 
by the RR model is a domain-general process. To prove this, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
discussed developmental research in five different domains: language, physics, 
mathematics, theory of mind, and notation. In the three domains that are related to 
conceptual development, namely physics, mathematics, and theory of mind, one 
experiment in the physics domain stands out as the most representative and provides 
the strongest empirical support for the RR model. This is the block-balancing 
experiment. 
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In the block-balancing experiment (KarmilofiF-Smith & Inhelder, 1974/75), 
children were required to balance symmetrical and asymmetrical blocks over a 
narrow support. (The details of this experiment are discussed later in this thesis.) The 
experiment provided empirical support for the existence of the Explicit 1 (El) level; 
the representation of this level is the abstraction of representation in the implicit level. 
El representation is not conscious and is not available for verbalization. The El level 
is a unique feature in the RR model that plays an important role in breaking up the 
explicit-implicit dichotomy. In the experiment, it was found that the behaviour of 
6-year-old children was unconsciously constrained by an implicit theory about 
balancing, but they were unaware of this theory and therefore unable to verbally 
report it. This matched the description of El representation. Another line of support 
provided by this experiment is the U-shaped performance curve. It was found that 
both 4- to 5-year-old and 8- to 9-year-old children could balance both symmetrical 
and asymmetrical blocks, but 6-year-old children failed to do so. The RR model 
predicts that a decline in performance may happen during the course of development 
because, after behavioural mastery is reached, there is a phase of development that 
focuses on internal representation; in this phase, development is not data driven, so 
external data may be disregarded temporarily and may result in a decline in 
performance. 
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Pine and Messer (1999, 2003) found that the implicit theory suggested by 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974/75) could be verbalized by children. If this 
implicit theory is available to conscious access and can be verbalized once it appears, 
then the block-balancing experiment fails to support the existence of El 
representation. If the implicit theory is at first unavailable to conscious access and 
verbalization, but exerts its influence by affecting where children place the blocks, 
then the geometric-centre theory is represented at level El at this time. Even though, 
after a period, this implicit theory becomes available to both conscious access and 
verbalization, the existence of El representation is still supported. However, such 
critical information about the timing of availability is unclear in Pine and Messer's 
(1999, 2003) research. 
Concerning the U-shaped performance curve, Krist et al. (2005) tested the 
performance of 4- to 6-year-old and 8-year-old children in the block-balancing task. 
They failed to replicate the finding of a U-shaped performance curve across the age 
groups, and instead they found quasilinear improvement with age. On the other hand, 
Pine and Messer (2003) found a U-shaped performance curve in the course of 
children's conceptual development. The age of their participants was between 5 years 
8 months and 6 years 1 month. Unlike Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder's (1974/75) 
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U-shaped curve. Pine and Messer’s U-shaped curve is within the age group but 
across the five days of the experiment. 
Given the importance of the block-balancing experiment to the RR model and 
the conflicting findings in the literature, children's performance in the 
block-balancing task was investigated in this study. There are four major aims of the 
study. The first aim is to find out whether the difference between implicit and explicit 
representation can be observed, and whether the block-balancing paradigm provides 
empirical support for the El representation. The former issue is associated with the 
basic assumption of the RR model. The second issue concerns with whether an 
intermediate representation level that exists between the extremes of the 
explicit-implicit dimension. Children's behavioural performance and verbal 
explanation was monitored trial by trial, in order to check whether Karmiloff-Smith 
and Inhelder's (1974/1975) claim that children could possess implicit theories that 
influence their behaviour is correct or not. The second aim is to see whether the 
bottom-up direction of development suggested by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) really 
exists. The third aim of this study is to see whether there is an across age-group 
U-shaped curve. The fourth aim is to study the developmental pattern of conceptual 
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understanding in a block-balancing task. Variations within an individual, between 
individuals, and between age groups were studied carefully. 
1.3 Study Two: The probability-estimation experiment 
The RR model is intended to be a domain-general model for development. To 
prove that this claim is valid, the model must be applied to domains that it has not 
been applied to previously. To the best of the author's knowledge, the RR model has 
not been applied to studying the conceptual development of probability. The second 
experiment of this study used the RR model to investigate children's conceptual 
development of probability, and to consider what insights the RR model brings to the 
field. 
The experiment focused on examining the following predictions that were 
deduced from the RR model: 
1. There are implicit and explicit levels of representation for the probability concept. 
2. The probability concept can be acquired by bottom-up development. 
i) Children can have some degree of behavioural success supported by 
implicit representation before they have explicit knowledge of how to 
carry out a correct computational procedure. 
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ii) Even if children receive no explicit instruction about the concept of 
probability, they can create explicit knowledge on the basis of their 
implicit knowledge. This representational redescription process can be 
facilitated by repeated practice with feedback. 
Piaget and Inhelder (1951/1975) were the pioneering researchers in the field of 
probability development, and their theory dominated the field for many years (Reyna 
& Brainerd, 1994). However, their theory did not include a distinction between 
explicit and implicit knowledge. Piaget assumed that the developmental direction of 
the probability concept should be top-down because an explicit understanding of the 
particular defining features of the probability concept is the prerequisite of further 
behavioural improvement. For instance, concrete operational children make 
probability judgments based on the absolute frequency of the intended event rather 
than the ratio between intended and unintended events, because their explicit 
knowledge of combinatoric system and proportions has not yet developed, and does 
not do so until they enter into the formal operational stage. 
Early research using the choice paradigm seems to agree with these suggestions 
(Chapman, 1975; Ross & Hoemann, 1975). In the choice paradigm, usually there 
10 
were two events, event A and event B, and children were asked to decide which event 
would have the greater probability of happening. For example, there were two red 
marbles and one blue marble in jar A, and six red marbles and two blue marbles in 
jar B. When concrete operational children were asked to choose which jar they 
wanted to take a marble from, if their aim was to get a blue marble they usually 
chose jar B because the number of blue marbles was greater. 
However, later research by Acredolo, O'Connor, Banks, and Horobin (1989) 
used the functional measurement method and found there was no difference in 
performance between concrete operational children and formal operational children. 
A possible explanation is that their probability-estimations have reflected an 
influence from both intended events and unintended events. Acredolo et al. believed 
their experiment showed that children possess implicit knowledge about probability. 
However, it is difficult to consider the distinction between explicit and implicit; 
given that Acredolo et al. did not ask children to explain their answers, the critical 
issue of the level of explicitness of these children's concept of probability was left 
unexplored in their study. Therefore, in this study, a modified design was applied to 
the experiment of Acredolo et al. (1989), and participants were required to provide 
11 
verbal explanations in order to check the level of explicitness of their conceptual 
understanding. 
When studying the direction of acquisition of the probability concept, results of 
previous experiments were all generalized from blocks of experimental trials; the 
temporal resolution of these experiments was quite low. The experimenters thus 
failed to capture the variations between trials that were critical to understanding how 
development actually occurred. Taking into consideration of the above limitations, 
children's performance and verbal explanations were monitored trial by trial in Study 
Two, with a view to constructing a picture of how conceptual changes occurred in a 
higher temporal resolution. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Approaches to studying conceptual development 
Conceptualizing is a salient feature of the human mind and is closely related to 
the intelligent behaviours of humans. It is hard to imagine what would happen to 
human mental life if conceptual functioning ceased to work. With concepts, human 
beings are not only passive recipients of sensory experiences initiated by the 
environment, but are also active agents who construct understanding and hypotheses 
about the outside world. By using their conceptual functions, human beings can build 
a large body of knowledge, which enables them to live a life that is better than that of 
other animals. 
In modem psychology, finding answers to the question of how concepts develop 
has been approached in various ways. The most traditional approach involves the 
rivalry between nativism (e.g., Fodor, 1975) and empiricism (e.g., Jackendoff, 1989), 
and debates whether conceptual knowledge is entirely innately specified, or is the 
result of interaction with the environment through the senses. Another approach is to 
ask whether human cognitive development is domain specific (e.g., Chomsky, 1980; 
Fodor, 1975) or domain general (e.g., Piaget, 1955). Some researchers ask whether 
children are universal novices, because if children become expert in a particular field, 
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like chess, their performance is similar to that of an adult. The question posed by this 
approach is whether development is the same as the development of expertise. 
Recently, the role of theories in conceptual development has attracted many 
researchers' attention (Carey, 1991; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). 
In this thesis, the RR model was used to understand how conceptual 
development occurs because this model tries to approach conceptual development in 
another way, by considering the explicit-implicit dimension. 
In cognitive psychology, there are several subfields related to implicitness. 
Reber (1967) discovered that if participants were required to remember lists of 
symbol strings that were generated by finite-state grammar, participants gradually 
acquired the grammatical rules, even though they were not informed of the existence 
of those rules. The participants acquired the rules incidentally and could not report 
the exact content of the rules. But the participants could remember novel 
grammatical strings better than ungrammatical strings, and when they classified 
strings as grammatical or ungrammatical their performance was above chance. 
Dienes, Altmarm, Kwan, and Goode (1995) required participants to perform a 
secondary task (random number generation) while they were judging whether the 
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stimuli were grammatical. It was found that responses that were judged by 
participants themselves as "guessing" were unimpaired, but knowledge associated 
with confident responses was impaired. This showed that implicit knowledge, which 
is unavailable to conscious access and represents itself as "guess," is qualitatively 
different from explicit knowledge. 
In the literature on memory, there is also a distinction between explicit memory 
and implicit memory (Schacter, 1999). The explicit form, or declarative memory, 
includes memory for facts and events; the implicit form, or nondeclarative memory, 
includes memory for skills and habits, priming, simple classical conditioning, and 
nonassociative learning (Squire, 1994). Declarative memory depends on brain 
structures and connections in the medial temporal lobe and the diecephalon. Damage 
to these structures results in amnesia related to the failure of declarative memory. 
However, nondeclarative memory is still normal in these patients. How this 
distinction of memory can be related to conceptual development will be further 
discussed in a later section of this thesis. 
Implicit knowledge is also found in developmental literature. Clements and 
Pemer (1994) investigated children's theory of mind using a false belief task. 
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Children were told a story about a protagonist who hid something in one location. 
After the protagonist left the room, the hidden object was moved to a new location 
and the protagonist did not know about this change. Children were asked where the 
protagonist would look for the object. Clements and Pemer found that before 
providing a verbal answer, children aged 2 years 5 months to 2 years 10 months 
looked at the new location of the object. Children aged 2 years 11 months to 
4 years 5 months looked at the empty location where the protagonist thought the 
object should be. However, within this group, only 45% of them could give a correct 
verbal answer. This showed that implicit knowledge may exist without children's 
awareness, so children's verbal reports may not be an accurate indicator of the 
conceptual knowledge they possess. Implicit knowledge exhibited in this experiment 
may be the precursor of correct explicit knowledge about a false belief. 
Gestures can reveal implicit knowledge possessed by children. Alibali and 
Meadow (1993) asked children to solve addition or addition-plus-multiplication 
problems and to explain how they solved each problem. Children's verbal 
explanations were often accompanied by gestures. Alibali and Meadow identified six 
types of procedures and the corresponding gestures. They found children often 
conveyed one procedure in a verbal explanation and another procedure by gestures at 
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the same time; these children were classified as "discordant." Alibali and Meadow 
believed that the discordant state is transitional, because it predicts receptivity to 
instruction, and such a discordant state is both preceded and followed by a 
concordant state. 
The empirical findings indicate that trying to understand conceptual 
development from the explicit-implicit representation seems to be a fruitful 
approach. 
2.1.1 Direction of development and its implications for the study of conceptual 
development 
If implicit and explicit representations of knowledge are different, their first 
occurrence may be different in the process of development. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
said the following: 
Development and learning, then, seem to take two complementary directions. 
On the one hand, they involve the gradual process of proceduralization (that is, 
rendering behavior more automatic and less accessible). On the other hand, 
they involve a process of "explicitation" and increasing accessibility (that is, 
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representing explicitly information that is implicit in the procedural 
representations sustaining the structure of behavior), (p. 17) 
2.1,1.1 Top-down: The Adaptive Control of Thought model (The ACT model) 
The top-down direction of development, that is, the process of knowledge 
represented in the explicit level guiding the development of the implicit level, can be 
explained by the ACT production model of skill acquisition (Adaptive Control of 
Thoughts; Anderson, 1982). This model proposes that the acquisition of cognitive 
skills involves two stages: the declarative stage and the procedural stage. In the 
declarative stage, people learn and memorize declarative knowledge about the 
specific domain that can be consciously recalled. During this stage, the execution is 
slow and resource demanding. Because declarative information needs to be retrieved 
from long-term memory, interpretation is required to turn declarative knowledge into 
an operation. This can place a heavy burden on the working memory. Anderson 
(1982) studied participants' performance in learning new geometry postulates and 
applying them to solve geometric problems. He found that, at the beginning, most of 
the participants' errors and their lack of speed could be attributed to the limitations of 
working memory. 
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The second stage of acquisition is called the procedural stage. Procedures are 
built to perform specific tasks, so that less time and working memory is required. 
Anderson (1982) observed that after solving four similar geometric problems, the 
protocol of a participant showed a qualitative change in the concepts involved. Since 
there was no verbal rehearsal of the statements of the postulate when solving the 
problem, this was evidence of reducing dependence on declarative knowledge. Also, 
a number of working-memory failures in the first protocol disappeared this time. 
Furthermore, in the first protocol, the application of the postulate was piecemeal, 
because the participant needed to identify and process every element in the postulate. 
But the postulate seemed to be matched in a single step this time. The process of 
declarative knowledge turning into procedures is called compilation, which can be 
subdivided into two stages: composition and proceduralization. Composition 
involves collapsing a sequence of productions into a single production, and 
proceduralization involves embedding factual knowledge into productions. When 
proceduralized, tasks can be performed efficiently and automatically, the procedure 
itself becomes encapsulated, and the intermediate steps of the task become 
unavailable to conscious access. 
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2.LL2 Bottom-up: The Representational Redescription model (The RR model) 
The bottom-up direction of development, that is, turning knowledge embedded 
in an implicit level into explicit conceptual knowledge, can be explained by 
Karmilofif-Smith's RR model (1986, 1992). Karmiloff-Smith suggested that there are 
at least four levels of knowledge: Implicit (I), Explicit-1 (El), Explicit-2 (E2), and 
Explicit-3 (E3). Knowledge of level-I is encoded in a procedural form and the 
content is sequentially specified. Since level-I knowledge is bracketed, it is available 
to other operators only as a whole and its individual components cannot be singled 
out for sharing with other procedures. Therefore, new knowledge is not integrated 
with existing level-I knowledge; rather, these knowledge types are stored separately. 
Intra-domain or inter-domain representational links cannot be established for this 
kind of implicit knowledge representation, so knowledge represented at this level is 
relatively inflexible. 
Knowledge represented at level-El is not bracketed, so it can be available for 
potential intra-domain and inter-domain representation links, and is relatively more 
flexible than knowledge represented in level-I. However, an El representation is not 
necessarily available to conscious access and verbal reports. Level-El is generated 
by the representation redescription of level-I representation. Redescriptions are 
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abstractions in higher level language, which enable higher level functions, like 
understanding the analogical relation between a zebra and a zebra crossing, but this 
is achieved at the expense of losing the detail of procedurally encoded information. 
Knowledge represented at level-E2 is available to conscious access, but not to 
verbal reports. For level-E3, knowledge is represented in a cross-system code, which 
can be easily translated into natural language. Karmiloff-Smith believed conceptual 
knowledge represented in linguistic form, like knowledge printed in books, is 
directly stored in E3 in the process of learning. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1986, 1992) insisted that behavioural mastery is not the end 
of development. She proposed that there are three phases of development that would 
occur iteratively in the development of each subdomain. In phase 1, learning is data 
driven and a new representation is stored as an adjunct to existing representations. 
This phase aims at reaching behavioural mastery. In phase 2, system-internal 
dynamics take over, and external data are temporarily disregarded, which may lead to 
a decline in performance. In phase 3, internal and external representations are 
reconciled, leading to improved performance. Unlike the stage model in which a 
21 
child can only be in one stage at a time, the RR model allows a child to be 
simultaneously in phase 1 in one subdomain and in phase 3 in another subdomain. 
A review of development (or psychological processes) from the top-down and 
the bottom-up directions provokes us to think about the study of conceptual 
development, and, in particular, about the values of the bottom-up direction as 
postulated by the RR model. 
In the following section, I will continue to review the RR model in detail. 
22 
2.2 The Representational Redescription model 
In this section, I will review the theoretical development of the Representational 
Redescription (RR) model, followed by a focused discussion of Karmiloff-Smith's 
(1992) book Beyond Modularity. I will first review Karmiloff-Smith's general view 
about human cognitive development, and then discuss the role of the RR model in 
development with respect to the domains of physics and mathematics. Finally, I will 
discuss an important concept in the RR model, namely "development beyond 
behavioural mastery." 
2.2.1 Theoretical development of the RR model 
The RR model was first proposed in a paper by Karmiloff-Smith (1986). The 
paper outlined three phases of development, and introduced four different levels of 
development along the explicit-implicit dimension (i.e., I, El, E2, and E3; see 
section 2.1.1.2). The data that provided support for the RR model in that paper came 
from the linguistic domain. In her book. Beyond Modularity, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
discussed how the RR model can be used in other domains like physics, mathematics, 
theory of mind, and notation. When applying her model to different developmental 
data in the book, she did not distinguish between level-E2 and level-E3, and called 
them collectively E2/3, because she said there was no direct evidence to prove the 
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existence of E2, but she stressed that she was open to the possibility of consciously 
accessible spatial, kinaesthetic, and other non-linguistically-encoded representation. 
She also loosened the sequential constraints of the implicit level in the domain of 
drawing in response to the findings of other researchers. 
The RR model proposed by Karmiloff-Smith (1986, 1992) was an attempt to 
explain the emergence of conscious access to knowledge, and to understand how 
representation becomes more manipulable and flexible. The core of the RR model is 
the representational redescription process. Karmiloff-Smith (1992, p. 18) explained 
that the "representational redescription process is a process by which implicit 
information in the mind subsequently becomes explicit knowledge to the mind.” 
2.2.2 The RR model in Beyond Modularity 
Often when other researchers mention the RR model, only the three phases of 
development and the different levels of explicitness are discussed. In the book 
Beyond Modularity, the RR model is not merely a theoretical tool for understanding 
development along the explicit-implicit dimension, but it is also the third way out of 
the dichotomy, which is generated by understanding development as completely 
domain-specific or completely domain-general. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) saw the 
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nativist view and Piaget's constmctivist view as not necessarily incompatible. She 
believed that infants are bom with domain-specific constraints that can either be 
detailed specifications or nonspecific, like attention bias or skeletal outline. Whether 
the constraints are specific or nonspecific depends on the domain. These constraints 
enable learning to take place by trimming down the number of possible hypotheses, 
because infants must process a tremendous amount of information. For nonspecific 
constraints to develop into knowledge, inputs from the physical environment or the 
sociocultural environment are essential. These inputs interact with inborn constraints, 
and structure the mind of infants and children. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) suggested that development involves two directions. 
One direction is gradual modularization; a process in which knowledge becomes 
more encapsulated and less accessible to other systems. The other direction is 
redescription; a process in which knowledge becomes progressively more accessible. 
She saw the representation redescription process as a bridge between implicit inborn 
constraints and explicit theories that can be consciously constructed, tested, modified, 
and explained. 
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In the following sections, I will first review Karmiloff-Smith's argument as 
presented in Beyond Modularity, and then discuss how she applied her RR model to 
the domains of physics and mathematics, because these two domains are the ones 
most closely related to conceptual development. 
2.2.2.7 The role of representational redescription in development: The physics 
domain 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) quoted Spelke's (1990) studies to illustrate that very 
early in their lives, infants possess the principles of perceptual processing, like 
boimdedness, cohesion, rigidity, and no action at a distance. This knowledge appears 
much earlier than Piaget suggested, but infants do not have all of the knowledge from 
the outset. For example, Spelke, Breinlinger, Cacomber, and Jacobson (1992) found 
that 6-month-old infants showed surprise when they saw a situation in which the law 
of gravity was violated, but 4-month-old infants did not show any surprise. 
Karmiloff-Smith agreed that infants possess a rich, coherent, and stable 
representation of these principles, but she denied that very young infants have 
theories. Theories are represented at level-El or higher. The principles possessed by 
infants are implicit and cannot be used for purposes other than the fixed input-output 
relation. She named this kind of implicit representation as level-I representation, and 
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suggested that it exists in the form of procedures for responding to environmental 
stimuli. To transform implicit representations into explicit linguistically coded theory, 
representation redescription is required. She provided three reasons to support the 
idea that a representational redescription process is necessary: while 4-month-old 
infants show surprise when seeing one object pass through another, 2-year-old 
children fail to give an explicit response other than a habituation response. Secondly, 
children's explicit theories usually strongly resemble constraints that control earlier 
behaviour. Third, there are examples of theory-in-actionchildren's behaviours 
demonstrate that they possess a particular theory, but they cannot encode that 
linguistically and they may even not be aware of that theory. However, their 
persistent behavioural tendency proves the existence of an implicit theory. 
Karmiloff-Smith used the following example to explain her last two reasons. 
Baillargeon and Hanko-Summers (1990) found that 7- to 9-month-old infants looked 
at a symmetrical object for significantly longer when the object exhibited an 
impossible support relation (upper right of Figure 2.1), but they were not surprised 
when asymmetrical objects exhibited an impossible support relation. 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974-75) studied how 4- to 9-year-old children tried 
to balance blocks on a narrow support (Figure 2.2). They found that the 6 year olds 
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stubbornly tried to balance all of the stimuli blocks at the geometric centre, 
regardless of whether the blocks were evenly weighted or not. This demonstrated 
their implicit geometric-centre theorya l l objects should be balanced symmetrically 
along their length. The theory is called implicit because the 6-year-old children could 
not verbally report this belief. Moreover, this geometric-centre theory resembles that 
of the 7- to 9-month-old infants, in the sense that the minds of both the children and 
the infants are constrained by symmetry, as shown in their responses. 
f^— r 
Fig. 2.1 Possible and impossible support relations (From Baillargeon & Kanko-Summener, 1990) 
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I « » A « f: i J t ^ 
Fig. 2.2 Stimuli for the block-balancing task (From Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p. 85) 
To summarize, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) used findings in the physics domain to 
demonstrate that infants possess rich knowledge, but the knowledge is represented in 
an implicit form. Representational redescription is required to develop explicit 
theories bases on implicit knowledge. 
2.2.2.2 The role of representational redescription in development: The domain of 
mathematics 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) quoted Antell and Keating (1983) to point out that even 
neonates can detect number difference. She agreed that some of the constraints on 
counting may be inborn. Gelman and Gallistel (1978) identified the following 
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constraints on counting: one-to-one correspondence, stable ordering, item 
indifference, order indifference, and cardinality. Karmiloff-Smith believed that 
one-to-one correspondence may be operative in a neonate's and young infant's 
discrimination of arrays; although toddlers make mistakes in counting, they rarely 
violate the one-to-one correspondence constraint. However, Karmiloff-Smith 
disagreed with Gelman and Gallistel that the principal of cardinality is innately 
specified. She quoted Gelman and Meck's (1986) study, which showed that when 2 
year olds were asked to give the cardinal value of a set, they correctly counted and 
repeated the last number. However, even though the same set of objects was used for 
every trial, the 2 year olds recounted on every new trial. Karmiloff-Smith attributed 
this to the reason that knowledge embedded in the counting procedure is not 
manipulated as separate components by the children, so they must reenact the whole 
procedure in every trial. She believed that the counting procedure itself does not 
equate to understanding cardinality because implicit principles that are embedded in 
procedures are not directly available to children. But with stable procedural 
representation accompanied by behavioural mastery, representation redescription can 
take place. Knowledge embedded in the procedure can be abstracted, redescribed, 
and represented in another format that is different from the procedural encoding. The 
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implicit cardinality principle embedded in the counting procedure can be converted 
into explicit knowledge. 
To summarize, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) used findings in the domain of 
mathematics to demonstrate how representation redescription could turn implicit 
knowledge that is embedded in procedural representation into explicit knowledge, 
and how procedural representation in the brain could act as an internal source of 
concepts. 
2.2,2.3 Important concept of the RR model: Development beyond behavioural 
mastery 
In developmental research, usually researchers are contented when they see the 
behavioural results of children reach peak performance for a particular task, and this 
point marks the end of the research because there is no more development to study. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) insisted that behavioural mastery is not the end of 
development, it is only the end of phase 1 development, which is primarily data 
driven and makes alterations in response to negative feedback. In phase 1, the object 
of the analysis is the external environment and the aim is to build up an internal 
representation of the external environment in order to achieve behavioural mastery. 
31 
In phase 2, the object for the analysis is internal representation and the aim is to 
disembed the knowledge that is implicit in procedures that are stored in the mind. A 
temporary drop in performance is very often caused by awareness of information that 
is already embedded in procedures that have been carried out successfully. This 
awareness may lead to overemphasis on that information, but this overemphasis is 
corrected in phase 3. Therefore, a U-shape may be found in the overall trend of 
development. 
For example, in the notation domain, Karmiloff-Smith (1979a) designed a 
map-drawing task for children. Participants needed to invent notation for recording 
the correct route between two places. Along the route, there were many bifurcations, 
and the participants needed to record which branch was the correct one. 
U . . . . . V ： . v J 
Fig. 2.3 Change of notation (From Karmiloff-Smith 1992, p. 153) 
The microdevelopmental changes of participants showed that development did 
not stop at behavioural mastery. After the children had used a form of notation that 
was sufficient for recording the route information, they suddenly introduced 
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redundant information to their notation. As shown in Figure 2.3, one of the 
participants added an arrow, and another added "yes" and "no," but such additions do 
not convey any additional information. This kind of change was not found in the first 
six records of bifurcations, so Karmiloff-Smith believed that it meant behavioural 
success, and the stable representation behind the behavioural success was the 
prerequisite for such a change. After a few trials, participants discarded the redundant 
information and returned to their original, more economic notation. 
Girl doirs playroom Boy doll's playroom 
春 S 
藥 X 
X' x» X' X* 
Child s e m i x l h e f # 
Fig. 2.4 The experimental context for the article task (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, p. 56) 
In the linguistic domain, Karmiloff-Smith (1979b) investigated the development 
of the article system in children who spoke French. In French, the indefinite article 
"im" (or feminine counterpart "ime") has two different meanings: it can act as an 
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indefinite reference like the English "a," and it can have a numerical function like the 
English "one." In the experimental context illustrated in Figure 2.4, there are several 
Y (cars) in the girl doll's room, but there is only one Y in the boy doll's room. When 
the experimenter said, "Lend me the car," the participant could infer from the article 
"the" that the experimenter was talking about the boy doll's car, since there was only 
one car in that room. If the experimenter said, "Lend me a car," the participant could 
infer from "a" that the experimenter is talking about the girl doll's car, because there 
were several cars in that room. It was found that at age 3 years, children are able to 
understand the difference in meaning between the definite and the indefinite article. 
In other words, they had reached behavioural mastery. However, around the age of 5 
or 6 years, children regress behaviourally and in the study, they responded to the 
indefinite version of the statement by picking up the car from the doll who only had 
one car. Karmiloff-Smith interpreted this as a development of representation because 
the child interpreted the statement as “lend me one car" instead of "lend me a car." 
The child is now aware of both the indefinite function and the numeral function of 
the word "im." 
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2.2.3 Remarks on the RR model and the representational redescription process 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) stated that only the representation redescription process 
is the core of the RR model. It was possible that there may be more or fewer levels 
than she originally suggested, or the relationship between her four levels is not as she 
originally thought, she indicated that the RR process was not challenged by these 
modifications. Although the need for behavioural mastery or the three recurrent 
phases of development can be modified or refuted, the validity of the RR process is 
not necessarily affected. Karmiloff-Smith pointed out that the RR model only loses 
its plausibility when empirical data show that the representation redescription 
process does not exist. 
After considering Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) clarification, I propose that the 
following three terms should be treated as different conceptual entities in the present 
study: Representational Redescription process, Representational Redescription model, 
and Representational Redescription theory. The representational redescription 
process is the process of creating a new level of representation based on the original 
representation. The RR model is the model built with the representation redescription 
process as the core, supplemented by the four hierarchical levels of representation, 
three phases of development, and the concept of development beyond behavioural 
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mastery. The representational redescription theory is a hypothesis about human 
cognitive development which proposes that human cognitive ability originates from 
domain-specific constraints, and development requires interaction between 
environmental inputs and innate constraints. The representational redescription 
process involves development by creating a more explicit representation of the 
originally implicit knowledge, so as to enable another conceptual development 
process, like explicit theory testing, which involves both graduated modularization 
and demodularization processes. 
2.2.4 Remarks on the meaning of the top-down and bottom-up directions of 
development 
The terms "top-down" and "bottom-up" are commonly used in the literature of 
psychology. Generally speaking, "top-down" implies a process that is guided by 
more abstract, explicit, conceptual, and generalized content. "Bottom-up" usually 
implies a process that is guided by more concrete, implicit, perceptual, and local 
features. Bottom-up can also mean the process of generalization from instances, and 
top-down means the application of a general rule (Shiu & Sin, 2005). 
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In this thesis, the terms "top-down" and "bottom-up" are used to indicate the 
developmental directions along the explicit-implicit dimension. Applying these 
directions to the RR model, top-down or bottom-up development implies 
interrepresentational development. Top-down development refers to the development 
that starts from a more explicit level of representation, and results in the formation of 
a less explicit representation. Conversely, bottom-up development starts from a more 
implicit level of representation, and results in a less implicit level of representation. 
In the following sections, I will review the empirical evidence for the RR 
model. 
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2.3 Empirical evidence related to the RR model in the linguistic domain 
2.3.1 Support for the explicit-implicit distinction 
Paradis (2004) proposed that there are two types of linguistic processes: one is 
explicit, consciously controlled, and requires effort; and the other is automatic, 
uncontrolled, and effortless. When one leams and applies explicit rules of language, 
like pedagogical grammars or various types of theoretical grammars, these kinds of 
processes rely on declarative knowledge and require conscious effort. With practice, 
learners become more fluent and proficient. However, this improvement is not the 
result of processing the explicit rules faster; instead, the conscious process is 
replaced by an automatic, procedural, and implicit computational mechanism. The 
process of learning explicit linguistic rules and the acquisition of implicit 
computational mechanisms are different processes. An explicit rule remains explicit 
and can be recalled like any other information stored in declarative memory, unless it 
is forgotten. Implicit computation is not automatization of an explicit rule; explicit 
knowledge does not evolve or change into implicit linguistic competence. No matter 
how the performance of the speaker resembles an explicit rule, the explicit rule 
remains an abstraction based on the outcome of language processing, and is not a 
correct descriptions of actual cerebral computational procedures. Explicit knowledge 
of language and linguistic competence rely on different memory systems that have 
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separate, anatomically distinct, neural substrates. The function of explicit knowledge 
is to guide attention, and to provide a model for monitoring and judging the quality 
of automatically generated structures during practice. 
People with genetic dysphasia leam their native language by learning explicit 
rules (Paradis & Gopnik, 1997). Normal 3-year-old children can automatically and 
unreflectively generate the plural of a nonword, like changing "wug" to "wugs." 
People with genetic dysphasia cannot do this at age 13 years, nor at age 43 years, nor 
at age 63 years, because they do not possess a generalized mechanism for processing 
plural forms. They leam plural forms as individual words and the plural forms are 
stored in their lexicon in the same way as nonimpaired speakers store irregular or 
idiosyncratic plurals. 
Paradis (2004) pointed out that Alzheimer's disease damages explicit memory. 
He quoted a finding by Meguor et al. (2003) that Japanese-Portuguese bilingual 
patients who had Alzheimer's disease experienced greater difficulty with kanji in 
Japanese and with irregularly spelt words in Portuguese. Paradis (2004) explained 
this by the difference in the ability of the patients to leam words and to acquire 
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syntax; most experimental primates have been able to leam an impressive number of 
words, but the best of them have been able to master only a very rudimentary syntax. 
Further evidence that proves the dissociation between explicit and implicit 
language processing comes from people who have semantic dementia, which causes 
the explicit memory for word meaning to be impaired. These people have poor 
comprehension ability, perform poorly on the naming task, and often make semantic 
errors. However, their ability to process syntax is preserved. They can speak and 
write fluently, but commit regularization errors, such as their pronunciation of "have" 
rhymes with "gave," and words with irregular spelling and sound correspondence are 
regularized, such as spelling "caught" as "cort" (Snowden, Neary, & Mann, 1996). 
2.3.2 Spelling development 
Nunes, Bryant, and Bindman (1997) investigated children's development in 
spelling past tense verbs, in a longitudinal study over 3 years that included 363 
children from three grade levels (Grades 2, 3, and 4). They found that children's 
development can be divided into five stages. In Stage 1, children have not yet 
established a stable letter-sound correspondence so they generate unsystematic 
spelling of word endings. In Stage 2, they begin to frequently transcribe word 
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endings related to past tense; however, the ending is not necessarily spelt as "ed," for 
example, "kissed" may be spelled as "kist." In Stage 3，children begin to produce the 
“ed’，spelling; however, they are insensitive to the meaning of "ed." Thus, they 
overgeneralize "ed" to nonverbs and they also use “ed” for irregular verbs. In Stage 4, 
children no longer overgeneralize "ed" to nonverbs, but they still use "ed" for 
irregular verbs. In Stage 5, children finally master the use of "ed" and use it only for 
regular verbs. This developmental trend resembles the overgeneralization of the 
block-balancing task, in which children developed an implicit geometric-centre 
theory for block-balancing (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974/1975). 
Steffler (2001) argued that the RR model can be used as a framework that 
provides better understanding of the development of the ability to spell. Critten, Pine, 
and Steffler (2007) tried to apply the RR model to study spelling of past tense words. 
They asked children to spell words and to judge whether stimuli words were 
correctly spelled. They found that a group of children failed to provide an 
explanation for their answers, and their responses included statements such as, “I 
don't know," or “It looks right." They could not make use of their own level-I 
representation, which would have helped them to make a judgment, to spell words, 
and to provide a verbal explanation. This agrees with previous neuronal data that 
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suggests that such processing is supported by an implicit process, and also agrees 
with the RR model's prediction that level-I representation must go through the 
representational redescription process before being available to conscious access and 
verbal reports. 
4 2 
2.4 Empirical evidence related to the RR model in the field of strategy 
development 
2.4.1 Siegler's research on strategy: behavioural changes precede insights 
Siegler and Jenkins (1989) provided evidence that conceptual change does not 
necessarily come from conscious inference, or by revising an explicitly represented 
hypothesis. Processes that are unreachable for consciousness also play an important 
part in conceptual change. Siegler and Jenkins investigated changes in children's 
strategy for addition; the focus of study was on how children change from using 
"sum strategy" to "min strategy." For example, to calculate 3+5, children using sum 
strategy put up three fingers first, then put up five fingers, and finally counted from 
one, saying ‘‘1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8" to obtain the answer. If the min strategy was used, 
the child counted from the larger addend, regardless of its position in the question. 
So, the child said "5, 6, 7, 8” or “6, 7, 8,” perhaps simultaneously putting up one 
finger on each count beyond 5. Siegler and Jenkins adopted a microgenetic approach 
to create a high-resolution picture of how changes occurred. Children were invited to 
explain their method of obtaining the answer after each question. It was found that 
children's insights about the better strategy that they had just used fell along a 
continuum. 
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Siegler and Jenkins classified the children's explanation into two categories. 
Children who counted unambiguously from the larger addend and accurately 
described their way of doing it were classified as meeting the strict criterion. For 
those counting from the larger addend but who were unable to explain what they did, 
or those who used an approach that combined the characteristics of the min strategy 
with other strategies were classified as meeting the loose criterion. Many children 
failed to acknowledge their change in strategy, and even after the new strategy had 
been used several times, they could not provide an explanation for that strategy. For 
example, here is the protocol of one of the participants, Whitney, when she first 
discovered the min strategy: 
E: How much is 4 + 3? 
W: (mumble) 6, 7,1 think it's 7. 
E: Seven, OK, how did you know that? 
W: Because I'm smart and I just knew it. 
E: Can you tell me, I heard you counting. I heard you. Tell me how you 
counted. 
W: I just~I didn't count anything ... I just added numbers onto it. 
E: Can you tell me how you added numbers? 
4 4 
W: No. 
E: Come on Whitneycome on, we have to do this, OK? 
W: OK, 3, add one makes 4, add one more makes 5, add one more makes 6, 
add one more makes 7, add one more makes 8. 
E: Wait, but how did you know what 4 + 3 was? 
W: Cause I did what I just showed you. I just used my mouth to figure it out. 
(Siegler & Jenkins, 1989, p. 86-87) 
Siegler and Jenkins explained that although Whitney said she counted from 3, 
the videotape showed Whitney's initial mumbled sound was clearly a single word, 
and sounded most like 5. In later trials when her counting could be heard clearly, 
Whitney consistently counted from the larger addend, but she often denied she had 
counted. Another participant explained to the experimenter that the answer "just 
popped into my head" and in two of three trials she used min strategy. 
If an improvement of strategy resulted from conscious inference, insights should 
not fall along a continuum, and changes in later use of a strategy should be clear cut, 
because once a better strategy is discovered, the better strategy should be used in the 
rest of the test. In the studies, most of the children fell back to an inefficient strategy 
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after initial discovery of an efficient strategy. Siegler and Jenkins found that the 
explicitness of the explanation predicts subsequent generalization of the strategy to 
other problems. 
Another discovery of the study is that there is a bridging strategy called a 
"short-cut sum" between "sum strategy" and "min strategy." When using this 
strategy to calculate "3 + 5," children say “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8" and may put up one 
finger on each count. To change from the sum strategy to the short-cut sum strategy, 
one discovery is needed: the numerical value of the addend is equal to the number 
itself. This knowledge is embedded in the procedure of sum strategy. Throughout the 
experiment, there was no direct instruction about this knowledge. Therefore, the 
representational redescription process should have taken place to disembed this 
information and contributed to the development. 
2.4.2 Dixon's research of the representational redescription process 
Another line of research conducted by Dixon (Dixon & Bangert, 2002; Dixon & 
Dohn, 2003; Dixon & Kelley, 2007) focused on the role of redescription in the 
process of representational change. It should be noted that the meaning of 
"redescription" in Dixon's papers had a slightly different meaning when compared to 
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Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and this thesis. Dixon's line of research mainly focused on 
one of the functions of redescription: to disembed knowledge from procedures. The 
other meaning of redescription, the process of a concept developing from one 
representation level to another level, was excluded. This difference was explained in 
the following footnote in Dixon & Bangert (2002, p. 919): "As Karmiloff-Smith 
noted [1992, p. 23], the appropriateness of the hierarchical model and the process of 
representational redescription are separate issues. The current article focuses on the 
process of representational change." Dixon's meaning of "representational change" 
refers to addition to or change in conceptual content rather than a change at the level 
of representation. 
Dixon and Bangert (2002) studied whether theory revision or the 
representational redescription process is responsible for a representational change 
and they found that both methods contribute to representational change. They used 
the gear-system task to investigate the problem. Figure 2.5 illustrates an example of 
the question used in the gear task. The gear with a single arrow on it is the driving 
gear that provides the force to move all the other gears in the system. The gear with a 
shelf holding a small pile of coal is the fuel gear. Participants needed to decide 
whether the fiiel gear would turn clockwise or counter-clockwise, and to place the 
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train that needs coal on the appropriate side. 
Small, Open 
Fig. 2.5 Example of the gear problem 
(Dixon Bangert, 2002, p. 920) 
One way to solve the problem is to simulate the movement of the gears, tracing 
how the force transfers from gear to gear. This strategy is called the "Figure 8" 
strategy because the path results from the force tracing movement resembles the line 
that is drawn for a figure of eight. A more advanced strategy is to represent the gear 
system as an alternating sequence, in which a clockwise gear is followed by a 
counter-clockwise gear, and no simulation is need. This strategy is known as the 
left-right (LR) strategy. The knowledge of the alternating sequence is embedded in 
the "Figure 8" strategy, because "clockwise, counter-clockwise" is repeated in the 
procedure of tracing the movement. Therefore, the LR strategy can be acquired by 
the representational redescription process from the "Figure 8" strategy. The 
alternating sequence can be abstracted further. If the total number of gears is even, 
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the final gear turns the same direction as a driving gear, and, if the number of gears is 
odd, the final gear goes in the opposite direction. This strategy is called the "counting 
parity" strategy. Dixon and Bangert constructed a model using the five immediate 
trials before the discovery of the LR strategy, and they found that the probability of 
discovering the LR strategy is significantly predicted by an increase of accuracy in 
recent trials. This agrees with the prediction based on the RR model that positive 
feedback is important for development beyond behavioural mastery. On the other 
hand, although theory revision predicts representational change when current 
representation produces error, it is not responsible for discovering the LR strategy. 
However, Dixon & Bangert found that low accuracy preceded the discovery of the 
"Figure 8" strategy. Therefore, Dixon & Bangert believed that the representational 
redescription process and theory revision play a different role in representational 
change. Dixon and Kelley (2007) hypothesized that theory revision is responsible for 
the search for the best relational structure in a child's repertoire that minimizes errors. 
The representational redescription process detects regularities in the interaction 
between the external environment and the internal representation, then produces a 
new representation of the relational structure. This new relational structure is added 
to a child's repertoire of relational structures, which is then available for the creation 
of a hypothesis in future, and becomes a source for theory revision. 
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Dixon and Dohn (2003) compared the effect of transfer between two kinds of 
acquisition methods: knowledge that is disembedded using the representational 
redescription process, and knowledge that is obtained from direct instruction. They 
designed two structurally similar tasks, one is the "Balance Beam" task, and the other 
is the gear task mentioned before. Participants attempt the balance-beam task before 
they try the gear task. Figure 2.6 shows an example stimulus for the balance-beam 
task. Three balance beams are connected by flexible joints, which are represented as 
ovals in the figure. The arrow indicates the point where the beam would be pressed 
down, and participants were required to answer whether the right-most arm would 
move up or down. 
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Fig. 2.6 The balance beam task 
(Dixon iSc Dohn 2003, p. 1084) 
Dixon & Dohn identified three kinds of strategies for the task: force tracing, 
up-down, and counting parity. Participants who use the force tracing strategy 
simulate the movement of beams by moving their hand in a continuous sinusoidal 
motion. The up-down strategy assigns "up" and "down" labels to beams alternately, 
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so that the up beam is followed by the down beam, and the down beam is followed 
by the up beam. The process for the counting parity strategy is to count the number 
of beams, and to decide the answer depending on whether the total number of beams 
is an odd or an even number. The force tracing strategy is the easiest strategy to 
acquire and most closely resembles the gear task situation. The knowledge about the 
up-down strategy is embedded in the force tracing strategy. Participants were divided 
into two groups; one group received no training, so they had to solve the problem by 
themselves. The other group received training about the up-down strategy. Dixon & 
Dohn predicted that the representational redescription process would produce a more 
abstract representation of the alternating sequence relationship, and thus would 
facilitate the use of the left-right strategy in the gear task. The results confirmed their 
prediction. In the gear task, the untrained group discovered the left-right strategy 
earlier than the trained group. Moreover, in the 10 trials that immediately followed 
the first discovery of the left-right strategy, the untrained group fell back to the 
"Figure 8" strategy less frequently than the trained participants. This showed that 
knowledge acquired by the representational redescription process is qualitatively 
different from that acquired by direct instruction. 
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2.5 Empirical evidence related to the RR model in the physics domain: 
The block-balancing problem 
2.5.1 The original experiment 
The block-balancing task, in which participants were requested to balance 
different kinds of blocks, was first introduced by Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 
(1974/1975). The stimuli that were used are illustrated in Figure 2.7. Among these 
stimuli, some of them balance at the geometric centre, and some of them do not. The 
experiment was divided into two phases. In phase I, the order of the blocks was not 
fixed, and the participants were free to choose which block they wanted to try first. 
About twelve months later, half of the participants in phase I were interviewed again. 
广 t [J Typg A � 
z , ^ > "Langth blocks" 
� IJ 二 9 ^ 
I ) 
Type C � 
‘ "Conspicuous weight 
^ ^ biocks" 
D ^^ 丁yp众 D 一 
广 lypLl 1 
* — J "Inconspicuous weight 
I nfqp J 
^ ^ Blocks of different 
‘ u w«ight for insarlion into F — 
• • •} J Typ« G (only ba(ancablc 
j by usmg counterweights) 
Fig. 2.7 Stimuli used in the Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder (1974/75, p. 197) experiment 
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Karmiloff-Smith (1992) used the results of this experiment to provide empirical 
support for the RR model. Four year olds were able to balance these blocks by using 
proprioceptive feedback. They placed the block on the metal support and, by trial and 
error, they could eventually balance the blocks. Karmiloff-Smith interpreted the 4 
year olds' performance as possessing knowledge at level-I. They failed to make use 
of the information that they had gained in previous successful trials. They did not 
pick a block that was identical to previous successful trials, and so they expressed no 
sign of an ability to use their successful experiences. Karmiloff-Smith observed that 
6-year-old children put every block, regardless of whether the block was symmetrical 
or asymmetrical, at the geometric centre. When an asymmetrical block fell, the 
children put the block at the geometric centre again, until they could no longer accept 
the failure and claimed that it was impossible to balance the block. Karmiloff-Smith 
interpreted this as a sign of El representation. The geometric-centre theory is a 
reduced redescribed representation, a common feature that holds for many situations. 
Children aged 8 or 9 years could balance both symmetrical and asymmetrical blocks 
and gave relevant explanations. Karmiloff-Smith interpreted that they possessed E2/3 
representation, which is an explicit knowledge about the geometric centre and a 
naive version of the law of torque. 
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This developmental sequence fits nicely with the three recurrent phases of 
development proposed by Karmiloff-Smith (1992). In phase 1, learning is data driven 
and new representations are stored as adjunctions. This phase aims at reaching 
behavioural mastery. In phase 2, system-internal dynamics takes over, and external 
data is temporarily disregarded, which may lead to a decline in performance. In 
phase 3, the internal and the external representations are reconciled, leading to 
improvement in performance. This U-shaped performance curve was reflected in the 
previously mentioned block-balancing task. 
To summarize, Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder's (1974/1975) experiment provides 
support to the RR model in the following ways: 
1. The 4 to 5 year olds treated each block as an individual problem and they did not 
use their successful experiences from previous trials. This is evidence for level-I 
performance, since each representation was added as an adjunction and no links 
were built between the new representation and the old representation. 
2. The 6 year olds had the implicit geometric-centre theory, which provides support 
for the existence of level-El. The geometric-centre theory also resembles an 
infant's ability to judge impossible balance relations. Infants showed surprise that 
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symmetrical objects showed an impossible balance relation, but they did not 
show any surprise about asymmetrical objects. 
3. The 8 to 9 year olds could verbalize explanations and balance both types of block, 
4 to 5 year olds could balance but cannot explain, and 6 year olds could not 
balance in certain cases. This U-shaped profile is predicted by the RR model. 
2.5.2 Later research 
When Krist, Horz, and Schonfeld (2005) reviewed the research that uses the 
block-balancing paradigm, which was after Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder (1974/75), 
Krist et al. (2005, p. 185) said that "To the best of our knowledge, there is only one 
line of such research: a series of studies conducted by Pine and Messer." My findings 
are similar, except that I found one more journal paper written by Messer without 
Pine (Messer, Joiner, Light, & Littleton，1998), and the experiment conducted by 
Krist et al.. I will first discuss the research that is most relevant to the issue of 
conceptual development in research conducted by Pine and Messer (Messer, Joiner, 
Light, & Littleton, 1998; Pine, Lufkin, & Messer, 2004; Pine & Messer, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2003). 
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When Messer, Joiner, Light, and Littleton (1998) studied the block-balancing 
task performance of 3- to 8-year-old children, they asked the children to balance 
eight blocks, half of which were symmetrical and half were asymmetrical. In Study 
One, they found that none of the children fulfilled their definition of Level I (the 
blocks were placed at the centre initially no more than twice, and eventually the child 
was able to balance at least six blocks). Messer et al. claimed that they could not 
provide a reason for this because the blocks used were very similar to those used by 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974/75). However, this is not true, Messer et al. did 
not use "invisible asymmetrical blocks" (Type E and F in Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder's (1974/75) study) and the Type B symmetrical block was not used. 
Different initial placements were made by 17% of the children, depending on 
the type of block, and Messer et al. classified these children as Level IV in their new 
seven-level scheme. 
In Study Two, Messer et al. (1998) introduced a paper-and-pencil version and a 
computer version of the balancing-block task. For the paper-and-pencil task, a block 
was drawn on paper and children were required to indicate where the fulcrum should 
be placed to balance the block. For the computer task, children were required to 
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move a cartoon character to the position that balanced the block. Feedback about 
success or failure was given and the children were allowed to attempt as many times 
as they liked. Messer et al. predicted that children would perform better in the 
physical version of the task because proprioceptive feedback could not be used in the 
other tasks. However, children appeared to perform better in the paper-and-pencil 
task, and this cannot be explained by the practice effect because the paper-and-pencil 
task was the first task that the children attempted. Of the children who were 
classified as Level II (initial central placement and failure to balance asymmetrical 
blocks) in the physical task, 29% were classified as Level IV in the paper-and-pencil 
task. Among the children classified at Level III in the block- balancing task (initial 
central placement and success in balancing both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
blocks), 55% of them performed at the same level in the paper-and-pencil task. 
Comparing with the computer task, among children classified as Level II in the 
physical task, 39% stayed at the same level in the computer task, and 29% of them 
performed at Level III in the computer task. 
Messer et al. (1998) explained superior performance of the computer task by the 
practice effect, because the computer task was attempted after the physical task. This 
reveals a design fault of the experiment, because participants always attempted the 
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paper-and-pencil task first, then the physical task, and attempted the computer task 
last- Since the aim of the experiment was to find out the performance difference 
between tasks, the task sequence should have been randomized among the 
participants to avoid practice effect. For the superior performance of the 
paper-and-pencil task, Messer et al. explained that placing the fulcrum under the 
block may reduce the salience of symmetry. I have concerns about their explanation, 
because it is difficult to understand why placing the fulcrum under the block may 
reduce the salience of symmetry, and how this reduction in salience of symmetry can 
affect performance. I suggest that the paper-and-pencil task and the computer task 
were superior to the physical task because the two tasks required the children to 
move the fulcrum but not the block. In Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder's (1974/1975) 
experiment, children were likely to attribute their failure to properties related to the 
blocks, rather than the point of balance that they attempted. Therefore, if children 
were required to move the fulcrum rather then the block, this may have the effect of 
sensitizing them to the critical point of the problem, helping them to avoid distracting 
information about the blocks. 
In both of the above experiments, a verbal explanation from children was not 
obtained. This is a serious deficit, because the RR model emphasizes development 
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beyond behavioural mastery and development along the explicit-implicit dimension. 
Just observing success or failure without understanding the children's belief about 
the task is not adequate, because such kind of observation neither validates nor 
falsifies the RR model. 
Pine and Messer (1999) used the same block-balancing paradigm and they 
asked the children for an explanation. They found that there were children who could 
fulfil their definition of Implicit level (balance at least 75% of both types of blocks, 
no systematic strategy about initial placement, and no verbal explanation), which 
contradicts Messer et al. (1998), because Messer et al. found no participant fitting 
their Level I definition. Pine and Messer (1999) mentioned that a typical child at this 
level, like Oliver (6 years 1 month), appeared to have no concept of balancing. When 
Oliver was asked for an explanation for his success in balancing an asymmetrical 
block, he replied, “I just put it on like that." 
Pine and Messer (1999) found that 45% of the children who were classified as 
El were able to explain their geometric-centre theory, by referring to placing blocks 
"in the middle" or having "both sides equal." It seems that Pine and Messer 
misinterpreted Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) levels of representation, the RR model is 
59 
not for classifying children's performance of a task, but is a framework for 
classifying representation. If geometric-centre theory can be consciously accessed 
and verbally reported by a child, then the representation of geometric-centre theory 
in that child should be classified as E3. In Study Two, Pine and Messer deleted 
level-E2 and inserted four new levels between level-I and level-E3; these are Implicit 
transition. Abstraction nonverbal, Abstraction verbal, and Explicit transition. 
Levels Definition 
Implicit transition Failed at least 3 of 4 attempts for each type of block, initial 
centre placement, no explanation nor relevant variables 
mentioned 
Abstraction nonverbal Only successful with symmetrical blocks, initial centre 
placement, no explanation nor relevant variables 
mentioned 
Abstraction verbal Only successful with symmetrical blocks, initial centre 
placement, explains centre strategy 
Explicit transition Success in 3 out of 4 attempts with both types of blocks, 
may have initial centre placement but rapid correction, 
explains strategy for balancing both types of blocks 
Table 2.1 New levels introduced by Pine & Messer, 1999 
In terms of classifying children's performance, these additional levels help to 
provide a clearer differentiation. However, these additions also further deviate from 
the original purpose of the classification system. These levels are not describing 
representation. Instead, they are describing children's block-balancing behaviour, 
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which certainly violates Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) original intention of creating a 
domain-general framework for classifying representation. The modified framework 
is entirely domain specific. 
In Study 2, using their modified framework. Pine and Messer (1999) found that 
the result of the British Picture Vocabulary Scale was not related to the level at which 
the children were classified, which means that successful verbalization of an 
explanation was not the result of more advanced language ability. Since their 
classification in this study so greatly modified the levels specified by 
Karmiloff-Smith's RR model, I have reservations about using this result to support 
using the RR model. 
Nevertheless, their finding that 6- to 7-year-old children were able to verbalize 
geometric-centre theory deserves attention. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) pointed out that 
the implicit geometric-centre theory is represented at the El level in 6 year olds, this 
implicit theory should be unreachable by consciousness and cannot be verbalized. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) also pointed out that the explicit form of geometric-centre 
theory should be possessed by 8- to 9-year-old children. If 6 year olds can verbalize 
the geometric-centre theory, then the geometric-centre theory in their mind is not 
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represented at level-El, but at level-E3. If the geometric-centre theory is immediately 
represented at level-E3 when it appears, then the block-balancing experiment does 
not provide empirical evidence for the existence of level-El representation. 
Unfortunately, more detailed information about the children's verbalization of 
geometric-centre theory cannot be found in the Pine and Messer (1999) experiment, 
such as, whether there is a developmental sequence within individuals, or whether 
children first possess implicit geometric-centre theory, and later develop it into E3 
representation. 
Pine and Messer (2003) studied children's conceptual development of block 
balancing over a 5-day period, for participants aged between the ages of 5 years 8 
months and 6 years 1 month. The experiment included a block-balancing task, a 
Predition task, and a period of free play time. They used the classification system 
introduced in Pine and Messer's study (1999), with an additional level, E4, which 
was defined as asymmetrical blocks being placed on or near the correct off-centre 
balance point. From the perspective of understanding conceptual development, this 
addition does not seem to be useful. Pine and Messer's E3 and E4 levels are both E3 
representation according to Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) model, because both of them 
could be accessed by consciousness and could be verbally reported. Moreover, from 
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the results of the experiment, the children who were placed at this level seemed to 
retrieve the answer from memory (the same stimuli were used repeatedly throughout 
the five days) rather than acquiring ftirther conceptual change, because all E4 
children reached this level on day 5, and the only difference between E3 and E4 was 
the initial placement position. 
Pine and Messer's (2003) framework helped to summarize the children's 
performance in the course of development. Of all the transitions within these five 
days, 80% were moving to a higher level, 8% stayed in the same level and 12% 
slipped back. Among 25 participants, 7 children were first classified as performing at 
the implicit level (can balance at least two asymmetrical blocks), then went through 
the Abstraction nonverbal level or the Abstraction Verbal level (both require 
balancing no more than one asymmetrical block). For the predition task, children 
were invited each day to place blocks that they thought could not be balanced into 
one group, and blocks that could be balanced into the other group. The results of the 
children's predictions at different levels of representation are shown in Figure 2.8. 
We can observe a U-shaped curve that shows best performance in the prediction test 
at two ends of the explicit-implicit spectrum, namely the implicit level, the level of 
explicit transition, level-E-3, and level-E-4. 
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Fig. 2.8 Children 's prediction of whether a certain block can be balanced (Pine iSc 
Messer 2003, p. 295) 
When observing verbalization of the geometric-centre theory, among 25 
children, 16 participants were classified as Abstraction verbal at least once. Among 
these 16 children, three of them were classified at this level on day 1. This suggested 
the possibility of the geometric-centre theory being available to conscious access and 
verbal reports earlier than Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974/75) suggested. 
However, it should be noted that in the experiment conducted by Pine and Messer 
(2003), the levels were assigned based on performance in the block-balancing task. 
The block-balancing task was preceded by the picture-story task and the Predition 
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task. In the picture-story task, participants were required to choose a picture that 
depicted a correct balance point. In the prediction task, participants were required to 
group blocks that could be balanced into one group and blocks that could not be 
balanced into another group. It may be the case that for the three participants who 
were classified as Abstraction verbal on day 1, their geometric-centre theory was 
implicit at the beginning of the experiment. After the practice provided by the two 
preceding tasks, the implicit geometric-centre theory became available to conscious 
in the block-balancing task. It is important to know whether geometric-centre theory 
is available to conscious access and verbal reports immediately after it exists, or 
whether the theory takes time to develop from unconscious theory-in-action into 
conscious theory. If the previous situation is true, then the block-balancing 
experiment does not provide evidence for the existence of El representation. If the 
later proposition is true, then the block-balancing experiment still provides good 
empirical support for El representation. 
Krist, Horz, and Schonfeld (2005) divided the evidence supporting the RR 
model into two groups. The evidence in the stronger group is concerned with 
development beyond behavioural mastery, especially the U-shaped curve. They 
believed that if the RR model was correct, then the following outcomes should be 
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found: the rate of success and relative frequency of correct adjustments should 
follow a U-shaped performance; and response time and frequency of initial midpoint 
placement of an asymmetrical block should follow an inverted U-shaped 
performance. They studied 4-, 5-, 6- and 8-year-old children. The children were 
asked to balance five blocks in the order A, B, C, D, E (shown in Figure 2.9) in two 
series of trials. No verbal explanation was required. The success scores showed a 
significant age effect, but no U-shaped curve was found. The age effect was not 
found in the Midpoint scores, which measure the number of trials in which a block 
was first placed at its geometric centre, but interaction between age and symmetry 
was significant. No U-shaped curve was found for the Midpoint score either. 
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Fig. 2.9 Stimuli used in the Krist et al (2005, p. 187) experiment 
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It seems that Krist et al.'s (2005) attempt at cancelling the block-balancing 
task's empirical support for the RR model is convincing, at first glance; however, it is 
not the case on closer inspection. Krist et al. argued that the RR model implies that 
the performance of children must exhibit a U-shaped curve in the course of 
development. They pushed this statement so far as to say that even response time and 
frequency of correct adjustments should follow a U-shaped pattern. They had totally 
mistaken what Karmiloff-Smith meant in her postulation about the U-shaped curve. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992, p. 20) said: "The temporary disregard for features of the 
external environment during phase 2 can lead to new errors and inflexibilities. This 
can, but does not necessarily [italics added], give rise to decrease in successful 
behavioura U-shaped performance curve." Karmiloff-Smith said herself that a 
U-shaped performance curve is not essential in the RR model, so Krist et al. 
misunderstood the role of a U-shaped curve in the RR model. 
Furthermore, Karmiloff-Smith (1992, p. 88) said the following: "It is also 
important to note that 6 year olds retain the level-I representations. Ask them to close 
their eyes and they can balance all the blocks easily." Karmiloff-Smith did not say 
that 6-year-old children cannot balance asymmetrical blocks. What she said is that 
the 6-year-old children were not aware of themselves being constrained by the 
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unconscious geometric-centre theory, therefore they failed to balance asymmetrical 
blocks when this problem was presented to them in a way that required use of 
conscious inference to solve the problem. The crucial point is how children develop 
their conception of the task, not whether they can behaviourally perform the task. 
Therefore, it is important to create an atmosphere that allows children to freely 
construct their own theory about balancing. If the experimental setting gives children 
an impression that they should be able to do it, the result would be affected. In the 
Krist et al. (2005) experiment, part of the instruction is as follows: "Please, try to put 
each block on this rod so that it will not fall down. I am not going to help you. If you 
can't do it the first time, that's not a problem. You can try it again if you want" (Krist 
et al., 2005, p. 187-188). When a child paused after having failed to balance a block, 
the child was encouraged to try again. If the pause was because the child thought the 
block could not be balanced, encouragement from the experimenter may have given 
the participant the impression that the block could be balanced. This setting clearly 
discouraged children to construct their own theory of balancing and instead they felt 
they should be able to balance all of the blocks. The experiment became a test for the 
children's behavioural ability, not exploration of conceptual change. It is not 
surprising that the U-shaped curve disappears. 
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Krist et al. criticized Pine and Messer (1999, 2003) for repeatedly asking 
children for an explanation and they argued as follows: 
"Children of this age tend to elaborate the geometric-center theory or a similar 
rule if they are induced to think about the question of why some blocks 
balance and some do not. Note that such a question is actually misleading 
because it erroneously presupposes that there are blocks which cannot be 
balanced." (Krist et al., 2005, p. 192) 
Therefore, they did not ask for an explanation from the children, and this further 
discouraged the elicitation of conceptual change in the experiment. Moreover, 
without verbal explanation provided by the participants, there was no way of 
knowing the participants' explicit understanding of the task. 
Though there were some problems found in the experiment of Krist et al., their 
empirical finding of "no U-shaped performance curve" cannot be simply dismissed, 
because the U-shaped performance curve was related to the existence of the 
geometric-centre theory. It is the geometric-centre theory that causes the performance 
to drop and the implicit version of the geometric-centre theory is an example of the 
level-El representation. In the current study. Study One is designed to create an 
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atmosphere that allows children to freely construct their own theory about balancing 
and the issue of whether the U-shaped performance curve exists will be investigated. 
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2.6 The RR model and the conceptual development of probability 
To the best of the author's knowledge, the RR model has not been applied to the 
study of children's development in probability concept. In this section, I will 
compare two key predictions of the RR model against the literature in this domain to 
see whether these predictions match the existing empirical findings. 
2.6.1 Piaget's theory of conceptual development of probability 
Piaget and his colleagues were the first group of researchers to study 
developmental analysis of probability judgment and their theories on this topic 
dominated the field for many years (Reyna & Brainerd, 1994). Piaget and Inhelder 
(1975) suggested that preoperational children are unable to distinguish what is 
possible from what is necessary. Preoperational children are prelogical, ruled by 
systems of intuitive regulations, and have no concept of chance or probability, so 
they are unable to use frequency information to make probabilistic judgment. 
Concrete operational children can discriminate events that would necessarily happen 
and events that are simply possible, because they begin to conceive sets of mixed 
elements as totalities formed from quantifiable parts. They can make decisions based 
on frequency, but do not understand the complex relationships between outcomes. In 
the formal operation stage, two discoveries help children to structure their system of 
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probabilities. The first discovery is the combinatoric system; that is, the system that 
can construct all possible operations by using a small number of elements. The 
second is the discovery of proportions. Added together, the two discoveries enable 
children to have a complete understanding of probability. 
Piaget's theory assumed that intuition is primitive and inaccurate knowledge, 
and that this kind of representation is replaced after children have advanced beyond 
the preoperational stage, when they acquire computational strategies to solve a 
probability problem. In contrast, the RR model predicts that the lower level 
representation is not replaced and coexists with the higher level representation. 
Intuitive knowledge is very similar to level-I representation, because the internal 
process of intuition is not accessible to consciousness and people can only be 
conscious of the product of intuition. Knowledge that is embedded in intuition cannot 
be used directly in conscious inferences. Piaget also assumed that the developmental 
direction of the probability concept should be top-down, because explicit 
understanding of the particular defining features of the probability concept is the 
prerequisite of further behavioural improvement. Examples of explicit understanding 
include the ability of concrete operational children to conceive mixed elements as 
totalities that are formed from quantifiable parts, and the ability of formal operational 
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children to acquire explicit knowledge about the combinatoric system and 
proportions. The RR model predicts that the opposite developmental direction is also 
possible, in which the development of explicit understanding can happen after 
behavioural improvement. 
2.6.2 Coexistence of the higher level and lower level representations 
In a review of research on conceptual development of probability, Reyna and 
Brainerd (1994) mentioned that Lovett and Singer (1991) studied the performance of 
children and adults when solving probability problems. In the task, participants were 
shown one of two displays. One depicted a pond with an outcrop of rock, in which 
the precise value of the length of the rock and the area of water could not be known; 
they could only be estimated perceptually. The other display contained a box with a 
number of pots of flowers and spiders in which the number of flowers and spiders 
could be counted. Participants were required to estimate the probability of an insect 
landing on the rock in the first display, and the probability of an insect landing on a 
pot of flowers in the second display. Children and adults performed equally well in 
both situations. Lovett and Singer (1991) found that in problems where counting 
could be used, the frequency of using counting to solve the problems among different 
age groups resembled a inverted U-shaped curve, because both young children and 
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adults were less likely to count. Only 25% of the adults chose to compute the 
numbers and the remaining adults chose to estimate magnitudes perceptually. 
Therefore, as the RR model predicts, a lower level representation that supports 
probability estimations is retained even when a higher level representation is 
available. The lower level representation supports probability estimations without 
knowing the actual number, or without performing computation. The higher level 
representation supports precise and conscious computation. 
2.6.3 Direction of development: Bottom-up 
In the course of studying probability development, two main paradigms are used. 
Early research using the choice paradigm seems to agree with Piaget's suggestions 
(Chapman, 1975; Ross & Hoemann, 1975). In the choice paradigm, usually there 
were two events: event A and event B. Children were asked to decide which event 
has the greater probability of happening. For example, there are two red marbles and 
one blue marble in jar A, and six red marbles and two blue marbles in jar B. When 
concrete operational children are asked to choose which jar they want to draw from if 
their aim is to get a blue marble, usually they chose jar B because the number of blue 
marbles is greater. 
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Acredolo et al. (1989) used the functional measurement developed by Anderson 
(1980) to study children's probability estimation. Their participants were 7- to 
11-year-old children. In Study One, participants were required to provide their 
estimation using a ruler, at one end of which there was a happy face and at the other 
end there was a sad face. A sliding marker was attached to the ruler and participants 
answered by sliding the marker to a position that they believed to be correct. The 
participants were told that a teacher wanted to offer every child a jelly bean and each 
child would draw a jelly bean from a well-shaken bag without looking. Participants 
were to decide the probability of drawing a jelly bean of a particular colour. Analysis 
of the participants' answers showed that, children from all of the age groups attended 
to variations in denominator, numerator, and interaction of these two factors. This 
finding disagrees with research using the choice paradigm, which suggested that 
children are only sensitive to changes in numerators. In Study Two, using a similar 
paradigm, Acredolo et al. found that children did not overweight the effect of 
numerators. Acredolo et al. suggested that "young children possess tacit knowledge 
of relations between dimensions well ahead of the point at which they are capable of 
understanding the underlying mathematics" (p. 934). However, the children were not 
required to explain their answers in this experiment, therefore the children's explicit 
understanding of the task and probability concept cannot be determined. 
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The concept of probability is closely related to the concept of proportion. The 
bottom-up direction for the development of the concept of proportion received 
support from a line of research on proportional reasoning. Moore, Dixon, and Haines 
(1991) asked participants to estimate temperature. The relationship between variables 
and temperature was determined by this equation Tf = (QiTi + Q1T2) / (Qi + Q2), in 
which Ti stands for temperature of the first cup of water, Qi is the amount of water in 
the first cup. T2 is the temperature of water added to the first cup, and Q2 is the 
amount added. Tf is the resultant temperature of the water. The participants were 
divided into two groups. One group received information in quantitative formation, 
such as "60°," and the other group received information that encouraged intuitive 
reasoning, such as "hot." Moore et al. (1991) used different dimensions to measure 
the quality of the participants' strategy and they found that the quality of children's 
strategies, particularly for younger children, was higher in the intuitive condition 
than in the computation condition. 
From this literature review, it can be seen that both of the predictions based on 
the RR model, namely the retention of lower representation and the possibility of 
acquiring implicit knowledge prior to explicit knowledge, agree with the empirical 
findings of this domain. 
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2.7 The RR model and the distinction of explicit-implicit memory 
The distinction of explicit and implicit memory (Schacter, 1987), or declarative 
and nondeclarative knowledge (Cohen, 1984; Squire, 1982), is also found in the 
human memory system. Moreover, concepts possessed by a person must be 
implemented in the memory system, so that the concepts can be stored for future use. 
Both Anderson (1982) and Karmiloff-Smith (1992) pointed out that there is an 
implicit, procedural layer of conceptual representation. This layer should correspond 
to implicit memory and procedural memory in the memory literature, and if their 
models are correct, the description of proceduralized knowledge (Anderson, 1982) 
and level-I (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) should agree with the findings in the memory 
literature. 
Normal people use both procedural memory and other types of explicit memory 
when dealing with different types of tasks. To tease apart the memory systems in 
order to understand the characteristics of implicit memory only, one of the common 
methods is to study the performance of people with amnesia. Amnesic participants 
have deficits in verbal long-term memory (Brooks & Baddeley, 1976) and in memory 
of recent events, so they are severely impaired when performing tasks that need 
recall or recognition of recently encountered facts or events. They cannot make use 
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of declarative knowledge (Squire & Frambach^ 1990) except for knowledge learnt 
before the onset of amnesia. Therefore, new knowledge that they acquire should be 
stored in implicit or nondeclarative memory, and should be in the form of procedures 
or level-I representation. Researchers found that amnesic participants can: acquire 
motor skills (Brooks & Baddeley, 1976) and perceptual skills such as reading 
mirror-reversed words (Cohen & Squire, 1980); show the word priming effect 
(Schacter & Graf, 1986); and show intact classical conditioning (Daum, Channon, & 
Canavar, 1989). I am going to focus on the acquisition of cognitive skill since this 
skill is more closely related to conceptual development. 
Glisky, Schacter, and Tulving (1986) trained amnesic participants to manipulate 
information on a computer screen, so that they could write, edit and execute simple 
computer programs. The participants learnt the meanings of terms and the association 
of operation and command words by the vanishing cue method. For example, the 
computer presented “A sequence of characters enclosed in quotation marks is called 
a .” The participant was required to enter "STRING" in response. If the 
participant did not know the answer, the initial letter of the answer was given as a 
hint and more hints were given when required. The training program also gave a hint 
if the participant committed an error in the process of writing a program. The 
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amnesic participants successfully leamt how to operate the computer and how to 
write a program. The amnesic participants required much more time to learn than 
normal participants and their concepts were hyperspecific, so the amnesic 
participants patients had difficulties in answering general or open-ended questions, 
like "How do you write a program?" Moreover, they failed to answer questions that 
were composed of words different from the training phase. Amnesic patients also 
failed in a transfer task. They had leamt how to perform mathematical operation on a 
computer, and they knew how to write program to output strings, but when they were 
required to write a computer program for performing mathematical operation, none 
of the amnesic patients could do. Control subjects who received the same training 
experienced no difficulties in performing the same task. The difficulties experienced 
by amnesic patients were exactly the limitation of inflexibility of level-I 
representation described by Karmiloff-Smith (1992). 
Cohen, Eichenbaum, Deacedo, & and Corkein (1985) investigated whether 
amnesic participants were able to solve the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, which is shown 
in Figure 2.10. 
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Fig. 2.10 The Tower of Hanoi puzzle. All five blocks are arranged from small to large on peg A in 
the initial state. All five blocks should be moved to peg C in the goal state. Only one block is 
allowed to move each time, and a larger block cannot be placed on top of a smaller block. (From 
Cohen et al, 1985’ p. 57) 
It was found that the amnesic patients demonstrated normal learning of the 
puzzle. With more practice, they committed fewer errors and required fewer steps to 
recover from errors. By the end of the 16-day training, the amnesic patients were 
able to solve the puzzle from any intermediate step, and the mean number of steps 
was significantly and substantially reduced. However, this acquisition of skill was 
hardly revealed by their verbal reports. For instance, in the final test, one amnesic 
participant H.M. asked the experimenter 13 times whether he was permitted to move 
a block across two pegs, rather than only one. He claimed to be "stuck" and was 
unable to think of any legal moves eight times, despite the fact that he was reaching 
the optimal solution consistently. After solving the problem in the last session, H.M. 
was asked to provide a verbal account of how to solve the problem. H.M.'s verbal 
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answer involved illegal moves, and when these moves were pointed out by the 
experimenter, H.M. exclaimed that he could not figure it out, but in fact he had just 
solved the puzzle by moving the blocks. Improvement of skills was also poorly 
reflected by the verbal reports of normal participants, because their verbal reports of 
changes in strategy often occurred much later than the initial occurrence of the 
behavioural change. This reflects the dissociation between explicit and implicit 
representation. The inaccuracy in the verbal reports of change in strategy suggests 
that knowledge can be bracketed by implicit representation, and representation 
redescription is needed to redescribe embedded knowledge into explicit 
representation. 
Squire and Frambach (1990) studied how amnesic and normal participants 
behaved in a sugar production task. In the task, participants were required to enter 
the number of workers to be hired in a sugar factory, in order to achieve a particular 
sugar production level. The computer generated sugar production levels according to 
an equation that includes variables of “worker number" and "previous sugar 
production." It was found that the amnesic patients improved at a normal rate in the 
first session consisting of 90 trials. After one month, participants came back for 
session 2, which also consisted of 90 trials. In session 2, the control participants 
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performed much better than amnesic participants. All of the participants were 
required to complete questionnaires after the task. Neither the control participants 
nor the amnesic participants were able to answer specific questions about how the 
task worked and they were quite poor at predicting the computer's response to a 
particular input. However, the control participants acquired some knowledge about 
the general strategy for performing the task. This outcome agreed with 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) suggestion that results of redescription are reduced 
descriptions that lose many of the details, and that practice can lead to redescription 
of representation from one form to another. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
3.1 Study One: The block-balancing experiment 
The original block-balancing experiment of Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 
(1974/75) provides an illustrative example for different levels of representational 
explicitness. It was found that 4- to 5-year-old children possessed level-I 
representation, 6-year-old children possessed level-El representation, and 8- to 
9-year-old children possessed level-E3 representation. However, the age difference 
of representation was challenged by Pine and Messer (1999, 2003) because they 
found that 6- to 7-year-old children could verbalize geometric-centre theory, which 
conflicts with the level-El representation found in Karmiloff-Smith's study 
(1974/75). Krist et al. (2005) challenged the findings of previous studies by saying 
that 6-year-old children's performance was not worse than 4- to 5-year-old children, 
and no U-shaped performance curve was found in their study. 
One crucial question involved in this experiment is whether the 
geometric-centre theory exists in children's minds, and in what form it exists. If an 
implicit form of geometric-centre theory exists, it can be observed from a child's 
consistent pattern of behaviour. Although children should possess the ability to 
balance asymmetrical blocks, their performance falls short of their actual competence. 
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Since children are not aware of such implicit theory, they attribute their failure to 
features of the blocks, rather than to the placement position. Children must be 
consciously aware of this theory in order to falsify its applicability for the 
asymmetrical blocks, then their performance is improved. Thus, children may 
demonstrate a U-shaped performance curve across the span of their development. In 
this study, the form of geometric-centre theory held by children was investigated. 
Geometric-centre theory is an intermediate concept that children possess, before 
they develop a naive version of the law of torque, which explains the balance point in 
relation to weight and length. Geometric-centre theory is one concept that can be 
used for balancing symmetrical blocks. The naive version of the law of torque is 
another more generalized concept that explains how both symmetrical and 
asymmetrical blocks can be balanced. Though these two concepts are related and 
have an overlapping area of application, they are different entities in the mind of 
children; therefore, the two concepts go through developmental phases independently. 
It is possible for the intermediate concept to be represented explicitly, while the other 
more generalized concept is still being represented implicitly. It is also possible for 
one concept to develop in the top-down direction, while the other concept develops 
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in the bottom-up direction. The developmental pattern of these two concepts will be 
investigated in this study. 
3.1.1 Research Questions 
1. Can the difference between implicit and explicit representation be observed in 
the task of block balancing? What are the characteristics of these 
representations? 
1.1) Is there a stage during which children can balance symmetrical blocks and 
asymmetrical blocks, but are unable to provide correct verbal 
explanation? 
1.2) In what form does an implicit geometric-centre theory exist? 
1.3) Will the geometric-centre theory be mentioned by children spontaneously 
in their verbal explanation of their failure or success in the balancing 
task? 
1.4) When the experimenter explicitly asks the children whether they are 
aware of their initial placement pattern, can they give a correct answer? 
1.5) If children are aware of the geometric-centre theory, are they aware of the 
relation between this implicit theory and the success or failure of 
balancing? 
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2. Does bottom-up learning occur in the experiment? 
2.1) Does implicit representation occur before explicit representation among 
children? 
2.2) How do children's explicit explanations change across trials? 
3. Is there a U-shaped performance curve in children's block-balancing attempts? 
3.1) Will children be able to balance asymmetrical blocks in earlier trials, but 
fail to replicate this success in later trials? 
3.2) Among the three age groups of 4 to 5 year olds, 6 to 7 year olds, and 
8 to 9 year olds, will the middle group perform the worst? 
4. Both in terms of performance and conceptual understanding, what is the 
developmental pattern revealed in this block-balancing task? 
4.1) How does an individual develop across trials? 
4.2) How does each age group differ from the others? 
3.1.2 Participants 
All participants were recruited from a co-educational school located in Ho Man 
Tin, Kowloon. The school had both primary and kindergarten sections, and most of 
the students have a middle-class background. Three age groups were included in this 
study: 4 to 5 year olds, 6 to 7 year olds, and 8 to 9 year olds. Participants of the 4- to 
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5-year-old age group all came from K3 of the kindergarten section, and their mean 
age was 5 years 9 months. Participants of the 6- to 7-year-old age group all came 
from primary 1 of the primary section, and their mean age was 7 years 1 month. 
Participants of the 8- to 9-year-old age group all came from primary 3 of the primary 
section, and their mean age was 9 years 1 month. This age range was set after 
considering Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder's (1974/75) experiment. According to 
their experiment, there were performance differences between these three age groups. 
There were eight participants in each age group, half of them male and the other half 
female. A total of 24 participants were tested. The same group of children 
participated in both Study One and Study Two. Half of the participants in each age 
group attempted Study One first, and the other half attempted Study Two first. 
Consent from parents and children was obtained before the commencement of the 
experiment. 
3.1.3 Materials 
As shown in Figure 3.1, an A4 size (30 cm x 22 cm) wooden board was used as 
the stage for performing the block-balancing task. A 30 cm x 0.5 cm x 1.5 cm narrow 
wooden rod was fixed to the wooden board to act as the fulcrum. Eight wooden 
blocks served as stimuli. The four blocks that balanced at the geometric centre, were 
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referred to as symmetrical blocks, and the other four blocks that balanced off centre, 
were referred to as asymmetrical blocks. 
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Fig. 3.1 The plate for the block-balancing task 
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Fig. 3.2 The symmetrical blocks 
Blocks A, B, C, and D were symmetrical blocks (see Figure 3.2). Block A 
measured 30 cm x 1 cm x 1 cm and had nothing attached to it. Block B was made by 
attaching three small bricks of the same size (5 cm x 1 cm x 1 cm) at both end of a 
block that was identical to block A. Block C was made by sticking together two 
blocks that were identical to block A, with an overlapping area of 15 cm. Block D 
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was made by sticking together two wooden blocks (30 cm x 3.5 cm x 2 cm) so that 
the two blocks overlapped completely. 
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Fig. 3.3 The asymmetrical blocks 
Blocks E, F, G, and H were asymmetrical (Figure 3.3). Block E was made by 
attaching three bricks on only one end of Block A. Block F was made by attaching 
six bricks on one end of Block A. Block G was made by attaching three bricks on 
one end of Block A, and six bricks at the other end. Block H was made by sticking 
together two wooden blocks (30 cm x 3.5 cm x 2 cm) so that the two blocks 
overlapped completely, but a metal weight was placed between the two wooden 
blocks, so that one side was heavier than the other side although both sides appeared 
to be the same. 
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Blocks A, C, E, and H were adopted from Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder's 
(1974/75) experiment. Block B, F, and G were adopted from Messer et al.'s (1998) 
study. Since three of the asymmetrical blocks carried additional bricks, these bricks 
could be a feature that attracts the children's attention. Block B could act as a 
potential counter example for children who think that the existence of additional 
"bricks" is the reason why the block cannot be balanced. Block D and H look 
identical, the width and height of these two blocks is larger than other blocks. Block 
D could act as a potential counter example for children who think that the dimension 
of the block is the reason why the block cannot be balanced. 
Type G in Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder's (1974/75) experiment was not 
included, because it cannot be balanced without the use of a counter weight. Also, 
none of the block-balancing experiments that were conducted after Karmiloff-Smith 
and Inhelder's experiment used this type of block (Krist et al., 2005; Messer et al., 
1998; Pine & Messer, 1999, 2003). 
3.1.4 Design and procedure 
The experiment was divided into four parts: Phase One Test, a free play period, 
the Prediction Task, and the Phase Two Test. The whole study lasted around 
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30-35 minutes. Participants performed the block-balancing task in the Phase One 
Test and the Phase Two Test, using the same set of blocks and presentation order. The 
whole process was recorded by digital video camera. 
At the beginning of the Phase One Test, the participant was given the following 
instruction: "Today we are going to play with some wooden blocks. I am going to 
give you some blocks, I want you to try balancing them over here (point to the 
wooden board), so that they will not fall. Please don't put it vertically (with 
demonstration). You need to balance it horizontally. It may be the case that you can 
balance all of the blocks or it is also possible that some of the blocks cannot be 
balanced. If you think that a particular block cannot be balanced, you can tell me 
about that. This game is very challenging, never mind if you find it difficult. Just try 
to do your best." 
Incorrect vertical placement was demonstrated, but horizontal placement was 
not demonstrated to avoid any influence on the participants' initial placement point. 
Each stimulus block was attempted once in the Phase One Test. Only the current 
test block was visible to the children to avoid distraction. The order for presenting 
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the blocks was A, E, B, D, F, Q C, and H. Earlier blocks were usually easier to 
balance than later blocks, so participants would not become frustrated and lose 
motivation for continuing the experiment. 
The initial placement position of each block was recorded. Participants were 
allowed to try as many times as they liked. If they chose to give up or declare that the 
block could not be balanced, the experimenter asked, "Why didn't the block balance 
just now?" and the explanation was recorded for analysis. 
After all of the eight blocks had been attempted once, the Phase One Test ended 
and the free play period of 5 minutes began. Participants were given the following 
instruction: “Good, you have tried very hard in the test. Now, I will give you all of 
the blocks for you to play with for five minutes. Later I will test you again in the way 
we did just now. You can try again to balance the blocks that you did not succeed in 
balancing just now." In the free play period, all of the blocks were given to the 
participants. After the instructions had been given at the beginning of the free play 
period, the experimenter did not intervene with participant's activities any more. 
There was also a free play period in Pine and Messer's (2003) experiment. The aim 
of such a free play period is to allow children to freely explore and to construct their 
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theory about balancing. As mentioned before, the aim of this experiment is not to 
assess children's behavioural ability to balance the wooden blocks, but to study how 
their concept of this task developed. 
The Prediction Task started after the 5 minutes' free play. The experimenter 
collected all of the blocks and put them into one group. The experimenter then took 
out two cards, one printed with a big tick and one printed with a big cross. The card 
printed with a tick was placed on the right, the cardboard with a cross was placed on 
the left- The participant was given the following instruction: “I want you to classify 
this pile of blocks. If you think that a certain block can be balanced, place it over the 
card with a tick. If you think that a certain block cannot be balanced, place it over the 
card with a cross." After the participant finished the sorting process, the experimenter 
recorded the results. 
After the Prediction Task, the Phase Two Test began. The experimenter 
collected all of the blocks and reran the test using the same procedure as in the Phase 
One Test. At the end of the Phase Two Test, the experimenter asked three more 
questions: 
1. Is there a position on the block that you usually place over the ftilcrum? 
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2. Did you notice your habit before I asked you about it? 
3. Do you think the way you usually place the block will affect whether a block can 
be balanced? 
After answering all of these questions, the child was thanked for his or her 
participation and a souvenir was given to each participant. 
3.1.5 Analysis 
In some studies of conceptual developmental, it is taken for granted that 
behaviour and verbal reports are just two sides of the same coin, both of them reflect 
the concept(s) possessed by the children. From the perspective of the RR model, the 
representation that is responsible for behaviour and the representation that is 
responsible for explicit knowledge may both represent the content of the same 
concept, but they may belong to different levels of representation. Different 
representations may develop at different paces and may give rise to a difference in 
behavioural and verbal performance. To see whether this kind of difference in 
performance really existed, the behavioural performance and performance of explicit 
knowledge were first analyzed independently. After building up some basic 
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dimensions for measuring both types of performance, these two kinds of 
performance were compared to see if there was any difference between them. 
3.1.5.1 Behavioural performance 
According to the RR model, only knowledge that is represented at the E2/3 
level can be verbalized. Knowledge represented at levels lower than E2/3 cannot be 
verbalized and can only be observed from behavioural performance. In this study, 
behavioural performance of the block-balancing task was measured in three ways: 
Success Score, Initial Middle Placement Score, and Geometric Centre Area 
Placement Score. The first two ways of measurement are very common in the 
block-balancing paradigm, for example, as can be found in the work of Messer et al. 
(1998) and Krist et al. (2005). To the best of the author's knowledge, the third way of 
measurement cannot be found in the current block-balancing paradigm literature. 
The Success Score was calculated by counting the number of successfully 
balanced blocks. The Initial Middle Placement Score was calculated by counting the 
number of times the block was initially placed at the geometric centre. Both scores 
were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
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The Geometric Centre Area Placement Scores (GCP Scores) of symmetrical and 
asymmetrical blocks were obtained by counting the number of blocks placed in the 
geometric-centre area only throughout the trial for each block. It should be noted that 
"geometric-centre area" does not only mean the exact point of geometric centre, but 
also includes an area close to the geometric centre. The reason for choosing "central 
area" rather than the centre point is that even if young children have the intention of 
placing the block at the centre, the placement position may not be the exact 
geometric centre because of their immature motor ability. ANOVA of GCP Scores 
were also carried out. 
If geometric-centre theory really exists, it leads to failure in balancing 
asymmetrical blocks by constraining block placement positions throughout the trial, 
not only the initial placement. Therefore, performance in the rest of the trial should 
also be considered. Children who possess this theory try to balance all of the blocks 
in the geometric-centre area only, but the balance point for asymmetrical blocks 
(except block G) are not in this area, so that is why these children cannot balance 
asymmetrical blocks. In other words, persistent central placement is the direct effect 
of geometric-centre theory, and success or failure in block balancing is the result of 
persistent centre placement. Success in block balancing can be affected by factors 
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other than geometric-centre theory. For example, younger participants tend to make 
less subtle changes in placement. Sometimes the placement positions they tried were 
roughly correct, and they failed only because the placement was not precise enough. 
Therefore, the GCP Score should be a more sensitive measure of geometric-centre 
theory compared to Success Score or Initial Middle Placement Score. 
If a block is only placed in the central area throughout the trial, 1 point is added 
to the GCP Score for symmetrical or asymmetrical blocks. To maintain consistency 
between different behavioural performance measures, the following rules are 
defined: 
1. If a block does not score a point for the initial centre placement score (that means 
the initial placement position of that block is off centre), the GCP Score of the 
block is zero. 
2. Except for Block G, if an asymmetrical block is successfully balanced, its GCP 
Score is zero. 
Block G is exempted from the second rule because its balance point is within the 
central area, though it is not at the geometric-centre point. 
One of the research questions was to investigate whether the implicit 
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geometric-centre theory exists and whether younger children persistently try to 
balance all of the blocks in the geometric-centre area. In this study, the behavioural 
pattern of each participant should be considered individually. Test Phase One or Two 
is classified as exhibiting a behavioural pattern of geometric-centre theory (BGeo) if 
the GCP Score for an asymmetrical block in that test phase is greater than or is equal 
to 3. 
The geometric-centre theory and the naive version of the law of torque are two 
different conceptual entities that may go through different developmental paths. 
Therefore, the behavioural pattern reflecting the naive version of the law of torque 
(BTorque) should also be analyzed. The Phase One or Phase Two test is classified as 
exhibiting BTorque if 3 or more of the trials for asymmetrical blocks fulfil both of 
the following two requirements: 
1. The block is successfully balanced. 
2. The initial placement position is on the correct side of the block, that is, the initial 
placement position is on the heavier side of the block. 
It should be noted that BGeo and BTorque are mutually exclusive for a priori 
reasons. BGeo requires three or more central-area-only placements, which guarantees 
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at least two failures in balancing asymmetrical blocks (asymmetrical Block G 
balances within the central area, therefore the minimum number of failures is not 
three but two). BTorque requires participants to successfully balance at least three of 
the four asymmetrical blocks in a test phase. Therefore, it is impossible for a test 
phase to exhibit both BGeo and BTorque at the same time. 
3.L5.2 Performance that demonstrates explicit understanding 
According to the RR model, knowledge that can be verbalized is represented at 
the E2/3 level. In this experiment, children's explicit understanding was studied in 
two ways by examining their performance in the Prediction Task and their verbal 
explanations provided in Phase One and Phase Two tests. 
In the Prediction Task, the participants' predictions of whether the blocks can be 
balanced was analyzed. This task was designed to enquire the accessibility of the 
concept(s) involved in the block-balancing task. If a certain concept is represented at 
level-I, then participants should not be able to use this concept for making a 
prediction, because questioning and balancing involve different modalities, and 
level-I representation does not allow interdomain or intradomain links to be 
established. If participants made use of a certain concept in making a prediction, then 
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some kind of cross-modality accessibility was shown and the representation should 
be at a level above that of level-I. If a participant consistently predicts asymmetric 
blocks as impossible to balance, and the explanation provided by the participant does 
not mention the "middle point," it can be interpreted that the geometric-centre theory 
is an implicit assumption that the participant is not aware of. 
The verbal explanations obtained in test Phases One and Two were classified 
into different categories, which helped to reveal the pattern of development, and this 
classification was also the foundation for further analysis. During the pilot study 
reported in section 3.4, five types of verbal explanations were observed: 
1. No explanation. 
2. Physical properties: An explanation that attributed success or failure to physical 
properties of the block, like weight or size. 
3. Geometric-centre theory: An explanation that included "middle point" or "length 
of both sides is equal." 
4. The naive version of the law of torque: An explanation of the relationship 
between weight and balance point. 
5. Other explanations (Idiosyncratic). 
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After examining the empirical data of the current study, the explanation type 
that was related to the physical properties of blocks were further divided into 3 
subtypes: PI, P2, and P3, in order to reflect the variations of the children's 
explanations more accurately. 
There are eight categories in the new system. To assess the interrater reliability, 
transcripts and video recordings of 10 participants (41.7% of all trials) were given to 
a second rater to independently perform classification. The first rater was the 
researcher. The second rater was a PhD student. The interrater reliability was 
evaluated using Cohen's Kappa. With K 二 .887, the degree of agreement was almost 
perfect (strength of agreement based on Landis and Koch, 1977)). 
Here are the classification requirements of the eight categories: 
1. No explanation (N): Participants said that they did not know. 
2. Physical properties (PI, P2 or P3): Explained by the physical properties of the 
block. Explanations that belong to this category were further classified into one 
of the following three subtypes: 
i. PI: Explained by the size or weight of the whole block. 
ii. P2: Explained by the equality or inequality of size or weight of the two 
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sides of the block (divided by the geometric centre), 
iii. P3: Explanation did not belong to the above two subtypes. 
3. Geometric-centre theory (G): Explained the success of balancing a symmetrical 
block by mentioning that the block could be balanced at the geometric centre. 
Explained the failure in balancing an asymmetrical block by mentioning that the 
block could not be balanced at the geometric centre. The geometric centre or 
expressions that have similar meaning must be explicitly mentioned in the 
explanation. 
4. Balance point related (B): Explanation fulfils only one of the following 
conditions: 
i. Explained that a balance can be achieved if two sides of the block 
(divided by the balance point, not by the geometric centre) carry the 
same weight, but the concept of balance point was not explicitly 
mentioned. 
ii. Used the concept of a balance point in the explanation. 
5. The naive version of the law of torque (T): Mentioned either the complementary 
relationship between the length of one side of the block and the weight of the 
other side of the block, or explained by mentioning weight, balance point, and 
how the relationship of the two contributes to balancing. 
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6. Others — Idiosyncratic (O): Explanation did not belong to any of the above 
categories. 
To have a balanced picture of the distribution of the explanation types, the 
distribution was analyzed in two ways: the frequency of occurrence among the trials 
in each age group, and the number of participants who had used a certain type of 
explanation in each age group. If a certain explanation was found to have a low 
frequency of occurrence among the trials, this may be because all of the participants 
had tried the explanation, but each of them used it in very few trials. Alternatively, it 
may be because the explanation was used by a few participants consistently 
throughout the experiment. Therefore, if only the frequency was considered, the 
distribution may be misunderstood. 
The conceptual understanding reflected by each explanation type was analyzed 
in detail. Explanation type T (the naive version of the law of torque) was the most 
correct type of explanation in the classification system, so what kinds of explanations 
preceded and were followed by the discovery of the type T explanation were 
explored. 
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3.1.5.3 Comparison of behavioural performance and performance that 
demonstrates explicit understanding 
Two major issues were investigated by analyzing the data of both behavioural 
performance and performance based on explicit understanding: geometric-centre 
theory and the direction of development. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) believed that 6-year-old children implicitly possessed 
the geometric-centre theory, which led to their persistent failure in balancing 
asymmetrical blocks. This implicit geometric-centre theory was used to prove the 
existence of the El level. Therefore, the issue of whether implicit geometric-centre 
theory exists has theoretical importance to the RR model. 
If a participant had an implicit form of geometric-centre theory, this could be 
observed by the participant's behavioural pattern, which could be measured by BGeo 
in this study. If a participant had explicit knowledge about the geometric-centre 
theory, this knowledge should be found in the participant's explanation within a test 
phase and the explanation was categorized as a type G (Geometric-centre theory) 
explanation. Also, at the end of the experiment, the experimenter explicitly asked the 
participants whether they were aware of their habit of initial placement, and if the 
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placement position affected whether a block could be balanced or not. 
To study the developmental changes that occurred within the experiment over 
time, four periods of time were defined, and in this study are referred to as "time 
points.’，T1 was test Phase One, T2 was the Prediction Task, T3 was test Phase Two 
and T4 was the last part of the experiment in which the experimenter explicitly asked 
questions about the initial placement position and its relationship to block balancing. 
For both T1 and T3, four kinds of possible situation may exist, therefore four kinds 
of label were used: 
1. Implicit geometric-centre theory (IG): If BGeo was found, but no explanation 
type G was found within the eight trials of T1 or T2, this time point was 
interpreted as reflecting the existence of implicit geometric-centre theory, and 
labelled as "IG". 
2. Explicit geometric-centre theory (EG): If BGeo and explanation type G were 
both found, the participant possessed explicit geometric-centre theory at that time 
point, and label "EG" was used. 
3. Explicit geometric-centre theory only (E Only): If BGeo was not found but the 
participants tried to use explanation type G to explain balancing an asymmetrical 
block for at least one time (but not symmetrical blocks, since symmetrical blocks 
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do balance at the centre), the time point was labelled as "E Only." 
4. No geometric-centre theory found (N): If BGeo was not found and the 
participants did not try to use explanation G, that meant the participant did not 
exhibit any sign of geometric-centre theory, and the time point was labelled as 
"N.” 
For T2, that is, the Prediction Task, two labels were used: 
1. ">3": If the participant predicted that three or more asymmetrical blocks could 
not be balanced. 
2. “-，，： If the above condition was not met. 
Because the T4 time point follows immediately after T3, the performance of T3 
affects the labelling categories for T4. 
1. IG: If T3 is IG, and T4 fulfils one of the following conditions: 
i. The participant's answer reflected that the participant was not aware of 
his/her persistent initial middle placement, or 
ii. The participant was aware of the placement habit, but do not think that it 
related to the experience that the asymmetrical blocks could not be 
balanced. 
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2. EG: If T3 is EQ or T3 exhibits BGeo, and T4 fulfils both of the following 
conditions: 
i. The participant's answer reflected awareness of the persistent initial 
middle placement, and 
ii. The participant believed that the asymmetrical blocks could not be 
balanced because those blocks fell when being placed at the centre. 
3. E Only: If T3 is E Only, or T4 fulfils both of the following conditions: 
i. The participants' answer reflected awareness of the persistent initial 
middle placement, and 
ii. The participant believed that the asymmetrical blocks could not be 
balanced because those blocks fell when being placed at the centre. 
4. N: If T3 is N, and the participant's answer does not reflect the belief that 
asymmetrical blocks cannot be balanced because those blocks fall when placed at 
the centre. 
One of the major objectives of the current study is to use the explicit-implicit 
dimension for studying development. How development happens across different 
levels of knowledge representation will be investigated. Viewing from this 
explicit-implicit dimension, development can be divided into two main directions: 
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top down and bottom up. The top-down direction of development refers to the 
process that knowledge in an explicit level guides the development of an implicit 
level. The bottom-up direction of development involves turning knowledge 
embedded in an implicit level into explicit conceptual knowledge. If top-down 
development takes place, explicit knowledge is a precondition of behavioural success. 
For example, in the participants studied by Anderson (1982), if the participants had 
no explicit knowledge of the postulates, they could not solve the geometric problems 
by applying these postulates. If explicit knowledge is the precondition of behavioural 
success, then without explicit knowledge, no success is possible. That means, the 
conditional probability of P (Behavioural success | Explicit knowledge does not exist) 
and P (Explicit knowledge does not exist | Behavioural success) should both be 0. 
The above two probabilities were calculated to investigate the relationship between 
success in balancing individual blocks and giving a correct explanation, as well as 
the relationship between BTorque and a naive version of the law of torque. 
3.2 Study Two: The probabilitv-estimation experiment 
Previous researchers have found that people can perform probability estimation 
intuitively without explicit computation (Lovett & Singer, 1991), and young children 
can have tacit knowledge about probability (Acredolo et al., 1989). This intuition or 
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tacit knowledge is very similar to knowledge represented at level-I of the RR model, 
but this requires verification because past studies only focused on participants' 
behavioural performance. It should be noted that the ability to perform a task and the 
participants' conception of a task are two different issues. Therefore, in this study, 
both the results of probability estimation and verbal explanations were studied; the 
results were viewed as two sources of data, each of which has equal importance for 
understanding the characteristics of the children's minds. 
The RR model predicts that the probability concept can be acquired from the 
bottom-up direction, and might aid in describing how the implicit representation of 
this concept can be transformed to an explicit representation. These developmental 
patterns must be captured when development is actually taking place, therefore 
trial-by-trial analysis was used in this study. 
3.2.1 Research Questions 
1. Can the distinction of implicit and explicit representation be observed in the 
task of probability estimation? What are the characteristics of these representations? 
1.1) Does the behavioural performance of probability estimation develop at the 
same pace as the performance that involves explicit understanding? 
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1.2) Are any thoughts related to a certain concept of probability mentioned 
spontaneously by the children in their estimation task? 
1.3) In response to the experimenter's request for an explanation for the 
probability estimation in each trial, is there any explicit representation of a 
probability concept? 
1.4) In response to the experimenter's counter argument and probing questions, 
what are the characteristics of the children's explicit representation of the 
probability concept? 
2. Does bottom-up learning happen in the experiment? 
2.1) Does implicit representation occur before explicit representation? 
2.2) How do children's explicit explanations change across the trials? 
3. Is there a U-shaped performance curve in children's performance of the 
probability estimation? 
3.1) Among the three age groups of 4 to 5 year olds, 6 to 7 year olds, and 
8 to 9 year olds, do the middle group perform the worst? 
4. Both in terms of performance and conceptual understanding, what is the 
developmental pattern revealed in this probability estimation task? 
4.1) How does an individual develop across the trials? 
4.2) How does each age group differ from others? 
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3.2.2 Participants 
All of the participants were recruited from a co-educational school located in 
Ho Man Tin, Kowloon. The school has both primary and kindergarten sections and 
most of the students have a middle-class background. Three age groups were 
included in this study: 4 to 5 year olds, 6 to 7 year olds, and 8 to 9 year olds. 
Participants of the 4- to 5-year-old age group all came from K3 of the kindergarten 
section and their mean age was 5 years 9 months. Participants of the 6- to 7-year-old 
age group all came from primary 1 of the primary section and their mean age was 7 
years 1 month. Participants of the 8- to 9-year-old age group all came from primary 3 
of the primary section and their mean age was 9 years 1 month. The youngest group 
of participants in Acredolo, O'Connor, Banks, and Horobin (1989) was 7 year olds. 
The 4- to 5-year-old group was added to see if they also possess implicit 
representation of probability. In the pilot test (see section 3.4), 4- to 5-year-old 
participants demonstrated that they were capable of understanding and tackling the 
task and no floor effect was observed. There were eight participants in each age 
group, half of them male and the other half female. A total of 24 participants were 
tested. The same group of children participated in both Study One and Study Two. 
Half of the participants in each age group attempted Study One first, the other half 
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attempted Study Two first. Consent from parents and children was obtained before 
the commencement of the experiment. 
3.2.3 Materials 
The probability estimation task itself can be quite boring, so children may lose 
motivation and refuse to concentrate on the task. Therefore, the experimental 
instruction was presented in the form of a story. Three hand puppets were used to 
attract children's attention. In the pilot study, many participants showed excitement 
when I took out a new hand puppet. At the beginning of the pretest, a sheep hand 
puppet was shown and children were told the following story. Little Sheep lived in 
the Sun Kingdom. All of the animals in the Sun Kingdom ate grass. There were two 
types of grass in this kingdom, one type was delicious and green in colour, the other 
type was bitter and brown in colour. Little Sheep went to a party one day, but there 
was not enough delicious grass. So the host of the party decided to distribute grasses 
by asking the animals to draw grass from a bag. Each animal had to close its eyes 
and draw grass from a transparent plastic bag. The children were asked to estimate 
how happy Little Sheep would be when she saw different combinations of delicious 
grass and bitter grass in the bag she would draw from. At the beginning of the 
training phase, a hand puppet of a horse was shown, and the children were told that 
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Little Horse also loved to eat green grass and hated brown grass. It was now Little 
Horse's turn to draw grass from the bag and the children were required to estimate 
Little Horse's happiness. This time Little Horse told the children the correct answer. 
At the beginning of the posttest, a hand puppet of a pig was shown. The children 
were told that Little Pig wanted to leam to perform estimations, and the participant 
was asked to teach Little Pig if she asked questions. 
The participants indicated their probability estimations by moving an arrow that 
was attached to a plastic Answer Board (see Figure 3.1). Each of the 10 marks on the 
Answer Board were marked with a number. The first mark on the left was marked 
with "0," and an unhappy face was placed above the 0, the following marks were “1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,” and "9." The last mark was "10," and a happy face was placed 
above the 10. Children indicated their answers by moving the arrow to the number 
they preferred. 
© © 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Fig. 3.4 The Answer Board for indicating an answer 
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Stimuli were presented by a notebook computer using Microsoft PowerPoint. Each 
question was presented in one slide. Green-coloured grass images represented 
delicious grass and brown-coloured grass images represented bitter grass (see Figure 
3.2). 
^ \ M i ^ ^ J Green grass representing 
^^^m ^ ^ ^ 餐‘该讚 ^ ^ ^ delicious grass 
^ ^ ^ y < ] Brown grass representing 
V H I W VHf S H i grass 
Fig. 3.5 An example of the stimuli slide 
Both the pretest and the posttest contained the five questions that are shown in 
Table 3.1. In both the pretest and the posttest, the first two questions had a different 
numerator (number of delicious grass images) and a different denominator (total 
number of grass images), but the probability value of the questions was the same. For 
example, in the pretest, question one was 1/2, question two was 4/8，so the 
probability value is the same. It was found in Acredolo et al.'s (1989) study that 
children often failed to understand that the true probability is the same in such a 
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variation of numerator and denominator. The third and fourth questions in the pretest 
and the post test were another pair of similar questions; in both pairs, the one with 
the small numerator had higher value. This was included to test the claim of some 
researchers that concrete operational children cannot handle this kind of question 
(e.g.. Chapman, 1975; Ross & Hoemann, 1975). 
Q no Pretest Value Posttest Value Remarks 
1 1/2 5 5/10 5 Q1 and Q2 are the same in probability 
2 4/8 5 3/6 5 value, but the numerator and 
denominator are different 
3 2/3 6.7 5/9 5.6 For Q3 and Q4, the one with the smaller 
4 3/9 3.3 3/4 7.5 numerator has a higher probability value 
5 1/5 2 8/9 8.9 -
Table 3.1 Questions for the pretest and the posttest 
The questions used in the training phase are shown in Table 3.2. The first three 
questions have the same numerator, but of different denominators. The third and 
fourth questions share the same probability value, but their numerators and 
denominators are different. The fourth and fifth questions, as well as the sixth and 
seventh questions, are two pairs that share the same denominators but with different 
numerators, so their probability values are different. 
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Q no Training Value Remarks 
1 4/5 8 Ql, Q2, and Q3 share the same numerator 
2 4/7 5.7 
3 4/10 4 
4 2/5 4 Q3 and Q4 share the same value, but their numerators 
and denominators are different 
5 2/10 2 Q4 and Q5 share the same numerator 
6 6/10 6 Q6 and Q7 share the same numerator 
7 6/7 8.6 
8 7/10 7 
Table 3.2 Questions for the training phase 
The three hand puppets were used in the experiments were a sheep, a horse, and 
a pig. 
3.2.4 Design and procedure 
The experiment was composed of three phases. The pretest contained five 
questions, the training phase contained eight questions, and the posttest contained 
five questions. The whole study lasted around 30-35 minutes, and the process was 
recorded by digital video camera. The aim of the pretest was to test the participants' 
initial concept of probability. In the training phase, feedback was provided to the 
children, and the questions were grouped together in terms of their characteristics; it 
was hoped that this would help the children to redescribe implicit knowledge about 
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probability into explicit knowledge. In the posttest phase, counter suggestions to the 
participants' answers were raised to elicit more verbal responses and to test whether 
the participants' beliefs were consistent. 
3.2.4.1 The pretest 
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter gave the following 
instruction to the children. 
Little Sheep lives in the Sun Kingdom. All of the animals living in the Sun 
Kingdom eat grass. In the Sun Kingdom, there are two types of grasses. One 
type of grass is bitter and it is brown in colour (demonstrated with the 
PowerPoint slide). The other type is very delicious and it is green in colour 
(demonstrated with the PowerPoint slide). Today, Little Sheep goes to a party, 
but there is not enough delicious grass there. To avoid animals fighting for the 
delicious grass, the host of the party has decided to put the grasses into a 
transparent plastic bag (the experimenter took out a transparent plastic bag 
containing cards printed with green grass or brown grass), and each animal has 
to draw grasses from the plastic bag. Before the animal draws from the bag, it 
has to close its eyes (the experimenter covered her eyes with her hands), the 
bag would be well shaken (the experimenter shook the bag), and the animal 
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has to draw with its eyes closed (the experimenter drew a card from the bag). I 
would like you to guess how happy Little Sheep will be when it sees different 
combinations of numbers of delicious grass and bitter grass drawn from the 
bag. 
The experimenter then demonstrated how to use the Answer Board. 
If Little Sheep finds that the grasses in a certain bag is like this (the 
experimenter showed a slide with all bitter grasses), then she will feel very 
unhappy (the experimenter moved the arrow on the Answer Board to 0). If 
Little Sheep finds that the grass in a certain bag is like this (the experimenter 
showed a slide with all delicious grasses), she will be very happy (the 
experimenter moved the arrow on the Answer Board to 10). 
In the experiment, some of the participants spontaneously moved the arrow to 10 
before the experimenter tried to do so. The experimenter then asked whether the 
participant had any questions. If there were no questions, the experiment would then 
start. 
Every time a new question was shown on the slide, the participant was asked 
"How many bitter grasses are there?" and “How many delicious grasses are there?" 
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The aim of asking these questions was to prevent misrecognition, because the 
youngest participant in the pilot test wrongly recognized the grass types in two trials. 
He mistakenly recognized brown grass as green grass. After confirming that the 
images have been correctly recognised, the experimenter said, "Little Sheep is going 
to draw from this bag. How happy do you think Little Sheep is after knowing the 
combinations of those grasses? Please tell me by moving the arrow on the board." 
After the participant had moved the arrow, the experimenter said, "Your answer is X, 
isn't it? How do you get this answer?" Both the participants' answers and their 
explanations were recorded. In the experiment, participants were allowed to place the 
arrow between whole numbers. If the arrow was placed around the middle point of 
two whole numbers, the experimenter asked the participant if the answer was is the 
middle of the two numbers. If the participant answered, "Yes,", the experimenter 
recorded the answer as x.5. If the participant answered, "No," or the arrow was not 
around the middle point, the experimenter intended to take out a ruler to measure and 
record the answer with one decimal place, however, this last situation did not occur 
in the trials. 
At the end of the pretest phase. Little Sheep thanked the participant for making 
predictions for her and said goodbye to the participant. 
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3.2.4.2 The training phase 
At the beginning of the training phase, the experimenter gave the following 
instruction: 
Let us begin the second activity. In this activity, I will tell you whether your 
estimation is correct or not. Please pay attention to the correct answers, and try 
to think about why your answer is correct or incorrect. If your answer is 
correct, I will give you 2 points. If your answer is greater than or smaller than 
the correct answer by 1, I will give you 1 point, because the task is really 
difficult, and you are very smart to get your answer so close. If you get high 
marks in this test, I will give you a present. So please do your best when you 
make your estimation and you may try to think about previous questions and 
answers when you try to make an estimation. 
The experimenter asked if there were any questions. If not, the experimenter 
introduced a new hand puppet to the participant: 
This is Little Horse. Just like Little Sheep, he likes delicious green grass and 
hates bitter brown grass. Now it is Little Horse's turn to draw some grass from 
the bag. You need to do estimations similar to the previous activity. After you 
have made an estimation. Little Horse will tell you whether your answer is 
correct or not. 
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As in the pretest, after confirming the correct number of delicious and bitter grasses 
identified, the participants were asked to indicate their answer using the Answer 
Board. They were also asked to explain how they arrived at a certain answer. After 
that, Little Horse told the participant the correct answer, the correct answer was also 
shown on the PowerPoint slide, and the experimenter moved the arrow of the Answer 
Board to the correct answer. The experimenter then recorded the participants 
answers. 
At the end of the training phase, Little Horse thanked the participant for trying 
so hard and said goodbye to the participant. The experimenter told the participant the 
number of points achieved and gave the present to the participant after the third 
activity was over. 
3.2丄3 The posttest 
At the beginning of the posttest, the experimenter gave the following 
instruction: 
Very good, I can see that you have tried very hard to do the estimations and to 
explain your answers. Now we will begin our third activity. Little Pig knows 
that you are able to perform estimations and because she thinks that you are 
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very smart, she wants to learn the method of doing estimations from you. 
Please be her teacher and tell her what you think when she asks you questions. 
In the posttest, children first performed estimations following the same procedure 
as in the pretest. After the children had offered their explanations for questions 2 and 
4, Little Pig came forward to give counter suggestions. 
Question 1: 5 green grasses out of 10 grasses, probability value 0.5 
Question 2: 3 green grasses out of 6 grasses, probability value 0.5 
If a participant's answer to question 2 was within +/- 1 of the answer to question 1, 
Little Pig said: 
In the previous bag, there were five delicious grasses and five bitter grasses, 
and your answer was X. In this bag, there were three delicious grasses and 
three bitter grasses. There were more delicious grasses last time. Why is your 
answer so similar to your previous answer? 
If a participant's answer was not within +/- 1 of the answer to question 1, Little Pig 
said: 
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In the previous bag, there were five delicious grasses and five bitter grasses, 
and your answer was X. In this bag, there were three delicious grasses and 
three bitter grasses. The number of delicious grasses and bitter grasses are the 
same both times. Why is your answer this time so different from your previous 
answer? 
Question 3: 5 green grasses out of 9 grasses，probability value 0,56 
Question 4:3 green grasses out of 4 grasses, probability value 0.75 
If a participant's answer to question 4 was greater than that of question 3, Little Pig 
said: 
In the previous bag, there were five delicious grasses and four bitter grasses, 
and your answer was X. In this bag, there were three delicious grasses and one 
bitter grass. There are less delicious grasses this time, why is your answer 
greater than last time? 
If a participant's answer to question 4 was smaller than or equal to the answer to 
question 3, Little Pig said: 
In the previous bag, there were five delicious grasses and four bitter grasses, 
and your answer was X. In this bag, there were three delicious grasses and one 
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bitter grass. There are less bitter grasses this time, why is your answer smaller 
than (or equal to) last time? 
After completing question 5, Little Pig asked the following questions: 
1. Do you think about the number of delicious grasses when you make your 
estimation? 
2. Do you think about the number of bitter grasses when you make your estimation? 
3. Do you think about the total number of grasses when you make your estimation? 
4. Do you think about anything else? 
5. You say you think about XX, YY, and ZZ, so after looking at XX, YY, and ZZ, 
how do you know the answer? 
3.2.5 Analysis 
3.2.5.1 Behavioural performance 
The accuracy score is the absolute value of the difference between the correct 
answer and the participant's estimation. Correct estimation results in zero. The 
absolute distance between the correct answers and the estimations should be a more 
sensitive measure of children's ability than the dichotomous classification of 
"correct" and "incorrect," and subtle improvement in estimation performance should 
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be detected more easily. The lower the accuracy score, the higher the accuracy in the 
probability estimation. ANOVA of the overall accuracy score for each participant was 
performed. The mean accuracy scores of the pretest and the posttest were calculated 
and were compared to see if there was any improvement. 
Bryant (1974) suggested that, when the part-whole concept is not yet developed, 
using relations of "greater than," "smaller than," and "equal to" to compare 
constituent parts could be the first step in the process of quantification of fractions. In 
the probability estimation task of this study, "half was also a very useful concept. If 
the number of both types of grasses were equal, the answer must be 5. If the number 
of green grasses was more than brown grasses (or the number of green grasses was 
more than half of the total number of grasses), then the answer must be greater than 5. 
If there were more brown grasses than green grasses, then the answer must be 
smaller than 5. By using this “half rule," accuracy of estimation could be greatly 
improved. 
The behavioural half rule score (BHalf score) of each participant was obtained 
by counting the number of trials that adhered to the half rule in all three phases. For 
example, if there were 2 green grasses and 1 brown grass, the correct answer was 6.7. 
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If the participant's response was 9, though the response was not correct, the 
participant had adhered to the half rule: there was more green grass than brown grass 
and the participant's answer was greater than 5. If the participant's response was 5, 
though it was more accurate than the response of 9, this answer violated the half rule: 
5 could only be used when both types of grasses were equal in number. 
3.2.5.2 Performance that demonstrates explicit understanding 
In Siegler and Stem's (1998) study, they classified children's computational 
strategies into four types, and studied how children progress from lower strategies to 
higher strategies. In this experiment, the verbal explanations provided by the 
participants in each trial were categorized into different categories. 
The classification system used in the pilot test was amended after examination 
of data obtained in the main study. Originally, the following seven types of 
explanation were created, based on the literature: Implicit computation, Numerator 
only, Numerator and denominator only, Subtraction, Half rule. Others (Idiosyncratic), 
and Others (Correct). Two categories were eliminated from the old system: 
Numerator Only and Numerator and denominator only. They were designed into the 
original system because research suggested that children would only consider the 
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numerator when they made probability decisions. Therefore, the researcher believed 
that it was meaningful to include these two categories for investigating the issue. 
However, when the researcher tried to classify the experimental data, it was found 
that these two categories often overlapped with other types of explanation, and 
therefore the researcher decided to restructure the classification system. The new 
classification system aimed at classifying the different types of computations that 
were reflected by the explanations. The categories "Numerator only" and 
'TSFumerator and denominator only" were removed, because they were not 
computation methods. The original categories "Subtraction" and "Others (Correct)" 
were renamed "Comparison" and "Division/Fraction" respectively, in order to 
represent the essence of these computational methods more accurately. A new 
category, "Plus minus," was created after the examination of empirical data. 
To assess the interrater reliability, transcripts and video recordings of 10 
participants (41.7% of all of the trials) were given to a second rater to independently 
perform classification. The first rater was the researcher. The second rater was a PhD 
student. The interrater reliability was evaluated using Cohen's Kappa. With K = .794, 
the degree of agreement was substantial (strength of agreement based on Landis and 
Koch，1977). 
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In the new classification system, explanations provided by participants were 
classified into seven categories: 
1) Implicit computation (I): The participants said that they did not know, or the 
explanation fulfilled all of the following requirements: 
i. Participant did not mention the relationship between the quantity of 
grass and the answer. 
ii. Participant did not comment on the quantity of grass. 
iii. Participant did not make any comparison. 
2) Last question (L): The participant's explanation was based on information from 
previous question(s). 
3) Comparison (C): The participant explained by comparing the number of green 
and brown grasses to identify which type occurred more or less times. 
4) Plus minus (P): The participant assigned a score to each green or each brown 
grass image and the answer was obtained by adding or subtracting these scores. 
The score carried by brown grass must be used for deduction in the computation 
process. 
5) Half rule (H): 
i. If the number of green grasses was equal to the number of brown 
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grasses: The participant's response must be 5, and the explanation 
indicated that both types of grasses were the same. 
ii. If the number of green grasses was more than the number of brown 
grasses: The participant's response must be greater than 5, and the 
explanation indicated that the number of green grasses was more than 
the number of brown grasses: therefore, the answer should be greater 
than 5. 
iii. If the number of green grasses was less than the number of brown 
grasses: The participant's response must be less than 5, and the 
explanation indicated that there were more green grasses than brown 
grasses; therefore, the answer should be greater than 5. 
6) Division/Fraction (F): The participant explained correctly using the concept of 
division or fractions. 
7) OthersIdiosyncratic (O): The participant provided a computation method or 
relationship between quantity of grass and the response that could not be 
classified within the above categories. 
Like the explanation analysis of the block-balancing task, the distribution was 
analyzed from two directions: the frequency of occurrence among the trials in each 
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age group, and the number of participants who had used a certain type of 
explanation in each age group. The accuracy score of each explanation type was 
calculated in order to see which type of explanation gave a more accurate answer. 
The conceptual understanding of participants reflected by these explanation types 
was also analyzed. 
In the posttest phase of Study Two, the experimenter provided counter 
suggestions to the participants based on the answers they provided in the previous 
two questions. If the participants were able to produce correct estimations and they 
had fiill insight into their answers' correctness, they should not be misled by the 
counter suggestions. The participants' responses to counter suggestions was analyzed 
in order to see how well they understood their own estimations. 
At the end of the experiment, the experimenter asked some general questions 
about the computation method used in the probability task. If the developmental 
direction of this task followed the top-down direction, participants should perform 
better in general questions about computation, because this was the starting point of 
the development. Explicit knowledge would be the guide for carrying out 
computation and for getting the answer. The development should happen in this way: 
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1) The participants' acquisition of explicit knowledge about the general principle of 
computation, which was represented at E2/3 level, becomes available to conscious 
access and can be verbalized. 2) The participants with a lower level representation of 
knowledge (El or level-I) cannot verbalize, intermediate steps are unavailable to 
conscious access, but computation is carried out automatically and efficiently. This is 
what Anderson found (1982) when he studied how students learn to solve geometric 
problems using postulates. He found that in the first stage, that is the declarative 
stage, the participants first memorized declarative knowledge. Upon execution, the 
participants might verbally rehearse the explicit knowledge that they needed to 
interpret the explicit knowledge and turn the knowledge into operation. In the second 
stage, declarative knowledge was compiled into procedures. After composition and 
proceduralization, procedures became encapsulated, and intermediate steps were 
unavailable to conscious access. The responses provided by participants in response 
to general questions and their explanations provided in these experimental trials were 
compared, in order to see which one was more advanced. 
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3.2.5,3 Comparison of behavioural performance and performance that 
demonstrates explicit understanding 
The first comparison concerns the trials in which Explanation I was provided. In 
trials where no explicit computation method was provided by the participant, the 
answer provided by the participant should be generated by intuitive estimation. The 
computational process of intuitive estimation is not available for conscious access; 
therefore, the representation of intuitive estimation is not represented explicitly. If 
there is only one kind of representation for knowledge, namely explicit knowledge, 
or explicit knowledge replaces implicit knowledge in the process of development, 
then, among trials of Explanation I, the accuracy score should be the same in all of 
the age groups, because no explicit knowledge was used in this kind of trial. 
Comparisons were made to test whether the accuracy was the same in all of the age 
groups for this kind of trial. 
The second aim was to compare the pace of development between behavioural 
performance and explicit verbal explanation. If these two kinds of performance were 
sustained by the same kind of representation, then when one kind of performance 
improves, the other kind of performance should also improve. If there were 
differences between the two, then it is more reasonable to take the position that the 
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two are sustained by different kinds of representation. If there were different kinds of 
representation and the developmental direction was top-down, then improvement in 
verbal explanation should precede behavioural improvement, because explicit 
knowledge is the precondition for improvement in implicit knowledge. To see 
whether the difference in performance exists, pretest and posttest performance of 
both kinds of performance were compared. 
As mentioned before, the half rule may be a stepping-stone for children to 
develop correct concepts about probability. It would be meaningful to find out 
whether there was a difference in performance of the behavioural and verbal versions 
of the half rule. 
3.3 Notes about feedback in the two experiments 
In both Study One and Study Two, the participants received feedback. In the 
block-balancing experiment, the participants received feedback about whether the 
block fell or was successfully balanced. In the probability-estimation task, feedback 
was provided in the training phase in the form of a correct answer. This correct 
answer could not be viewed as equivalent to providing explicit knowledge. In the 
experiment, it was repeatedly found that participants were puzzled by the correct 
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answers. They often asked the experimenter why the correct answer was correct, 
because the correct answer itself could not tell the participant how to perform the 
computation. The implication of the answer was completely subject to the children's 
interpretation, and this was affected by the participants' conception of the task. The 
same was also true for the feedback in the block-balancing task, because 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) pointed out that: 
In the present microdomain, when a weighted block balances off-, this represents 
positive feedback for the younger children because it meets their goal. However, 
the very same stimulus represents negative feedback (a balanced block) for older 
children holding the geometric- theory. Similarly, when a block placed off- falls, 
this represents negative feedback for the younger children, whereas the same 
stimulus represents positive feedback for the somewhat older children because a 
failed off- attempt confirms their geometric- theory (p.87). 
3.4 The pilot study and amendments made after the pilot study 
Pilot tests of Study One and Study Two were conducted in October, 2007. A 
total of 10 children participated in the pilot study (three of them undertook the pilot 
test of Study One, whereas seven of them undertook the pilot test of Study Two). 
Five of these children came from a tutorial school in Wanchai, two were children of 
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the researcher's schoolmates, and another two went to the Sunday school of the 
researcher's church. One of the participants was the child of a university professor. 
The purpose of the pilot study was to find out whether the experimental design 
achieved the purpose of the study, and whether the intended findings can be elicited. 
Another aim was to test whether the experimental design was feasible and whether 
the tasks were suitable for the selected age groups. Experience gained in the pilot 
study was used to improve the experimental design of this study. 
The three participants who participated in the pilot study of Study One were one 
from each age group. None of the participants showed difficulty in understanding the 
instructions. The youngest participant demonstrated the implicit geometric-centre 
theory by his persistent central-area placement, but it is unclear whether the 
geometric-centre theory was represented at El, since he did not mention anything 
about the middle point. With a view to better differentiating level-El representation 
from level-I representation among the children, it was decided to add the Prediction 
Task into the main study. The free play period was reduced to five minutes, because 
the experimenter observed that the children began to use the blocks to do things other 
than balancing if the free play time went on for too long. It took more than half an 
hour for the whole experiment to be completed in the pilot test. The experiment for 
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Study One was adjusted to last about 30-35 minutes, after amendments to the pilot 
experiment. Three questions to gauge the children's awareness of the 
geometric-centre theory were added at the end of the experiment, so as to understand 
more about the metacognitive status of the geometric-centre theory. 
Seven children participated in the pilot test of Study Two. There were three 
participants in the youngest age group, one participant in the middle age group, and 
three participants in the eldest age group. The result of the pilot study showed that 
even the youngest participant was able to tackle the task and the score obtained was 
similar to the score of some of the older participants. After the pilot test of the first 
participant, the stimuli set was reconstructed to shorten the time of the experiment. In 
the pilot test of the second participant, it was found that the original method of 
stimuli presentation was too time consuming and the participants became distracted. 
Starting from the pilot test of the third participant, a notebook computer was used for 
presenting the stimuli. The remaining pilot tests lasted around 30-35 minutes. 
The story told by the experimenter in this pilot test was slightly modified. In the 
pilot test, children were told that Little Sheep or Little Horse went to visit different 
grasslands in the Sun Kingdom. The animals were unable to distinguish delicious 
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grass from bitter grass and they could not remember which grass they had just eaten. 
The grass in the Sun Kingdom were very special, after it was eaten it immediately 
grew again and looked the same as before. These instructions aimed to create a 
scenario of random draw with replacement. However, this was too complicated for 
the children to grasp. The experimenter had to remind participants about these 
instructions throughout the experiment. Therefore, in the main study, the scenario of 
random draw was created with another set of instructions. The participants were told 
that Little Sheep or Little Horse had to take grass from a transparent plastic bag with 
their eyes closed. Such a scenario was easier for the children to understand and 
remember, and participants in the main study showed no problem in understanding 
the constructed scenario. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF STUDY ONE 
4.1 Outline 
The performance of the block-balancing task will be reported from two 
directions: behavioural performance and performance that demonstrates explicit 
understanding. 
In this study, the behavioural performance in the block-balancing task was 
measured in three ways: success in block balancing, initial placement of the blocks, 
and the placement area of the blocks. First, the basic dimensions for measuring 
behavioural performance will be introduced, then the two behavioural patterns, 
namely the behavioural pattern of geometric-centre theory (BGeo) and the 
behavioural pattern that reflects the naive version of the law of torque (BTorque), 
will be discussed. The development of these two patterns will be compared with the 
development of the explicit concepts that are involved in the block-balancing task. 
For the performance that demonstrates explicit understanding, the Prediction 
Task will be discussed first, then the explanations provided by participants will be 
classified into different types, and finally, the characteristics and developmental 
trends of the explanations will be discussed. 
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The behavioural performance and the explicit understanding of the participants 
will then be compared to see whether the distinction between implicit and explicit 
representation can be observed. The questions that will be investigated are whether 
implicit geometric-centre theory exists in El form, and whether development occurs 
from the top-down direction or the bottom-up direction. 
4.1.1 Notes on the participant code 
In this experiment, the performance was studied individually. To protect the 
privacy of the participants, they are assigned a participant code in the report of the 
results. An example of a participant code is "AFl." The first letter indicates age 
group: "A" for age 4 to 5 years old, "B" for age 6 to 7 years old, and "C" for age 8 to 
9 years old. The second letter indicates gender: "F" for female and "M" for male. 
The last digit ranges from 1 to 4. The participant code “AFl，，thus means "the first 
female participant of the 4- to 5-year-old age group." 
4.2 Behavioural performance 
4.2.1 Success Score 
Success Scores of symmetrical blocks (Blocks A, B，C, and D) and 
asymmetrical blocks (Blocks E, F, G, and H) were obtained by counting the number 
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of successfully balanced blocks in each group. 
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Fig. 4.1 Success Score of Phase One and Phase Two 
The Success Score was analyzed using ANOVA. The within-subjects factors 
were block type (Symmetrical and Asymmetrical) and phase (Phase One and Phase 
Two), and the between-subjects factors were age group (Age groups 4-5, 6-7, and 8-9) 
and gender (Male and Female). 
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The main effect of age group is significant, F(2, 18) = 9.405, p < .05, Partial Eta 
Squared = .51, representing a large effect. The main effect of gender is not significant, 
F(l, 18) = 2.01, p > .05. The effect of phase factor is not significant, F(l, 18) = 2.65, 
p > .05. The main effect of block type is significant, F(l, 18) = 40.933, p < .01, 
Partial Eta Squared = .695, which is a large effect. 
None of the interactions is significant except the interaction between block type 
and age, F(2, 18) = 7.067 , p < .01, Partial Eta Squared = .44. The Bonferroni 
adjusted pairwise comparisons show that for asymmetrical blocks, the mean 
differences between age groups 4 to 5 years old and 8 to 9 years old, and 6 to 7 years 
old and 8 to 9 years old are significant. All other mean differences are not significant. 
In Phase Two, all participants in the 8- to 9-year-old age group could balance all 
of the symmetrical and asymmetrical blocks used in the experiment. 
4.2.2 Initial Middle Placement Score 
Initial Middle Placement Scores of symmetrical and asymmetrical blocks were 
obtained by counting the number of blocks being initially placed at the 
geometric-centre. 
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Fig. 4.2 Initial Middle Placement Score of Phase One and Phase Two 
The Initial Middle Placement Score was analyzed using ANOVA. The 
within-subjects factors were block type (Symmetrical and Asymmetrical) and phase 
(Phase One and Phase Two), and the between—subjects factors were age group (Age groups 4-5, 6-7, and 8-9) and gender (Male a d Female). 
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The main effect of age group is significant, F(2, 18) = 14.103, p < .01, Partial 
Eta Squared = .61. This finding is different from the study performed by Krist et al. 
(2005). In their study, the main effect of age was insignificant, and only the 
interaction between age and block type was significant. 
The main effect of gender is insignificant, F(l, 18) = .557, p > .05, and the 
effect of phase is not significant, F(l, 18) = .421, p > .05. However, the main effect 
of block type is significant, F(l, 18) = 30.584, p < .01, Partial Eta Squared = .630. 
The only significant interaction effect is between block type and age, F(2, 18)= 
14.496, p < .01, Partial Eta Squared 二 .617. The Bonferroni adjusted pairwise 
comparisons show that for asymmetrical blocks, the mean differences between age 
groups 4 to 5 years old and 8 to 9 years old, and 6 to 7 years old and 8 to 9 years old 
are significant. All other mean differences are not significant. 
4.2.3 Geometric Centre Area Placement Score (GCP Score) 
Geometric Centre Area Placement Scores (GCP Scores) of symmetrical and 
asymmetrical blocks were obtained by counting the number of blocks placed in the 
geometric-centre area only, throughout the trial, for that block. 
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The GCP Score was also analyzed using ANOVA. The within-subjects factors 
were block type (Symmetrical and Asymmetrical) and phase (Phase One and Phase 
Two), and the between-subjects factors were age group (Age groups 4-5, 6-7, and 8-9) 
and gender (Male and Female). 
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Fig. 4.3 GCP Score of Phase One and Phase Two 
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The main effect of age group is significant, F(2, 18) = 3.895, p < .05, Partial Eta 
Squared = .302. The effect of gender is not significant, F(l, 18) = .324, p > .05. The 
within-subjects factor phase is not significant, F(l, 18) = .728, p > .05, while block 
type is significant, F(l, 18) = 64.059, p < .01, Partial Eta Squared = .781. 
Again, the only significant interaction is between block type and age group, F(2, 
18) = 7.118, p < .05, Partial Eta Squared = .442. The Bonferroni adjusted pairwise 
comparisons show that the only significant mean difference is between the means of 
the asymmetrical block scores of the 6- to 7-year-old and 8- to 9-year-old age groups. 
4.2.4 Comparison between the three behavioural measures 
A good performance in the Success Score measurement requires high marks for 
both symmetrical and asymmetrical blocks. Good performance in the Initial Middle 
Placement Score and GCP Score measurements requires high marks for symmetrical 
blocks and low marks for asymmetrical blocks. By comparing Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 
4.3, two observations can be made: 
1. The development trends reflected by the measures are different: Looking at the 
Success Score, a linear increase of score with age is found for both phases. This 
agrees with Krist et al.'s (2005) finding. However, this linear improvement trend 
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cannot be observed in the Middle Placement Score of Phase One and the GCP 
Score for in the two phases. 
2. The GCP Score is more sensitive than the Middle Placement Score: Participants 
of the 8- to 9-year-old age group could balance all of the asymmetrical blocks in 
Phase Two. Comparing the Middle Placement Score and the GCP Score, the GCP 
Score is more sensitive in detecting this change because the score is markedly 
lower for the GCP Score than for the Middle Placement Score. 
The ANOVAs of the three measures all agree that the only significant interaction 
is the interaction between block type and age group, and they all agree that the main 
effect of age group and block type is significant. Considering the interaction effect 
between block type and age group, all three measures agree that for asymmetrical 
blocks, the difference between the 6 to 7 year old and 8 to 9 year old groups is 
significant. 
The difference in performance with the asymmetrical blocks between the 4 to 5 
year old and 8 to 9 year old groups, is significant for Success Score and Initial 
Middle Placement Score, but it is not significant for the GCP Score. 
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To prove that there is a U-shaped performance curve for asymmetrical blocks 
across age groups, the performance of the 6 to 7 year olds should be significantly 
worse than the performance of both the 4 to 5 year olds and the 8 to 9 year olds. 
However, the difference of asymmetrical block performance between 4 to 5 year olds 
and the 6 to 7 year olds was not significantly different in the three age groups. Thus, 
there is no support for the existence of a U-shaped performance curve in this 
experiment. 
4.2.5 Behavioural pattern 
4.2.5.1 Behavioural pattern of the geometric-centre theory (BGeo) 
Test Phases One and Two were classified as exhibiting a behavioural pattern of 
geometric-centre theory (BGeo), if the GCP Score for asymmetrical blocks in that 
test phase was greater than or was equal to 3. 
Age 4-5 (A) Age 6-7 (B) Age 8-9 (C) 
AFl AF2 AF3 AF4 AMI AM2 AM3 AM4 BFl BF2 BF3 BF4 BMl BM2 BM3 BM4 CFl CF2 CF3 CF4 CMl CM2 CM3 CM4 
Phase 1 G - G - - - G G - G G G G G - - G 
Phase 2 G - G G G - G G G G G G G -
Table 4.1 Distribution of BGeo by individual participants, "G" indicates the 
behavioural pattern of geometric-centre theory 
Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 
Phase One 4 5 1 
Phase Two 6 5 0 
Table 4.2 Distribution of BGeo by age group (8 participants per age group) 
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It can be seen that the BGeo was the prevailing behavioural pattern among the 
groups of 4 to 5 year olds and 6 to 7 year olds. In Phase Two, 6 of the 8 participants 
in the group of 4 to 5 year olds, and 5 of the 8 participants in the group of 6 to 7 year 
olds exhibited the BGeo. None of the participants from the group of 8 to 9 year olds 
exhibited this behavioural pattern in Phase Two. 
In the 4- to 5-year-old group, 2 participants did not exhibit the BGeo in Phase 
One, but developed this pattern in Phase Two. In the 8- to 9-year-old group, one 
participant exhibited the BGeo, but abandoned this pattern in Phase Two. The 
transcript of this participant reveals that the participant discovered blocks can be 
balanced off centre when she successfully balanced the last block of Phase One 
(Block H, asymmetrical block). She was surprised by the result: 
CF2: This thing is really strange. Because…cannot... put that... that is 
cannot balance it at centre, must put it near the side a little bit, so I don ’t 
know why... 
(Participant CF2, Phase One, Trial of block H) 
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4.2.5.2 Behavioural pattern reflecting the naive version of the law of torque 
(BTorque) 
Phase One and Phase Two tests were classified as exhibiting BTorque if 3 or 
more of the trials for asymmetrical blocks were successfully balanced and the initial 
placement position of the block was on the correct side. 
Age 4-5 (A) Age 6-7 (B) Age 8-9 ( Q 
AFl AF2 AF3 AF4 AMI AM2 AM3 AM4 BFl BF2 BF3 BF4 BMl BM2 BM3 BM4 CFl CF2 CF3 CF4 CMl CM2 CM3 CM4 
Phase 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T - - - - T 
Phase2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T - - T T - T - T 
Table 4.3 Distribution of BTorque by individual participants, "T" indicates the 
behavioural pattern of the naive version of the law of torque. 
Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 
Phase One 0 0 2 
Phase Two 0 1 4 
Table 4.4 Distribution of BTorque by age group (8 participants per age group) 
None of the participants in the group of 4 to 6 year olds exhibited BTorque. 
Except for one participant, who came from the group of 6 to 7 year olds and 
exhibited BTorque in Phase Two, all of the other participants who exhibited BTorque 
came from the group of 8 to 9 year olds. Half of the participants in the group of 8 to 
9 year olds exhibited BTorque in Phase Two. The result suggests that BTorque 
appears rather late developmentally. 
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4.3 Performance that demonstrates explicit understanding 
Performance of explicit understanding will be approached from two directions: 
one is participants' performance in the Prediction Task, the other is the explanations 
provided by participants during the Phase One and Phase Two tests. 
4.3.1 Prediction Task 
In the Prediction Task, participants were required to classify all of the blocks 
into two groups: "can be balanced" and "cannot be balanced." Because all of the 
stimuli blocks could be balanced, a block that was classified as "can be balanced" 
scored one point in this task. The score of the task was analyzed using ANOVA. The 
between-subjects factors were gender (Male and Female), and age group (Age 
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Fig. 4.4 Score of the Prediction Task 
The only significant main effect is block type, F(l, 18) = 24.381, p < .01, Partial 
Eta Squared = .575. The main effect of age group is not significant, F(2, 18) = .977, 
p > .05. This is different from the result of behavioural measures, where for all three 
behavioural measures, the effect of age group is significant. The effect of gender is 
not significant, F(l, 18) = .362, p > .05. The effect of interaction between age group 
and block type is significant in all behavioural measures, but is not significant in the 
Prediction Task, F(2, 18) = .452, p > .05. The only significant interaction for the 
Prediction Task is the three-way interaction between block type, age group, and 
gender, F(2, 18) = 5.167, p < .05, Partial Eta Squared = .365. This finding also 
contradicts the analysis of behavioural measures, because the effect of this interact on is not signif cant in all three behavio al measures. Bonferroni adjusted
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pairwise comparisons show that for the group of 8 to 9 year olds, for asymmetrical 
blocks, the mean between male and female is different. 
CFl CF2 CF3 CF4 CMl CM2 CM3 CM4 
No. Asym blocks success: Phase One 4 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 
Prediction Score: Symmetrical 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Prediction Score: Asymmetrical 3 4 4 4 0 3 0 0 
No. Asym blocks success: Phase Two 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Table 4.5 Prediction Score for the 8- to 9-year-old group (Asym = Asymmetrical) 
Referring to Table 4.5, it is surprising to find that participants CMl, CM3, and 
CM4 predicted that all of the asymmetrical blocks could not be balanced. However, 
all three participants had successfully balanced all of the asymmetrical blocks in test 
Phase One, which preceded the Prediction Task, and in test Phase Two, which 
immediately followed the Prediction Task. 
Symmetrical Block Asymmetrical Block 
Subject Block Phase 2 Exp T in Subject Block Phase 2 Exp T in 
success Phase 1 success Phase 1 
AF4 Block B N N BM3 Block E, F Y Y 
AMI Block D Y N CFl Block F Y Y 
AM4 Block D Y N CMl Block E, F, G, H Y Y 
BF4 Block D N N CM2 Block H Y Y 
BMl Block D Y N CM3 Block E, F, G, H Y Y 
BM2 Block D Y N CM4 Block E, F, G, H Y Y 
CFl Block C Y Y 
Table 4.6 Blocks being successfully balanced in Phase One but predicted as could 
not be balanced. (Exp T = Explanation type T) 
Other than the above mentioned three surprising cases, there were other cases of 
contradiction between the Phase One behavioural performance and the Prediction 
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Task, which were reported in Table 4.6. The patterns of contradiction for symmetrical 
blocks and asymmetrical blocks were quite different. On the "Symmetric Block" side 
of Table 4.6, participants were from the younger group as compared with those on 
the "Asymmetrical Block" side. On the "Symmetric Block" side, each participant 
only made one contradiction for symmetrical blocks, and no participant would 
produce contradiction for all of the symmetrical blocks. The majority of these 
contradictions occurred for block D. Though these participants had successfully 
balanced the symmetrical blocks in test Phase One, they did not always repeat this 
success in test Phase Two. Only one of these participants provided explanation type 
T in test Phase One (details of explanation type T will be discussed in the next 
section). However, for asymmetrical blocks, no single type of block was responsible 
for the majority of the contradictions. Three participants produced contradictions for 
all of the asymmetrical blocks. All of the participants were capable of balancing the 
asymmetrical blocks again in Phase Two, and all of them had provided explanation T 
in test Phase One. 
In the group of symmetrical blocks, block D was the most common block that 
was associated with contradiction. Block D and block H looked visually the same, 
but block H was an asymmetrical block. Block H was the last stimulus in Phase One, 
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and all of the participants who predicted block D could not be balanced in Table 4.10 
failed to balance block H in Phase One. They all predicted that neither block D nor 
block H could be balanced in the Prediction Task. It seems that these participants' 
prediction about block D was due to the recent failure of block H. 
It is easier to dismiss the contradictions that occurred with the symmetrical 
blocks as memory failure. However, the anomaly with the asymmetrical blocks 
cannot be easily dismissed in the same way. An appropriate explanation is needed for 
the contradictions that were expressed by the participants regarding the asymmetrical 
blocks. This interesting finding will be discussed later in this chapter. 
4.3.1.1 Comparing the Prediction Score with the Success Score 
Comparing Figure 4.8 (Prediction Score) with Figure 4.1 (Success Score), the 
developmental trends reflected by the two figures are markedly different. The 
Success Score increases with age and ANOVA shows the effect of age group is 
significant. For the Prediction Score, symmetrical blocks show a similar increasing 
trend, but for asymmetrical blocks, the scores for the three age groups are very 
similar, and ANOVA shows that the effect of age group is not significant. 
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The Success Score reflects behavioural success and the Prediction Score reflects 
performance of conscious inference. If behavioural performance and explicit 
understanding are sustained by the same representation, it seems difficult to 
understand why the discrepancy between Success Score and Prediction Score occurs. 
It seems more reasonable to interpret the discrepancy by proposing that behavioural 
success is sustained by knowledge that can only be used in performing the 
block-balancing behaviour, because the knowledge cannot be used for making 
predictions. If this is the case, then the knowledge that contributes to behavioural 
success should be represented at level-I; and the performance of the Prediction Task 
should be caused by knowledge represented at a level other than level-I. 
4.3.2 Explanation types 
From the perspective of the RR model, the explanations provided by the 
participants should reflect knowledge represented at E2/3 level, because this is the 
only level that can be reported verbally. The verbal explanations provided by 
participants in each trial were classified into eight categories, namely: (1) N: No 
explanation; (2) PI: Physical properties 1; (3) P2: Physical properties 2; (4) P3: 
Physical properties 3; (5) G: Geometric-centre theory; (6) B: Balance point related; 
(7) T: The naive version of the law of torque; and (8) O: Others—Idiosyncratic. For 
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the classification requirements, please refer to section 3.1.5.2. 
The distribution of explanation types is shown in Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13. 
As reported in section 3.1.5.2, the interrater agreement on the explanation types is 
almost perfect. 
Symmetrical Block Asymmetrical Block 
Age Group Age Group 
4-5 ^ 8-9 4-5 ^ 8-9 
N 16 (25%) 12(19%) 2(3%) N 9(14%) 8 (13%) 3 (5%) 
PI 8(13%) 2(30/0) 0(0%) PI 9(14%) 4(6%) 0(0%) 
P2 15 (23%) 18(28%) 22 (34%) P2 32 (50%) 30 (47%) 6 (9%) 
P3 14 (22%) 8(130/0) 0(0%) P3 6(90/0) 1(2%) 0(0%) 
G 4(6%) 9 (14%) 15 (23%) G 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
B 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 6 (9%) B 6 (9%) 5 (8%) 5 (8%) 
T 0(0%) 9 (14%) 16 (25%) T 0 (0%) 13 (20%) 47 (73%) 
O 6 (90/0) 6 (90/0) 3 (5%) O 2 (30/0) 3 (5%) 3 (5%) 
Table 4.7 Number and percentage (relative to each age group) of all explanations 
Age group 
^ ^ ^ Total 
N ^^Y5 (20%) 20 (16%) 5 ^ 50 (13%) 
PI 17 (13%) 6 (50/0) 0 (0%) 23 (6%) 
P2 47 (37%) 48 (38%) 28 (22%) 123 (32%) 
P3 20 (16%) 9 (70/0) 0 (0%) 29 (8%) 
G 4 (30/0) 9 (7%) 15 (12%) 28 (7%) 
B 7 (5%) 5 (40/0) 11 (90/0) 23 (6%) 
T 0 (0%) 22 (17%) 63 (49%) 85 (22%) 
_0 8 (6%) 9 (7%) 6 (50/0) 23 (6%) 
Table 4.8 Total number and percentage of all explanations 
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Age group 
4-5 ^ 8-9 
N 5 5 3 
PI 6 4 0 
P2 7 7 5 
P3 6 3 0 
G 3 3 5 
B 3 2 3 
T 0 2 8 
_ 0 3 3 2 
Table 4.9 Number of participants in each age group who provided a specific type of 
explanation (8 participants in each age group) 
The distribution of explanation types will be discussed from two directions: 
distribution among trials and distribution among individuals. 
Considering the distribution among trials, the top three categories of 
explanations were P2 (32%), The naive version of the law of torque (22%) and No 
explanation (13%). Added together, these top three categories of explanation were 
used in 67% of the trials. 
Among 24 participants, the top three types of most frequently used explanation 
were as follows: P2 (19 participants, 79.2%), No explanation (13 participants, 
54.2%), and Explanation involving the geometric centre (11 participants, 45.8%). 
Explanation T (The naive version of the law of torque) is the most correct type 
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of explanation. "Most correct" means that the level of correctness is the highest when 
compared with other types of explanation in this study. It is unreasonable to expect 
children in this experiment to provide a completely correct explanation. None of the 
participants in the youngest age group could provide this type of explanation (Table 
4.9), though there was one participant in this age group who was capable of 
balancing all of the blocks. The first appearance of explanation T was in the age 
group of 6 to 7 year olds, when 2 of the 8 participants gave this type of explanation. 
In the eldest age group, all of the participants provided this type of explanation at 
least once. 
In terms of individual development across trials, explanation T was never the 
first type of explanation used by a participant. The first occurrences of T in all 10 
participants were in the trials of asymmetrical blocks. Siegler and Jenkins (1989) 
found that more challenging problems stimulated discovery of a more advanced 
strategy. Asymmetrical blocks are more difficult to balance than symmetrical blocks; 
therefore, children were challenged to provide a more comprehensive explanation. 
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Occurrence order 
(Counting from the trial T first occur) 
Subject 1 2 3 
BM3 B G N 
BM4 G P2 




CMl P2 G 
CM2 P2 O 
CMS B O 
CM4 ^ B 
Table 4.10 Types of explanation found after the first occurrence of Explanation T 
Explanation T is correct for explaining all of the blocks in the experiment. 
However, after the first use of explanation T, not all participants shifted to using 
explanation T for the rest of the trials. Rather, of the 10 participants who had 
provided explanation T (Table 4.10), 8 still used other explanations in later trials. 
Moreover, 6 of them still used incorrect explanations (Explanation type P2, O, or N) 
in later trials. This finding aligns with Siegler and Jenkins' (1989) finding that a more 
advanced strategy did not completely replace less advanced strategies once it had 
been discovered; less advanced strategies were only phased out gradually. 
Explanation type G is the explicit version of geometric-centre theory. All age 
groups had participants who provided this kind of explanation at least once (Table 
4.9). All explanation G explained was used for explaining symmetrical blocks (Table 
7). Explanation G never appeared in trials of the asymmetrical blocks. It should be 
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noted that explanation G is correct for the symmetrical blocks, but incorrect for the 
asymmetrical blocks. 
The explanations about physical properties (PI, P2, and P3) were all incorrect 
explanations, within the context of this experiment. No one in the eldest age group 
used PI or P3 (Table 4.9), but PI and P3 were used by 6 of the 8 participants in the 
youngest age group. P2 was the most commonly used explanation, with 32% of all 
trials explained by P2 (Table 4.8). P2 was also used by the greatest number of 
participants: 19 of the 24 participants (79.2%) provided P2 at least once. P2 was 
commonly used for explaining why asymmetrical blocks cannot be balanced. 
Let us turn back to the interesting results of the 3 participants in the group of 8 
to 9 year olds (CMl, CM3, and CM4), who successfully balanced all of the 
asymmetrical blocks in both Phase One and Phase Two, but predicted that all of the 
asymmetrical blocks could not be balanced. In the Prediction Task, when they were 
asked why these blocks could not be balanced, all 3 participants' responses were 
explanation P2. 
E: Hum... Why can，t this pile of blocks be balanced? 
CMl: Because... This side is heavier, that side is not heavy. 
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(CMl, Prediction Task) 
E: You think these blocks cannot be balanced on that wooden board; they will 
fall, right? 
CMS: Because this side is lighter, that side is heavier. 
(CMS, Prediction Task) 
E: So this pile of blocks, if put on that wooden board, they must fall and 
cannot be balanced? 
(CM4 nodded) 
E: Why? Why can 't they be balanced? 
CM4: Because the two sides... two sides weigh differently. 
(CM4, Prediction Task) 
However, in both test Phase One and Phase Two, all three participants 
successfully balanced all of the asymmetrical blocks, and they provided explanation 
type T for their success in both Phase One and Two. Other than these three 
participants, the two other participants, (CFl and CM2), who had made similar 
contradictions in the Prediction Task also used P2 to explain why they thought that 
the asymmetrical blocks could not be balanced in the Prediction Task. Even though 
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the 6 participants had previously used explanation T and had successfully balanced 
asymmetrical blocks before, they still used P2 to explain why the asymmetrical 
blocks could not be balanced in the Prediction Task. 
4.4 Comparison of behavioural performance and performance that 
demonstrates explicit understanding 
In this section, after examining the behavioural performance and performance 
that demonstrates explicit understanding, the data obtained from these performances 
will be compared to obtain a more comprehensive picture of development in the 
block-balancing task. 
4.4.1 Geometric-centre theory 
Whether the geometric-centre theory exists, and the whether geometric-centre 
theory exists in implicit form, has important theoretical implications for the RR 
model. Behavioural performance, BGeo, revealed whether participants had persistent 
central placement, and explicit verbal explanations, type G, revealed whether the 
participants had awareness of their own geometric-centre theory. Four time points 
were set in order to capture changes as they occurred during the experiment. For 
more information about the time points and the classification labels used in Figure 
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14.5, please refer to section 3.1.5.3. 
Age group 4-5 
AFl AF2 AF3 AF4 AMI AM2 AM3 AM4 
T1 IG N IG N N N IG IG 
T2 >3 - >3 - - - >3 >3 
T3 IG N IG IG IG N IG EG 
T4 IG N IG IG EG N IG EG 
Age group 6-7 
BFl BF2 BF3 BF4 BMl BM2 BM3 BM4 
T1 N IG IG IG IG IG N N 
T2 >3 >3 >3 - >3 - -
T3 N IG IG IG IG IG N N 
T4 N IG IG EG IG IG N N 
Age group 8-9 
CFl CF2 CF3 CF4 CMl CM2 CM3 CM4 
T1 N E G N N N N N N 
T2 >3 - >3 >3 
T3 N N N N N N N N 
T4 N N N N N N N N 
Table 4.11 Individual development over time 
Note: “77” = Phase One, = Prediction Task, ‘TJ” = Phase Two, and “T4，，= 
questioning about the initial placement position and its relation with 
block-balancing. 
For 77，T2 and T4: “IG，，= Implicit geometric-centre theory, “EG，，二 Explicit 
geometric-centre theory, “E Only" = Explicit geometric-centre theory only, and “N，， 
=No geometric-centre theory found. 
For T3: = the participant predicted that 3 or more asymmetrical blocks could 
not be balanced, and “-，，= the previous condition was not met. 
Shaded cells indicate the influence of geometric-centre theory at that particular time 
point. 
4.4.1.1 Implicit geometric-centre theory and explicit geometric-centre theory 
Figure 4.15 shows that 6 of the 8 participants in the group of 4 to 5 year olds, 
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and 5 of the 8 participants in the group of 6 to 7 year olds were classified as IG for at 
least one time point. This result supports the hypothesis that implicit 
geometric-centre theory exists in younger children. 
Of the 4 participants who were labelled as EG for at least one time point, three 
had received an IG label in the previous time point. The remaining participant who 
had EG at Tl belonged to the eldest age group. This suggests the possibility that the 
developmental order is that IG precedes EQ but the number of cases is too small to 
provide solid support. 
In the youngest age group, 2 participants (AF4 and AMI) did not possess 
geometric-centre theory in Tl and T2, but developed BGeo in T3. 
4.4.1.2 Implicit geometric-centre theory: level-I or El? 
After proving the existence of implicit geometric-centre theory (IG), further 
evidence is needed to decide whether IG is represented by level-I representation or 
El representation. According to Karmiloff-Smith (1992), neither level-I nor El 
representation can be accessed consciously and reported verbally. Level-I 
representation is bracketed, inflexible, and individual components cannot be singled 
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out to share with other process. No intradomain and interdomain link is possible. 
Knowledge cannot be transferred and applied to other task. On the other hand, El 
representation is not bracketed, so it is available for potential intradomain and 
interdomain representation. El can be generated by abstraction from level-I 
representation. 
If IG is a level-I representation, its effect should only be limited to T1 and T3, in 
which the behavioural skill can be applied. The Prediction Task should not be 
affected because no block-balancing action is involved in this task. If participants 
exhibiting BGeo also predict that the asymmetrical blocks cannot be balanced, then 
their IG should be represented at El level. 
Of the 11 participants who had the IG label, 2 first had IG in T3, which means 
that their IG emerged after completion of the Prediction Task, so these 2 participants 
were excluded from the analysis. Among the 9 participants who had IG before T2, 8 
(89%) of them predicted at least three times that asymmetrical blocks could not be 
balanced in the Prediction Task. The only participant who did not make this 
prediction was BMl. In the free play period, which was a section held just before the 
Prediction Task, the participant succeeded in balancing three of the asymmetrical 
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blocks, so he predicted that those blocks could be balanced. But in T4, he failed to 
repeat the success in balancing the asymmetrical blocks and again claimed those 
blocks could not be balanced. Observing from the video recording, in the free play 
period, BMl's placements of the blocks were performed in a very casual maimer, he 
approached the block-balancing task much more seriously in Phase One and Phase 
Two. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) pointed out that children possessing implicit 
geometric-centre theory still possessed the ability to balance asymmetrical blocks, 
because the level-I representation sustained this type of function still existed. When 
the explicit goal was house building, these children could balance asymmetrical 
blocks. But when the explicit goal was to balance blocks, the children called on 
explicit representation and this resulted in exclusive failure in balancing 
asymmetrical blocks. BMl's success in free play and failure in Phase One and Phase 
Two may also be explained in the same way. When he approached the task seriously, 
explicit knowledge was called upon to make the inference, and that was why he 
failed in Phases One and Two. When he approached the task casually, he might not 
have given the task so much thought and only used level-I representation to complete 
the task. 
The implicit geometric-centre theory did not only affect the behavioural result 
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in test Phases One and Two, but it also exerted influence on conscious inference in 
the Prediction Task. Given that the implicit geometric-centre theory could be used 
outside the normal input-output relation, it cannot be represented at level-I. However, 
the implicit geometric-centre theory could not be verbally reported, so it could not be 
represented at E2/3. Therefore, this implicit geometric-centre theory should be 
represented at El. 
4.4.2 Development from top-down and bottom-up 
There are two possible directions of development along the explicit-implicit 
dimension: top-down and bottom-up. The top-down direction of development is the 
process of knowledge represented in the explicit level guiding the development of 
the implicit level. The bottom-up direction of development involves turning 
knowledge that is embedded in implicit level into explicit knowledge. This section 
investigates whether the top-down or the bottom-up direction of development 
occurred in the block-balancing task. 
4.4.2.1 Relationship between success in balancing individual blocks and the correct 
explanation 
If the developmental direction between behavioural success in balancing 
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individual blocks and the correct explanations is top-down, in the first stage, a 
correct explanation should exist without behavioural success, and in the next stage, 
both correct explanation and behavioural success can be found. Explicit knowledge 
is the precondition of behavioural success in the top-down direction of development, 
that is, if there is no correct explicit knowledge, there will be no behavioural success. 
Therefore, a stage (or trial) in which behavioural success exists without a correct 
explanation should not exist. Therefore, P (Behavioural success | Explanation 
Incorrect) should be 0. In this experiment, explanation types T and B are correct, and 
type G is correct for the symmetrical blocks. Explanation type N (No explanation), 
PI, P2, P3, O (Others), and explanation G for the asymmetrical blocks are regarded 
as incorrect explanations. The total number of trials that have an incorrect 
explanation is 248. Among these 248 trials, block-balancing success is found in 131 
trials, so P (Behavioural success | Explanation incorrect) = 52.8%. 
Also, if there is no correct explicit knowledge, there will be no behavioural 
success, then P (Explanation incorrect | Behavioural success) should also be 0. In the 
experiment, there were 267 trials in which blocks were successfully balanced. 
Among these trials, incorrect explanations were found in 131 trials, so P 
(Explanation incorrect | Behavioural success) = 49.1%. 
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Based on the above statistics, it seems unlikely that the behavioural success of 
this block-balancing task is a result of top-down development. 
If the developmental direction is bottom up, in the first stage, behavioural 
success should exist without correct explanation. In the next stage, both behavioural 
success and correct explanation should be found. Behavioural success is the 
precondition of providing a correct explanation. Therefore, there should be no stage 
(or trial) in which a correct explanation coexists with behavioural failure. It was 
found that P (Explanation correct | Behavioural failure) = 0. Therefore, in the trials in 
which blocks could not be balanced, all of the explanations provided were incorrect. 
Also, P (Behavioural success | Explanation correct) is 100%. So, in the trials in 
which explanations were correct, all of the blocks were successfully balanced. These 
findings support the hypothesis that bottom-top development occurred in this 
experiment. 
In the Prediction Task, 6 participants predicted that the asymmetrical blocks that 
they had successfully balanced in Phase One could not be balanced. They had all 
given explanation T in Phase One, and they succeeded in balancing the asymmetrical 
blocks again in Phase Two. If the development of explanation T followed the 
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top-down direction, explicit knowledge should be the guide for development of 
lower levels. It is very difficult to explain why these 6 participants performed better 
in the task that involved behavioural implementation of explicit knowledge, but 
performed less well in the task that involved the use of explicit knowledge. It seems 
that the bottom-up direction of development is more reasonable. These participants' 
explicit knowledge of the naive version of the law of torque was not consolidated 
well. In Phases One and Two, they could reason from their own correction 
behaviours to be able to give explanation T. In the Prediction Task, when no 
block-balancing behaviour was performed, these participants were not able to use the 
naive version of law of torque to infer the answer and were influenced more by the 
consolidated geometric-centre theory that appeared earlier in their development. 
4.4.2.2 Relationship between the behavioural pattern that agrees with the naive 
version of the law of torque and the explicit verbalization of the naive version of the 
law of torque 
The direction of development may not be the same throughout the 
developmental process. It is possible for the direction of development to be bottom 
up in the first stage, then change to top down in the next stage. We have shown in the 
previous section that explanation T and other correct explanations were the results of 
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bottom-up development. This section focuses on the naive version of the law of 
torque. We investigated the developmental relation between the behavioural pattern 
and the explicit verbalization of the concept to see which one is the prerequisite of 
the other. 
In the previous part, the focus was on the relation between success in balancing 
individual blocks and the correct explanation. Analysis was based on individual 
trials. 
In this section, the focus is on the relationship between the behavioural pattern 
that agrees with the naive version of the law of torque, and the correct explanation T. 
Analysis is based on the test phases. Each participant had gone through the two test 
phases. Phase One and Phase Two, in the experiment. 
The definition and prevalence of the behavioural pattern reflecting the naive 
version of the law of torque (BTorque) can be found in section 4.2.5.2. Whether each 
phase has at least one explanation T will also be analyzed. The distribution can be 
found in Table 4.12. 
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Have explanation T No explanation T 
Have BTorque 7 7 0 
No BTorque 41 12 29 
Total 19 29 
Table 4.12 Distribution of BTorque and explanation T across phases 
If explicit knowledge is the precondition of a behavioural pattern, then P (BTorque 
No explanation T) and P (No explanation T | BTorque) should both be 0. Referring to 
Table 4.12, P (BTorque | No explanation T) = 0 / 29 = 0. P (No explanation T | 
BTorque) = 0 / 7 = 0. This shows that the verbalization of explanation type T 
occurred before the behavioural pattern, so this stage of development seems to follow 
a top-down direction. 
The developmental path can be summarized as follows: 
Behavioural success of individual blocks Occurrence of explanation involving the 
naive version of the law of torque ^ Behavioural pattern reflecting the naive version 
of the law of torque 
4.5 Summary 
4.5.1 List of important findings related to the RR model 
Findings related to the explicit-implicit dimension: 
1) The performance difference between block balancing and the Prediction Task was 
observed in this block-balancing experiment. If both kinds of performance were 
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sustained by the same type of representation, then their pace of development and the 
factors that affect their development should be the same across age groups. However, 
it was found that the significant factors affecting the behavioural measures and the 
Prediction Task were different. For all of the behavioural measures, the main effect 
of age was significant, but this was not the case for the Prediction Task. The 
performance for the asymmetrical blocks in the Prediction Task was very similar for 
all three age groups. It seems more reasonable to take the position that the knowledge 
that sustained the behavioural performance and the knowledge that led to the 
prediction performance were represented at different levels rather than at the same 
level. 
2) Evidence for supporting the existence of implicit geometric-centre theory was 
found. 
3) The implicit geometric-centre theory was not represented at level-I representation 
but was represented at El representation, because it could exert influence outside the 
normal input-output relation, which influenced the results of the Prediction Task. 
This finding provides empirical support for the existence of the level-El 
representation, which is a unique contribution of the RR model that breaks the 
implicit/explicit dichotomy. 
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Findings related to development direction (top-down/bottom-up development): 
1) It was found that explicit correct knowledge was not the precondition of 
behavioural success in block balancing. On the other hand, in the trials in which 
blocks could not be balanced, all of the explanations provided were incorrect. Among 
the trials in which the explanations were correct, all of the blocks were successfully 
balanced. It seems that the implicit knowledge about block balancing was acquired 
before the explicit knowledge. If that was the case, the direction of development is 
bottom up. 
2) The developmental path of the naive version of the law of torque was observed in 
this study and can be summarized from the results. If a participant first succeed in 
balancing some symmetrical and asymmetrical block(s), this might lead to the 
discovery of the naive version of the law of torque. After this discovery, the 
behavioural pattern reflecting this knowledge might appear. Put a different way, 
bottom-up development was involved in the discovery of the explicit concept, and 
top-down development was involved in the occurrence of the related behavioural 
pattern. This result suggests that, in the developmental process of a concept, 
top-down and bottom-up development can happen for the same concept in different 
stages. 
3) Six participants predicted that some or all of the asymmetrical blocks could not be 
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balanced, and they explained their predictions using P2. However, the blocks were 
successfully balanced by these participants in Phases One and Two, and they 
provided explanation type T in both phases. This result contradicted the thesis of 
top-down development, because the performance of the task involving application of 
explicit understanding was worse than the performance of the task requiring 
behavioural implementation of explicit knowledge. Therefore, the bottom-up 
direction of development appears to be more reasonable. 
Findings related to the U-shaped performance curve : 
1) No U-shaped performance curve was found for behavioural performance across 
age groups. According to the RR model, behavioural performance may decline while 
internal representation is developing to a higher level. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) said 
that this performance decline does not necessarily occur. Therefore, even though the 
U-shaped curve was not found in this experiment, this does not threaten the 
plausibility of the RR model. 
4.5.2 List of important findings related to the age-related development of the 
block-balancing task 
1. The behavioural performance of the group of 8 to 9 year olds was significantly 
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more successful in balancing asymmetrical blocks, and had significantly less initial 
middle placement than the groups of 4 to 5 year olds and 6 to 7 year olds. The 
persistent central-area placement throughout the trial of the group of 8 to 9 year olds 
was only significantly different from the group of 4 to 5 year olds. 
2. The behavioural pattern of geometric-centre theory was concentrated in the groups 
of 4 to 5 year olds and 6 to 7 year olds, and was rarely found in the group of 8 to 9 
year olds. 
3. The behavioural pattern that reflected the naive version of the law of torque was 
concentrated in the group of 8 to 9 year olds, being rarely found in the group of 6 to 
7 year olds, and absent in the group of 4 to 5 year olds. 
4. The performance for asymmetrical blocks in the Prediction Task was similar for all 
of the three age groups. 
5. The explanation of the naive version of the law of torque first occurred in the 
group of 6 to 7 year olds, and was given by all of the participants of the group of 8 to 
9 year olds. 
6. Two incorrect explanations, PI and P3, were not found in the group of 8 to 9 year 
olds. 
7. Implicit geometric-centre theory was commonly found among children in the 
groups of 4 to 5 year olds and 6 to 7 year olds, but was absent in the group of 8 to 9 
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year olds. The only participant who exhibited BGeo in the group of 8 to 9 year olds 
was aware of her geometric-centre theory. 
4.5.3 Responding to key research questions in a nutshell 
To summarize, the findings of this block-balancing task provided support for the 
RR model. Though the U-shaped performance curve was not found, this did not pose 
any challenge to the RR model, because Karmiloff-Smith (1992) had already said 
that it was not essential for the U-shaped performance to occur. More importantly, 
the differences between implicit and explicit representations and the bottom-up 
direction of development can be found in the current experiment. Evidence for the 
existence of the El level was also found. The results of experiment one provided 
empirical support for the RR model. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF STUDY TWO 
5.1 Outline 
The performance of the probability task will be reported from two directions: 
behavioural performance and performance that demonstrates explicit understanding. 
In this probability task, three issues associated with behavioural performance 
were investigated: overall accuracy, difference between pretest and posttest 
performance, and behavioural performance of the half rule. 
To study the performance that demonstrates explicit understanding, explanations 
provided by participants were classified and studied carefully, in order to understand 
what children explicitly knew about the task. 
Behavioural performance and explicit understanding of the participants will be 
compared to see whether the developmental pattern of the two is different, and 
whether the development of probability concepts was from the bottom-up direction. 
5.1.1 Notes on participants' background knowledge 
Before conducting the experiment, the researcher had consulted the head teacher 
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of the primary school about whether the participants had received any instruction 
about fractions. The teacher said this topic would be taught to primary 3 students, 
and the period assigned for teaching this topic was scheduled to be after the 
empirical study. In other words, none of the participants in the current study had 
received any instruction about fractions at school. 
5.2 Behavioural performance 
5.2.1 Overall accuracy score 
The accuracy score of each question was obtained by calculating the distance 
between the response and the correct answer. The correct response scored zero. In 
other words, a lower accuracy score meant better performance. 
The overall performance, (that is, performance including all test phases: pretest, 
training, and posttest,) was analyzed using ANOVA. The between-subjects factors 
were age group (Age groups 4-5, 6-7, and 8-9) and gender (Male and Female), and 
the within-subjects factor was the question number (a total of 18 questions in the 
three test phases). 
The main effect of age group was significant, F(2, 18) = 23.220, p < .05, Partial 
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Eta Squared = .721. The main effect of gender, however, was not significant, F(l, 18) 
=.002, p> .05. The effect of question number was significant, F(17, 306) = 3.392, p 
< -01, Partial Eta Squared = .159. The only significant interaction was between 
question number and age group, F(34, 306) = 1.910, p < .01, Partial Eta Squared 
=.175. 
Overall Accuracy Score 
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Fig. 5.1 Overall accuracy score 
No U-shaped performance curve was found across the age groups. The 
performance improved as age increased. According to Karmiloff-Smith (1992), the 
reason for the U-shaped performance curve is that after reaching behavioural mastery, 
the implicit knowledge embedded in level-I may become available to consciousness. 
This awareness of knowledge may lead to overemphasis on that knowledge, resulting 
1 8 0 
in a decline in performance. In the current study, though the U-shaped performance 
curve was absent, there was evidence to suggest that there may be improvement in 
awareness of previously implicit knowledge. This will be further discussed in the 
section related to bottom-up development. 
Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 
Worst B ^ Worst B ^ Worst Best 
1/2 (4.25) 8/9 (0.76) 3/4(1.75) 5/10(0.25) 2/5 (1.625) 1/2(0) 
Pretest Q1 Posttest Q5 Posttest Q4 Posttest Q1 Training Q4 Pretest Q1 
Table 5.1 Questions that had maximum or minimum accuracy score in each age group (accuracy 
score in brackets) 
The questions that were answered best and worst by each age group are shown 
in Table 5.1. It should be noted that, since the primary aim of this study was not to 
identify which fraction participants would perform best or worst, the presentation 
order of the questions was fixed, not randomized among the participants. Therefore, 
it was difficult to rule out the practice effect as a whole (in fact, the experiment was 
designed to ascertain whether practice does have an effect). The performance 
difference found in the group of 4 to 5 year olds might be due to practice, because the 
best question was the last question of the whole experiment and the worst question 
was the first question of the whole experiment. However, it seems that the practice 
effect cannot completely explain the result in Table 5.1, because the presentation 
order was the same among the age groups, but the best and worst questions differed 
among the age groups. The best question for the group of 8 to 9 year olds was the 
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first question of the experiment, the worst question for the 6 to 7 year olds was the 
second-to-last question of the whole experiment. These two results could not be 
explained by the practice effect. In an experiment that used the proportional 
matching paradigm, Singer-Freeman and Goswami (2001) also found that among 
participants of 3 to 4 years old, their performance for problems involving halves and 
three-quarters were better than for problems involving quarters. Different fractions 
have a different level of difficulty, and this level of difficulty interact with age. 
5.2.2 Pretest and posttest score 
In the training phase of the experiment, correct answers were provided to the 
participants after the participants had given their own answer. Other than the correct 
answer, the experimenter did not provide any other information or instruction about 
how the computation should be carried out. Therefore, if there was improvement in 
the posttest, this was not the result of explicit knowledge taught to the participants, 
and should have been the result of experience gained, particularly from the 
interaction with feedback, in the training phase. 
ANOVA of accuracy score was carried out. The between-subjects factors were 
age group (Age groups 4-5, 6-7’ and 8-9) and gender (Male and Female), and the 
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within-subjects factors were phase (pretest and posttest) and question type (questions 
1-5 of each test phase). The questions in pretest and posttest were designed to be 
parallel: please refer to the method section 3.2.3 for a detailed explanation. 
Pretest and Posttest Performance 
3.5 J 
3 
2 • Pretest 
8 2.5 




,[M 一 CM: 
Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 
Age group 
Fig. 5.2 Difference between pretest and posttest performance 
The effect of phase was significant, F(l, 18) = 8.891, p < .05, Partial Eta 
Squared = .331. The effect of question type was also significant, F(4, 72) = 4.29, p 
< .05, Partial Eta Squared = .193. The main effect of the between-subjects factor age 
group was significant, F(2, 18) = 26.770, p < .05, Partial Eta Squared = .748. The 
main effect of gender, however, was not significant, F(l, 18) = .009, p > .05. 
Only the following two interactions are significant: the interaction effect of 
phase and question type was significant, F(4, 72) 二 4.103, p < .05, Partial Eta 
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Squared = .186, and the interaction between phase and age group was significant, F(2, 
18) = 7.173, p < .05, Partial Eta Squared = .444. Using Bonferroni adjustment to 
control the familywise alpha at .05 level, pairwise comparisons indicated that only 
the group of 4 to 5 year olds shows a significant difference between the pretest and 
the posttest (Mean difference: pretest — post test 二 1.545, SD = .321, p < .01). 
It can be seen that the participants in the group of 4 to 5 year olds performed 
significantly better in the posttest. One of the possible reasons was that this youngest 
group of participants might not have fully understood the task in the first few trials, 
resulting in poorer performance in the pretest. In the posttest phase, their 
understanding was improved because of the experience gained from the pretest and 
training phases. It should be noted that the experimenter took extra care to ensure 
that these participants understood. The experimenter carefully inspected the 
explanations provided by these participants, particularly in the first few trials. If there 
was any sign of confusion or misunderstanding, the experimenter explained the 
whole task again. 
184 
Pretest Training Posttest 
Q no Score Q no Score Q no Score Q no Score 
1 3.00 1 2.14 5 1.86 1 1.86 
2 3.00 2 1.61 6 2.14 2 1.43 
3 3.13 3 1.00 7 1.97 3 2.03 
4 2.60 4 1.57 8 1.43 4 2.21 
5 4.25 5 0.76 
Table 5.2 Accuracy Score of the group of 4 to 5 year olds 
Table 5.2 lists the accuracy score of each question for the group of 4 to 5 year 
olds. If the poor performance in pretest was due to incomplete understanding of the 
task instructions, and the experience gained from trials led to behavioural 
improvement by improving the understanding of the instructions, then the 
improvement of accuracy score should take place gradually across the trials. 
However, it seems that Table 5.2 does not exhibit this pattern, because in the pretest, 
a general trend of improvement across the five trials cannot be observed. The 
performance of question 5 was even worse than the performance of question 1 • In the 
training phase, the accuracy score remained about 1-2. The scores were much smaller 
when compared with the pretest. As mentioned before, correct answers were 
provided in the training phase. It seems more likely that the participants were able to 
make use of the correct answer to fine-tune their estimation. If this was the case, then 
the improvement found in the posttest might be caused by the fine tuned estimation 
ability. 
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Among the three age groups, only the youngest age group was able to make 
significant improvement in the posttest phase. Why did the two older age groups fail 
to benefit from the training phase? One of the possible explanations is the difference 
in initial performance. In figure 5.2, it can be seen that the initial performance of the 
youngest age group was much worse than the two older age groups. Therefore, the 
youngest age group had more room for improvement. The two older age groups may 
have reached the ceiling performance for intuitive estimation. To achieve further 
improvement, correct explicit knowledge must be acquired. The training phase only 
provided correct answers: no direct instruction on correct computational procedure 
was provided. The correct answers were more helpful in fine-tuning the intuitive 
estimation, but they did not provide any direct information about the correct 
computational procedure. Therefore, only the youngest age group could benefit from 
the training. 
More details about this improvement will be discussed later in this chapter. 
5.2.3 Behavioural adherence of the half rule 
The behavioural half rule score (BHalf score) of each participant was obtained 
by counting the number of trials that adhered to the half rule in all three phases. For a 
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detailed explanation, please refer to section 3.2.5.1. ANOVA of BHalf score was 
implemented. The between-subjects factors were age group (Age groups 4-5, 6-7, 
and 8-9) and gender (Male and Female). 
Behavioral Half rule score 
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Fig. 5.3 Behavioural Half rule score 
The effect of age group was significant, F(2, 18) = 16.763, p < .01, Partial Eta 
Squared = .651. The effect of gender, however, was not significant, F(l, 18) = .175, p 
> .05. The interaction between age group and gender was not significant either, 
F(2, 18)= .405, p > .05. The post hoc tests using the Tukey HSD (honestly 
significant difference) procedure indicated that the performance of the group of 
4 to 5 year olds was significantly different from both the 6- to 7-year-old and 8- to 
9-year-old groups. However, the difference between the group of 6 to 7 year olds and 
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the group of 8 to 9 year olds was not significant. 
We will revisit the BHalf score later in this chapter. The development of BHalf 
score will be compared with explicit performance of the half rule, to see whether the 
two improved at the same rate among different age groups. 
5.3 Performance that demonstrates explicit understanding 
5.3.1 Verbal explanations 
In each trial, after participants had provided their answers, the experimenter 
asked them to explain their answers. The explanations were classified, based on the 
computational methods used, into one of seven different categories: 1) Implicit 
computation (I); 2) Last question (L); 3) Comparison (C); 4) Plus minus (P); 5) Half 
rule (H); 6) Division/Fraction (F); and 7) Others一Idiosyncratic (O). For more 
information about the classification requirements of these categories, please refer to 
section 3.2.5.2. 
The distribution of explanation types are shown in Figure 5.4 and Tables 5.3 to 
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Fig. 5.4 Distribution of explanation types among trials (in terms offrequency) 
Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 Total 
I 78 (54.2%) 46 (32.9%) 6 (4.2%) 130 (30.1%) 
L 8 (5.6%) 5 (3.5%) 7 (4.9%) 20 (4.6%) 
C 39 (27.1%) 50 (34.7%) 83 (57.6%) 172 (39.8%) 
P 0 (0%) 31 (21.5%) 14 (9.7%) 45 (10.4%) 
H 0 (0%) 11 (7.6%) 26 (18.1%) 37 (8.6%) 
F 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (2.1%) 3 (0.7%) 
O 19 (13.2%) 1 (0.7%) 5 (3.5%) 25 (5.8%) 
Table 5.3 Distribution of explanation types among trials (in terms ofpercentage) 
Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 
1 8 8 4 
L 2 1 5 
C 7 6 8 
P 0 3 4 
H 0 5 8 
F 0 0 2 
6 1 4 
Table 5.4 Distribution of explanation types among participants (8 participants in each age group) 
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Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 Across age group 
I 2.159 0.963 0.650 1.666 
L 1.875 1.060 1.043 1.380 
C 1.967 1.050 0.999 1.233 
P - 1.684 0.629 1.356 
H - 0.145 0.158 0.154 
F - - 0.000 0.000 
O 2.311 3.400 0.720 2.036 
Table 5.5 Accuracy score of each type of explanation 
Among the seven types of explanations, only type P (Plus minus) and F 
(Division/Friction) consisted of an exact computational procedure that could be 
repeated. Half rule (H) guaranteed the same answer when the number of both types 
of grasses was the same. For the other situations, the half rule only provided a range 
for the correct answer. 
5.3.1.1 Explanation type F (Division/Fraction) 
An explanation is classified as type F (Division/Fraction) if participants used the 
concept of division or fractions to explain how they arrived at their answers. Here is 
an example of type F: 
(5 green grasses and 5 brown grasses, correct answer: 5) 
E: 5 points, why is it 5 points? 
CF3: Because... if all of them are green then it is 10 points. But now it is 
equally divided，half is green, half is brown, so 10 divided by 2 is 5 points. 
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(CF3, Posttest Question 1) 
The accuracy score of all of the responses that were explained by type F 
explanation were 0 (Table 5.5), that is, all responses were completely correct. This 
type of explanation was only found in the eldest age group of 8 to 9 year olds, and it 
was only used in three trials (Table 5.3) by two participants (Table 5.4). All of these 
trials had equal numbers of green grasses and brown grasses. Although this 
explanation could be used for all of the questions in the experiment, neither 
participant completely shifted to explanation F after its first occurrence. Participant 
CFl used this explanation for the first trial of the experiment, but after that she never 
used it again, and instead she offered explanation types L, C, and H in later trials. 
Participant CF3 first used explanation type F in the first question of the posttest, then 
she used it in the second question, but after that she fell back to using explanations H 
andP. 
Participant CFl used the concept of fractions to explain her answer. As 
mentioned before, the school had not taught this topic yet, so the experimenter was 
curious about the source of her concept: 
E: I see, the chance is 5/10. Have you learnt about fractions? (CFl shook her 
head) But why do you know things like “something over ten ”？ 
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CFl : Because my mother has taught me. 
(CFl, Pretest Question 1) 
This is an example of children using explicit knowledge in problem solving, and the 
direction of development reflected in this trial is top-down development. However, it 
should also be noted that the area of application for this concept was very narrow for 
CFl. She only used explanation F for this question, and fell back to explanations L, 
C, and H after the first trial. It suggests that the more advanced knowledge coexisted 
with less advanced knowledge in CFl's mind, and the more advanced knowledge 
was mastered less well than the less advanced knowledge, because the application 
area of the advanced knowledge was narrow. 
5.3.1.2 Explanation type H (Half rule) 
The type H explanation (Half rule) requires participants to link the given 
situation of “the two types of grasses are equal in number" to "5 points on the 
Answer Board"~the middle point along the 10 point scale. Explanation H and 
explanation C (comparison) were very similar in the sense that both types of 
explanations involved comparison between the quantities of two types of grasses. 
The major difference between type H and type C was the "anchoring" of the "half in 
the grasses situation with the “half，on the 10 point scale, and realizing that when the 
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number of green grasses was more, the answer must be greater than 5, and when the 
number of brown grasses was more, the answer must be smaller than 5. Here is an 
example of explanation type H: 
(6 green grasses, 4 brown grasses, correct answer: 6) 
E: Why is it 7points? 
CF3: Because... there are 4 distasteful grasses, delicious grass... there are 6. 
Therefore, the chance for it to get green grass is bigger. So, if half and half 
should be 5 points, now it has 2 more, so it is 7 points. 
(CF3, Training Questions 6) 
The accuracy score of explanation H was 0.154 (see Table 5.5), which was much 
lower than explanation I (1.666), L (1.380), C (1.233), and P (1.356). Explanation H 
was the second most accurate type of explanation, being only less accurate than 
explanation T. 
No participant in the group of 4 to 5 year olds was capable of providing 
explanation H. This agrees with Spinillo and Bryant's (1991) finding that 4- and 5 
year olds were not capable of using the half boundary to make judgments about 
proportion. In the group of 6 to 7 year olds, five of the 8 participants provided 
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explanation H, but this explanation only appeared in 7.6% of the trials (Table 5.3). 
All of the participants in the group of 8 to 9 year olds gave explanation H, and it was 
the second most popular explanation, occurring in 18.1% of the trials (Table 5.3). 
This agrees with Spinillo and Bryant's (1999) finding that 6 to 8 year olds were able 
to make use of the half boundary for making comparisons between the ratios of 
discontinuous quantities. The current research extended the application area of the 
half boundary. In Spinillo and Bryant's (1991, 1999) experiment, one target ratio was 
presented (represented by white and blue areas of different sizes within a rectangle, 
or by different size slices of a pizza), participants were required to choose from two 
ratios that matched the target. In the current study, the requirement of the question 
was to convert discrete numbers of grasses into a 10-point scale. 
Question for which H Occurrence order of other explanations after H 
first occurs (Counting from the trial in which H first occurred) 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 
BF3 3/6 (Posttest Q2) C 
BF4 5/10 (Posttest Ql) C I 
BMl 1/2 (Pretest Ql) P I 
BM3 5/10 (Posttest Ql) C 
BM4 4/8 (Pretest Q2) I C 
CFl 4/8 (Pretest Q2) C 
CF2 1/2 (Pretest Ql) C P L 
CF3 5/10 (Posttest Ql) C O L P T 
CF4 1/2 (Pretest Ql) C 
CMl 1/2 (Pretest Ql) C P 
CM2 1/2 (Pretest Ql) L C I 
CM3 1/2 (Pretest Ql) I C P O 
CM4 1/2 (Pretest Ql) L O C 
Table 5.6 The trials in which explanation Hfirst occurred and the types of explanation found 
after the first occurrence of explanation H 
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Like explanation F, the trials in which explanation H first occurred were trials in 
which the numbers of green grasses and brown grasses were the same (see Table 5.6). 
This type of question was the easiest for the children. The finding that more 
advanced explanations (F and H) all first occurred in easier questions is very 
different from the related finding in the block-balancing task. In the block-balancing 
task, the more advanced explanations (Explanation T, the naive version of the law of 
torque) all first occurred in trials of asymmetrical blocks, which were the more 
difficult tasks. It seems that whether the more advanced explanation first occurs in 
more difficult trials or easier trials depends on the nature of the task. 
Explanation H could also be applied in all trials, but after the first occurrence of 
explanation H, no participant completely shifted to explanation H, and all of them 
used less advanced explanations (e.g., I, L, C, and P) in later trials. This finding 
agrees with the finding of the block-balancing task that lower explanations were only 
phased out gradually. 
5.3.1.3 Explanation type P (Plus minus) 
Participants who used explanation type P assigned a particular score for each 
green or brown grass, and their result was obtained by adding or subtracting these 
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scores. There were two main subtypes of explanation P (where GG = Green grass and 
BG = Brown grass): 
Subtype 1: Score of a GG x Number of GG — Score of a BG x Number of BG 
Subtype 2: 1 0 - Score of a BG x Number of BG/0 + Score of a GG x Number of GG 
If participants used subtype 1, usually they first established the ratio that one 
grass carried X points, then they counted the number of green grasses, and increased 
the number of points according to the assigned ratio at each count. Here is an 
example: 
(4 green grasses, 6 brown grasses, correct answer: 4) 
E: So, what do you think, how happy is Little Horse? 
(BMl counted the marks on the Answer Board, started from 0’ counted 2 
units on the board at each count. After counting to 8, BMl started counting 
backward, 1 unit for each count, counted to 2.) 
BMl: 2points. 
E: 2 points. Why is it 2 points? 
BMl : Because I did it like the previous question, 1, 2, 3, 4 (Counting 2 units 
on the board as one count, reached 8), then 6 (brown) grasses, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
(Counting backward from 8, 1 unit for each count, reached 2) I did the 
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subtraction this way. 
(BMl, Training Question 3) 
This computation procedure reflected that the participant understood that the 
number of both types of grass should be used to determine the probability of getting 
green grass. The participant had the concept of ratio, which is “1 grass, 2 points" in 
the example. The result was obtained by replicating; that is, adding to each set the 
corresponding unit for the set so that the invariant one-to-many correspondence is 
maintained (Nunes & Bryant, 1996, p. 145). The participant in the example carried 
out replication by constantly counting 2 units for each count. The ratio of how many 
points each grass should carry was set intuitively by the participants. None of them 
used division to calculate the "point per grass." When participants found that they 
were wrong (in the training phase), they usually thought the ratio was incorrect, and 
continued to use the same computation procedure in the next trial with a new ratio. 
Explanation P subtype 1 was used by two participants only. One of the 
participants did not understand the probability meaning of "10 points": the event of 
"getting green grass" must happen. Once the points exceed 10, it is meaningless. For 
example: 
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(6 green grass, 4 brown grasses, correct answer: 6) 
E: OK, why do you think it is 10? 
BM3: More than 3 grasses (BM3 mentioned in previous trials that if the 
number of green grass is more than 3，then each green grass should be 3 
points), 3, 6，9, 12，15’ 18，17, 16, 15, 14. There is no 14, so it is 10. 
(BM3, Training Question 6) 
BM3 did not recognize the conceptual importance of 10. He thought the answer 
should be 14, only there was no 14 on the Answer Board, therefore he had to opt for 
the closest choice: 10. 
Participants who used subtype 2 of explanation P first reasoned that if all of the 
grasses were green, then the answer should be 10 points. If there were X brown 
grasses in the question, the participant then deducted the total brown grass score 
from 10. Some participants did the calculation the other way round. They first 
reasoned that if all of the grasses were brown, then it should be 0 points. Then, they 
added back the score of all of the green grasses. For example: 
(4 green grasses, 1 brown grass, correct answer: 8) 
E: Nine points isn ’t it? Why is it 9points? 
CMl : If there is no distasteful grass then it is 10 points, but there is one, so 
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deduct one point. 
(CMl, Training Question 1) 
This computation procedure reflected the participants' grasp of the probability 
meaning of “10 points'V'O points," and the participant was able to make use of this 
as an "anchor point" to carry out reasoning. However, in the trials in which 
explanation P subtype 2 was used, no participant used division to calculate the "point 
per grass." Many of them believed, like CMl in the example, one point should be 
deducted for each brown grass. Some of the participants did adjust the ratio, but it 
was still performed intuitively, or by copying the correct ratio of the last trial. If the 
participants first divided 10 by the total number of grasses to get the correct "point 
per grass," they could get the correct answer by using this subtype 2 procedure; 
however, no participant using explanation P did so. 
No participant in the group of 4 to 5 year olds ever provided explanation R Of 
the 8 participants in the group of 6 to 7 year olds, three participants provided 
explanation P (Table 5.4), while two participants mainly used subtype 1 and one 
participant mainly used subtype 2. Explanation P is found in 21.5% of the trials 
performed by the group of 6 to 7 year olds (Table 5.3). Four of the 8 participants in 
the group of 8 to 9 year olds used explanation P, while all of them used subtype 2. 
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Explanation P was found in 9.7% of the trials performed by this group. 
As shown in Table 5.5, the accuracy score of explanation P (1.356) is 
approximately the same as that of explanation L (1.380) and explanation C (1.233). 
5.3.1.4 Explanation type C (Comparison) 
An explanation was classified as type C (Comparison) if the participants 
justified their answers by comparing the number of green grasses and the number of 
brown grasses. The following is an example of type C explanation: 
(6 green grasses, 4 brown grasses, correct answer: 6) 
E: 3 points of happiness, right? Why is it 3 points? 
AF2: Because 6 is more than 4. 
E: 6 is more than 4." You mean there are 6 green grasses, which are more 
than 4 brown grasses, right? 
AF2: Yes. 
(AF2, Training Question 6) 
In some earlier research that used the choice paradigm (Chapman, 1975; Ross & 
Hoemann, 1975), it was found that concrete operational children only considered one 
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variable when they made a probability judgment. For example, there were two jars 
containing different combinations of marbles. If children were required to decide 
which jar yielded the higher probability of drawing a marble of a certain colour, they 
only considered the absolute number of the type of marbles that they wanted to select. 
They did not consider the number of the other marbles. However, the current study 
found otherwise. When explanation C was used, numbers of both types of grasses 
were considered. Explanation type C was found in all three age groups and even the 
youngest age group made use of this type of explanation in 27.1% of the trials. 
Though participants using explanation C were aware that the number of both 
types of grasses had an effect on the result, the proper quantification of the 
probability concept had not been built up yet. Merely recognizing that "there are 
more green grasses" or "there are more brown grasses" could not determine the exact 
answer. The participant in the example correctly recognized that there green grasses 
were more, but the answer she gave violated the half rule. This is the difference 
between participants who had mastered the half rule and participants who were just 
capable of doing comparison: the half rule could be used to determine the range of 
the correct answer, but comparison itself could not suggest a range. 
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As shown in Table 5.3, the percentage of trials in which explanation C could be 
found seems to increase with age: 27.1% (age 4-5), 34.7% (age 6-7), and 57.6% (age 
8-9). The researcher of this study had considered whether the participants of the 
group of 8 to 9 year olds in fact had explanation H in their mind, they might have 
other reasons for not explicitly mentioning that the answer should be "greater than 
5," or "smaller than 5" (which is a classification requirement of explanation H), like 
this was too obvious. This possibility was also the main source of discrepancy in the 
explanation classifications between rater 1 (i.e., the researcher) and rater 2. Twelve 
explanations were classified as "Half rule" by rater 2, but classified as "Comparison" 
by rater 1. It was reasonable for rater 2 to make such a classification, because the 
explanations appeared after the first occurrence of explanation H. However, 
inspection of the behavioural result suggested that care should be taken, because after 
the first occurrence of half rule, the participant still violated the half rule in later 
trials. Of 13 participants who had provided explanation type H, only 3 of them 
completely adhered to the half rule behaviourally after the first occurrence of 
explanation H. Therefore, the researcher had decided to use a more conservative 
classification rule, by classifying the explanation as type H only when "greater than, 
smaller than, or equal to 5" was explicitly mentioned in the explanation. 
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5.3.1.5 Explanation type L (Last question) and I (Implicit) 
Both explanation types L (Last question) and I (Implicit) can be found in all 
three age groups (see Table 5.3). The popularity of explanation I in the trials seems to 
decrease with age: 54.2% (age 4-5 years), 32.9% (age 6-7 years), and 4.2% (age 8-9 
years). All participants of the groups of 4 to 5 year olds and 6 to 7 year olds tried this 
explanation, and only 4 participants in the group of 8 to 9 year olds provided this 
explanation. In the current study, explanation I did not only indicate a deficiency in 
participant knowledge, it also indicated a deficiency in metacognitive knowledge. It 
was expected that children of this age could not provide a completely correct 
explanation, which is why most of the explanation types in the current classification 
system were for explanation that were not completely correct. The difference 
between explanation I and other types of incorrect explanations (except type L) was 
that, in other categories, the exact computation method, or the relation suggested 
between the elements may be incorrect. Nevertheless, the explanations had included 
information that was provided along meaningful dimensions that helped to structure 
the problem of "how to compute probability." However, in explanation I, such 
meaningful dimensions were absent. In fact, no participant used explanation I 
throughout the experiment. Therefore, all of the participants must have some sense 
what kind of information was relevant to the computation of the probability problem. 
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Otherwise, the meaningful dimensions would not appear in the explanations that the 
participants provided in other trials. In the other words, although the participants 
made a decision about the answer, and they had some sense how the problem could 
be solved, they failed to recognize the information, or failed to recognize the 
relevance of such information, and so they failed to make use of the knowledge when 
they gave an explanation I. The decrease of explanation I indicates that this kind of 
metacognitive ability seems to increase with age. 
Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, and Andersen (1995) proposed a distinction between 
metacognitive knowledge and metastrategic knowledge. They explained that 
metacognitive knowledge involves awareness of and reflection on the content of 
one's thought, and reflection of the propositions that one believes to be true or 
chooses to consider. Metastrategic knowledge involves awareness and management 
of the strategies that are applied in the course of thinking and problem solving. 
Explanation type L reflected metastrategic knowledge, because it reflected that 
the participant did not view each problem as an individual, unrelated problem. 
Participants using explanation L were capable of using cross-trial information to 
improve their understanding. Even in the youngest age group, two participants were 
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capable of providing this kind of explanation. It seems that this metastrategic 
knowledge could appear quite early. 
5.3.1.6 Explanation type O (Others一Idiosyncratic) 
An explanation was classified as type O if a participant had mentioned a 
computation method or relationship between quantity of grasses, and if the response 
could not be classified as any of the previous categories. Within this type, the 
variation among explanations was quite large and to generalize the characteristics of 
the explanations is difficult. One common subtype in this category was the 
participants commented on the absolute number of green or brown grasses, like 
describing the absolute number as "many" or "not many," but made no comparison 
with the other type of grass. The percentage of trials for this explanation was 13.2% 
for the group of 4 to 5 year olds, 0.7% for the group of 6 to 7 year olds, and 3.5% for 
the group of 8 to 9 year olds. 
5.3.2 Responses to the general questions after the posttest 
After the completion of the posttest, the experimenter asked the participants two 
main questions: 1) when they tried to solve the questions, did they think about the 
number of green grasses, brown grasses, and total number of grasses? 2) After 
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considering the above things, how did they know the answers? 
Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 
Consider green grasses 6 8 8 
Consider brown grasses 7 8 8 
Consider total grasses 2 6 1 
Table 5.7 Participants，responses to the general questions about what kinds of 
information they considered 
All participants in the 6- to 7-year-old group and the 8- to 9-year-old group 
responded that they thought about both the number of green grasses and the number 
of brown grasses. Cross checking with their in-trial explanations, except for BM2, all 
of them used explanation C or P subtype 1 in the experiment, and these two 
explanations involved the number of the two types of grasses. The explanations 
provided by BM2 also involved the number of the two types of grasses. The 
self-reports about this question from the two age groups were accurate. In the group 
of 4 to 5 year olds, AF2 responded that she did not consider the number of green 
grasses, and AF3 responded that she considered neither the number of green grasses 
nor brown grasses. After checking the transcript, it was found that 12 explanations 
provided by AF2 involved the number of both types of grasses. Among the 
explanations provided by AF3, 11 explanations involved the number of one type of 
grass, and four explanations involved the number of both types of grasses. The 
self-report of this age group was less reliable. All other participants in this age group 
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reported that they had considered both types of grasses, and this agreed with the 
transcript's record. 
In the 4 to 5 year old group, two participants claimed that they thought about the 
total number of grasses, and six participants in the 6 to 7 year old group made the 
same claim. However, after checking with their in-trial explanations, only BMl, of 
the 6- to 7-year-old group, mentioned the total number of grasses in his explanation 
in one trial, and none of the other participants mentioned the total number of grasses 
in their explanations. In the 8 to 9 year old group, only one participant said he 
thought about this information, and this claim matched with his in-trial explanations. 
Age group 4-5 Age group 6-7 Age group 8-9 
Subject Explanation Subject Explanation Subject Explanation 
AFl 1 , 0 , C (O) BFl I, L,C (C) CFl T, L, C, I, H (C) 
AF2 O, C, I (I) BF2 I’ C (I) CF2 O, H, C, P, L (C) 
AF3 0,I, C, L (I) BF3 I, C, H (C) CF3 H, C, O, L, P, T (H) 
AF4 I (I) BF4 I, C, H (C) CF4 I, C, H (H) 
AMI 0 , I , C , L (I) BMl H,P,I (P) CMl H, C, P (H) 
AM2 I, O, C (I) BM2 I, P, O (I) CM2 H, L, C, I (H) 
AM3 I, O, C (I) BM3 I, P, C, H (H) CM3 H, I, C, P, O (C) 
AM4 I, C (I) BM4 H’ I, C (C) CM4 H, L, O, C (C) 
Table 5.8 Explanations provided by the participants. The abbreviations in brackets 
were responses provided to the question about general computational strategy. The 
list of explanations contains in-trial explanations provided by the participants and 
the order of the explanations in the lists follows the order of occurrence in the 
experiment. 
The participants' self-reports at the end of the experiment about their general 
computation strategies did not fully reflect their in-trial performances. The 
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explanations provided in response to the general questions were less advanced than 
the explanations that they provided in the experimental trials. In the group of 4 to 5 
year olds, although 7 of the participants provided explanation C in experimental trials, 
none of the participants was able to tell the experimenter how they obtained the 
answer at the end of the experiment. In the group of 6 to 7 year olds, five participants 
provided explanation H in the experimental trial; however, only one reported that at 
the end of the experiment. One participant (BM2), who used explanation P, failed to 
report this procedure at the end of the experiment. In the 8 to 9 year old group, 4 of 
the 8 participants reported explanation H, which they had also used in experimental 
trials. 
Explicit knowledge is the starting point of top-down development and is the 
guide for carrying out computation for each individual problem. The acquisition of 
explicit knowledge about the general principle of computation is a prerequisite to the 
formation of lower level representations (El or level-I). Therefore, if top-down 
development occurred, the general principle of computation should be more 
advanced than the in-trial explanation, which involved the application of general 
principles. 
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However, the finding of this current study suggested the opposite: the 
participants' explanations were less advanced in response to general questions than in 
the experimental trials. The alternative picture suggested by the current probability 
task may be explained by the possibility that when participants were faced with the 
question, task-specific knowledge that was not completely explicit to the participant 
was activated to solve the problem. This knowledge might be represented at level-I 
or El because the participants did not have fiill direct access to this knowledge. In 
the trial, the participants might have partial awareness of the activated nonexplicit 
knowledge, or they might apply reasoning to their own behaviour to provide an 
explanation. At the end of the experiment, neither of these information sources was 
available; therefore, the explanations provided by participants were less advanced at 
the end of the experiment when compared to in-trial explanations. The E2/3 
representation of knowledge for this task was developed later than the non-E2/3 
represented knowledge. Therefore, when the two developmental directions were 
compared, it seems that the bottom-up direction is the more plausible one. 
5.3.3 Counter suggestions in the posttest 
In the posttest, after the participants had provided answers for question 1 and 2, 
the experimenter gave a counter suggestion to see if the participants would change 
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their minds. In the slide for question 1, there were 5 green grasses and 5 brown 
grasses. In the slide for question 2, there were 3 green grasses and 3 brown grasses. 
The correct answer for both of the questions was 5. If the difference of a participants' 
answer for questions 1 or 2 was -/+1, the experimenter reminded them that there 
were more green grasses in the last question, and asked why the answers to the two 
questions were so similar. If the difference in the participants' response was grater 
than 1, the experimenter reminded them that both types of grasses were equal in 
number in both questions, and asked why the answer was so different. 
Difference of Ql & Q2 Responses to the counter suggestion 
Within 1 0 Total Change Stating number of Others Total 
answer grasses equal 
Age 4-5 2 1 3 2 1 0 3 
Age 6-7 4 2 6 0 5 1 6 
Age 8-9 2 6 8 0 8 0 8 
Table 5.9 Number of participants whose difference in answer to Ql and Q2 is within 
-/+7 and the number of responses to the counter suggestions 
In the group of 4 to 5 year olds, only three participants provided similar answers 
for questions 1 and 2, and only one participant produced the same response for 
questions 1 and 2. This participant, AMI, responded with "6" for both of the 
questions. This answer violated the half rule. AMI responded to the experimenter's 
counter suggestion by stating that the number of green grasses was equal to the 
number of brown grasses. The other two participants in the same age group were 
misled by the counter suggestion and changed their answers. 
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In the group of 6 to 7 year olds, 6 of the participants produced similar answers 
for questions 1 and 2, and 5 of them were capable of responding to counter 
suggestions by stating that the number of both grasses was equal. Only two 
participants, BM3 and BM4, provided the same value for both questions, and the 
value they provided was “5,” this adhered to the half rule. The other four participants 
provided different values, and one of them, BF4, other than stating that the number 
of grasses was equal, also said that the number of green grasses was more in question 
1, so the chance of getting green grass would be higher in question 2. 
In the group of 8 to 9 year olds, all participants provided similar values for both 
questions, and they all responded to the experimenter's counter suggestions by 
indicating that both types of grasses were equal in number. However, there were still 
two participants who provided different values for questions 1 and 2, and both of 
them explained that the number of grasses in question 2 was fewer, so the answer 
should be smaller. 
In the youngest age group, the children who were misled to change their 
answers all provided explanation I for questions 1 and 2. Their lack of E2/3 
knowledge may be the cause of their failure to resist counter suggestions and they 
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may have had the ability to produce nearly correct answers, but they failed to 
recognize that their original answers were nearly correct. In the groups of 6 to 7 year 
olds and 8 to 9 year olds, three of the participants believed that the absolute number 
of green grasses was more in question 1, so the chance of getting green should be 
bigger. In fact, one of the participants, CF2, explained the half rule very clearly in 
question 1. In question 2, she stated the half rule again, but she also stated that the 
absolute number of grasses had an effect on probability. She was not aware of the 
contradiction between the two beliefs: 
CF2: Because there is equal number of delicious and distasteful grasses this 
time, so it is not too unhappy, and it is not too happy, so it is 5. Because, if the 
score is less than 5, there is less delicious grass, but it is not the case. If the 
score is after 5, that means 6 to 10，it is because there are less distasteful 
grasses，but it is not the case. So it is 5. 
(CF2, Posttest Question 1) 
CF2: Because there are equal number of delicious and distasteful grasses, so 
it... and the grasses of this time is less than last time, so its happiness level 
should similar to last time. It should be a little bit lower, but 3 points is too 
low, so I think it is 4. 
(CF2, Posttest Question 2) 
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This example illustrated that the acquisition of the correct concept did not lead to 
automatic deletion of the wrong concept. It showed that a less advanced explanation 
was not completely wiped away when the correct explanation appeared. This also 
echoed another finding of both experiments in this thesis: when participants 
discovered more advanced or even correct explanations (Explanation T in the 
block-balancing task, and Explanation F and H in the probability task), they did not 
completely shift to the correct explanation. The lower level explanations were only 
phased out gradually. 
Comparing Q3 (5 green 4 brown) & Q4 (3 green 1 brown) 
Q4>Q3 Q3<Q4 
Age 4-5 5 3 
Age 6-7 5 3 
Age 8-9 6 2 
Table 5.10 Comparing the values of the answers to Q 3 and Q4 
In posttest question 3, there were 5 green grasses and 4 brown grasses, so the 
correct answer was 5.6. In question 4, there are 3 green grasses and 1 brown grass, so 
the correct answer was 7.5. There were more green grasses in question 3, but the 
answer to question 3 had a smaller value than question 4. When presented with the 
counter suggestion, only one participant in the group of 4 to 5 year olds changed her 
answer. Three participants in the group of 4 to 5 year olds, two participants in the 
group of 6 to 7 year olds, and three participants in the group of 8 to 9 year olds 
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explained their answer by stating how the number of grasses differed. Three 
participants in the group of 6 to 7 year olds and four participants in the group of 8 to 
9 year olds responded by explaining that the difference between the numbers of the 
two types of grasses were not the same in the two questions. No participant in the 
group of 4 to 5 year olds used the difference of two types of grasses in their 
explanation. 
According to Noelting (1980), comparison between 5:4 and 3:1 was a stage IIIA 
problem. (Ratios with two corresponding terms is a multiple of one another.) 
Noelting defined the age of accession for a stage as the age where 50% of the 
participants solved at least one item of the stage. It was found that the age of 
accession for stage IIIA was 12 years 2 months. In the current study, 62.5% of the 
participants in the groups of 4 to 5 year olds and 6 to 7 year olds, and 75% of 
participants in the group of 8 to 9 year olds were capable of providing a greater 
answer value for 3:1 than 5:3. The difference in the age of accession in the two 
studies was quite large. One of the main reasons behind this difference is that 
Noelting counted an item as correct only when the choice was correct and the 
explanation indicated that the participant had not just compared two terms additively. 
In the current study, only the answers to the two questions were compared. It was 
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reasonable for Noelting to consider both the explanation and the choice made, since 
their task required the children to choose one answer from two choices. If only the 
given options were considered, the chance for a child to get the correct answer by 
chance was 50%, so this behavioural measure could not accurately reflect the 
children's understanding if used on its own. On the other hand, participants were 
required to evaluate the probability of each question individually in this task. The 
behavioural measure of the current probability estimation task could reflect 
participants' knowledge more accurately than the choice task. More importantly, the 
belief that the explicit explanation can completely reflect children's understanding is 
challenged by the current experiment. Using the explicit explanation to decide 
whether a behavioural success should be counted as correct may lead to 
underestimation of children's ability, particularly if the development occurs from the 
bottom-up direction. 
Mix (2002, p. 72) suggested that tasks that do not require an explicit comparison 
across sets are easier than tasks that do. Noelting's task required explicit comparison. 
However, for the current experiment, the primary problem just involved evaluation 
of probability for one set of green grasses and brown grasses. The difference in the 
nature of the task may also explain the difference between the performances found in 
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the two studies. 
5.4 Comparison of the behavioural performance and the performance that 
demonstrated explicit understanding 
5.4.1 Accuracy score of explanation type I 
An explanation was classified as type I (Implicit) if the participants said that 
they did not know, or their explanations did not provide any computation method, 
and they neither commented on the quantity of grasses, nor made any comparison. If 
probability estimation is only sustained by explicitly represented knowledge, then for 
the trials in which participants provided explanation I, there should be no difference 
in behavioural performance among the different age groups. In the trials in which 
explanation I was provided, three t-tests were carried out to test whether the accuracy 
score of the three age groups was the same. The familywise alpha was controlled 
at .05, therefore alpha for each test was .05/3 = .0167. 
In the trials in which explanation I was provided, the mean of accuracy score for 
the group of 4 to 5 year olds (M = 2.16, SD = 1.66) was significantly different from 
the group 6 to 7 year olds (M = .96; SD = 1.14): t(119.1) = 4.75, p < .01 (two-tailed). 
The mean difference between the group of 4 to 5 year olds and the group of 8 to 9 
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year olds (M = .65; SD = .56) was also significant: t(13.95) = 5.16, p<.01. However, 
the difference between the group of 6 to 7 year olds and the group of 8 to 9 year olds 
was not significant: t(50) = .66, p > .0167. 
The null hypothesis that the accuracy score of explanation I trials of all three 
age groups were the same was rejected. Because behavioural performance improved 
with age even when the participant failed to provide an explicit explanation, it is 
difficult to explain if explicit knowledge replaced implicit knowledge in the process 
of development. The behavioural improvement among these trials should be caused 
by improvement of intuitive estimation, which was sustained by implicit 
representation. The computation process of intuitive estimation is not available for 
verbal report and conscious access. 
5.4.2 Changes in the pretest and posttest performance of the group of 4 to 5 year 
olds 
In section 5.2.1.2, it was found that the posttest accuracy scores of the group of 
4 to 5 year olds was significantly improved when compared with their pretest 
accuracy scores. Since the participants did not receive any explicit instruction about 
how to carry out the computation, this improvement should be a result of experience 
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gained in the training task. There was behavioural improvement in accuracy, but was 
there improvement in the performance of explicit understanding? 
Pretest Posttest Training 
I 21 24 33 
L - - 8 
C 10 12 17 
P - - -
II - - -
F - - -
0 9 4 8 
Table 5.11 Explanation distribution of the group of 4 to 5 year olds 
It can be seen that, in both pretest and posttest, participants were restricted to 
using only explanation I, C, and O. None of the three explanations contained any 
explicit computation procedure that could lead to the correct answer, and nor could 
these explanations specify a range for the correct answer. At the end of posttest, 
when the experimenter explicitly asked participants for their method of knowing the 
answer, none of the participants provided any computational procedure. Therefore, 
the behavioural improvement was the result of improved intuitive estimation, not the 
discovery of a correct explicit computational procedure, and this intuitive estimation 
should be sustained by implicit representation. 
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5.4.3 Comparing the behavioural adherence of half rule with the performance of 
explanation type H 
Explanation type H required the half rule to be mentioned explicitly in the 
explanation, which was sustained by the E2/3 representation according to the RR 
model. If behavioural adherence to the half rule also relied on E2/3 representation, 
the developmental trend should be similar to the verbal version. 
The number of explanation type H provided by each participant among all of the 
trials in the experiment was counted, and ANOVA of the count was implemented. 
The between-subjects factors were age group (Age groups 4-5, 6-7, and 8-9) and 
gender (Male and Female). 
Number of Explanation H 
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Age 4-5 Age 6-7 Age 8-9 
Age group 
Fig. 5.5 Distribution of explanation type H 
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The effect of age group was significant, F(2, 18) = 9.764, p < .01, Partial Eta 
Squared = .520. The effect of gender, however, was not significant, F(l, 18) = .146, p 
> .05. The interaction between age group and gender was also not significant, F(2, 18) 
=.506, p > .05. Post hoc test using the Tukey HSD procedure indicated that the only 
significant performance difference was between the group of 4 to 5 year olds and the 
group of 8 to 9 year olds. The post hoc LSD (least significant difference) test, which 
is more able to detect difference with greater power, also agreed with the Tukey HSD 
test that the difference between the groups of 4 to 5 year olds and 6 to 7 year olds 
was not significant. 
We have shown that the BHalf score of the group of 4 to 5 year olds was 
significantly different from the group of 6 to 7 year olds and the group of 8 to 9 year 
olds. If both behavioural and explanation performance were sustained by the same 
E2/3 representation, it is difficult to explain the significant difference that occurred 
between the group of 4 to 5 year olds and the group of 6 to 7 year olds. The 
difference could be explained if explanation type H was sustained by E2/3 
representation, and behavioural adherence to the half rule was not sustained by E2/3 
representation, but was a representation of a lower-level, such as level-El or level-I. 
This explanation would allow the development of different levels of representation at 
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different speeds. 
The results indicated that, in the group of 6 to 7 year olds, the children's 
behavioural performance was better than the youngest age group, but their 
performance in giving explanations was similar to the youngest group. Their 
behavioural development preceded the development of explicit knowledge, so this 
seems to be an example of the bottom-up direction of development. 
5.5 Summary 
5.5.1 List of important findings related to the RR model 
Regarding to the distinction of implicit and explicit representation, three 
differences between behavioural performance and performance involving explicit 
knowledge were found in the current study: 
1. Among the trials in which explanation I were provided, the accuracy of 
estimation improved with age. 
2. A different pace of development was found between behavioural adherence to 
the half rule and explicit explanations of the half rule. 
3. In the group of 4 to 5 year olds, the posttest improvement in accuracy was not 
accompanied by the discovery of more appropriate computational procedures. 
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The difference in explicit knowledge (which sustains verbal explanation) and implicit 
knowledge (which sustains intuitive estimation) was observed in these results, and 
the difference in representation level is a possible explanation for all of these 
differences. 
The following two results suggest the existence of learning from the bottom-up 
direction in the experiment: 
1. In the posttest, accuracy of the group of 4 to 5 year olds improved, but no 
advanced computation strategy was discovered. This suggests that the implicit 
knowledge developed into a more advanced stage earlier than the explicit 
knowledge. 
2. The explanations that participants provided for the general questions were less 
advanced than those in the trials. This should not be the case if the developmental 
direction was top-down, because general knowledge should be the starting point of 
development. The result suggests that the participants might have relied on the 
problem solving process itself for more advanced explanations, which lends support 
to a bottom-up direction of development. 
The U-shaped performance curve among age groups was not observed in the 
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current study. This is not surprising because no previous research found U-shaped 
curves for the probability task, and the RR model does not predict that the U-shaped 
performance curve must occur. The issue of whether an intraparticipant U-shaped 
curve exists was not investigated, because the middle part of the experiment was a 
training phase. In the training phase correct answers were provided, so it is unfair to 
compare performance of the training phase with the pretest and posttest phases. 
The developmental pattern of more advanced explanations (explanation H and F) 
were all discovered in trials in which the number of green and brown grasses were 
equal. After the first occurrence of a more advanced explanation, participants still 
used less advanced explanations in later trials, until the less advanced explanations 
were gradually phased out. 
5.5.2 List of important findings related to the age-related development of the 
probability-estimation task 
The development of explicit understanding of the probability task was shown by 
the finding that the most correct explanation that the group of 4 to 5 year olds could 
provide was explanation C. This reflects that they had some awareness that the ratio 
of intended and unintended outcome could both affect probability. However, they did 
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not use this knowledge to respond to general questions about computation at the end 
of the experiment. Also, proper quantification of this awareness had not been 
developed yet. No participant described the computation method or the steps 
involved in the computation. 
In the group of 6 to 7 year olds, explanation C became the most commonly used 
explanation and was found in 34.7% of trials. Explanation P, which contains explicit 
descriptions of computational steps, first appeared in this age group and was found in 
21.5% of the trials. Explanation H also started to appear in this age group, but it was 
used in a very small number of trials (7.6%). At the end of the experiment, all of 
these participants correctly reported that they had considered both type of grasses. 
Their responses to the general questions about computation were much better than 
the group of 4 to 5 year olds, because only two of the participants responded with 
explanation I. 
Explanations involving the concept of fractions or division first appeared in the 
group of 8 to 9 year olds. However, the most commonly used explanation of this age 
group was still explanation C (57.6%). Explanation H was found in 18.1% of all 
trials, which was the second most popular explanation. Both explanation C and 
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explanation H were used by all of the participants. Explanation P was found in 9.7% 
of all trials, and all of them were subtype 2. In response to general questions, four of 
the participants mentioned explanation H, which they had used in previous trials. 
5.5.3 Responding to key research questions in a nutshell 
Like the case of the block-balancing task, differences between behavioural 
performance and performance that demonstrates explicit understanding was observed 
in this probability estimation task. The differences were likely to be caused by the 
difference in explicit representation and implicit representation. There is also 
evidence to suggest the existence of the bottom-up direction of development. Similar 
to the findings of the block-balancing experiment of this study, a U-shaped 
performance curve could not be observed in this experiment. As mentioned before, 
this did not pose any threat to the plausibility of the RR model. The results of 
experiment two echo the RR model's description of development. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary of findings in Experiments One and Two 
6.1.1 Performance difference that reflects the distinction between implicit and 
explicit representations 
In both experiments, the behavioural performance and the performance that 
demonstrates explicit understanding were first analyzed individually, and then the 
performances were compared with each other to see whether there was a difference 
between them. If there is only one type of representation, then the explicit 
understanding and the related behavioural performance should have a similar 
performance level, be affected by the same set of factors, and develop at the same 
rate. Both Study One and Study Two found the opposite because differences were 
found between the two types of performance in both tasks. It seems that it is more 
reasonable to take the position that the two types of performance are sustained by 
different levels of representation than the same level of representation. 
In the block-balancing experiment, the factors that had a significant effect on 
the Success Score and the Prediction Task were different. For the Success Score, age 
was a significant main effect, but this was not the case for the Prediction Task. The 
developmental trends of the two were also different. For the asymmetrical blocks, the 
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Success Score increased with age. However, this was not the case for the Prediction 
Task. The performance for the asymmetrical blocks in the Prediction Task was 
similar in the three age groups, and they all predicted a similar amount of failures for 
the asymmetrical blocks. 
The block-balancing task also provides evidence for the existence of El 
representation, which is a unique invention of the RR model that provides an 
intermediate representation level along the explicit-implicit dimension. It was found 
that there was a stage in which the geometric-centre theory could not be verbalized, 
but could lead to persistent central-area placement and incorrect judgment in the 
Prediction Task. 
In the block-balancing task, examples for all three levels of representation 
(level-I, level-El, and level-E2/3) were found. The behavioural skills involved in 
successfully balancing the blocks was represented at level-I. When the 
geometric-centre theory was neither available to consciousness nor ready for 
verbalization, it exerted influence in the form of persistent central-area placement 
and influenced the prediction result, so the geometric-centre theory was represented 
at the El level at this stage. In later a stage, when the geometric-centre theory was 
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verbalized and available for conscious inference, it was represented at level-E2/3. 
The discovery of the naive version of law of torque, in this study, seems to have 
involved the bottom-up direction of development. The possible developmental 
pattern may be that after the geometric-centre theory was discovered and represented 
at level-E2/3, it was compiled into a lower level which sustained the behavioural 
pattern that reflected the concept. The compilation involved in this suggested process 
is a kind of top-down development. The three entities mentioned above, namely, the 
behavioural skills for balancing, the geometric-centre theory, and the naive version of 
the law of torque, might coexist in the same person simultaneously. This might 
explain why some participants could balance the asymmetrical blocks and provide 
explanation T in Phases One and Two, but predicted that the blocks could not be 
balanced in the Prediction Task. 
In the probability task, the difference between behavioural performance and 
performance that demonstrates explicit understanding was also observed. First, it is 
noteworthy that accuracy improved with age, even among the trials in which 
explanation I was provided. Second, the pace of development was different between 
behavioural adherence and verbalization of the half rule. It should also be noted that 
the accuracy improvement found in the group of 4 to 5 year olds was not 
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accompanied by the discovery of more advanced computational procedures. 
In the block-balancing task, the different concepts could be clearly classified 
into the three different levels of the RR model. However, in the probability task, 
knowledge about probability could only be roughly classified into implicit and 
explicit representation. This is not a deficit of the RR Model; the rough classification 
is only due to insufficient evidence to judge whether knowledge that cannot be 
verbalized should belong to level-I or level-El representation. Intuitive estimation 
ability was sustained by implicit representation, and the verbal explanations given by 
the participants were different explicit concepts. The implicit representation and 
explicit representation coexisted in the same person's mind simultaneously. Although 
older participants had more advanced explicit knowledge about probability, when 
they provided explanation I in a trial, they made intuitive estimations in that trial. If 
explicit representation replaced implicit representation in the developmental process, 
implicit representation was no longer found in older participants, because their 
implicit representation had already been replaced by explicit representation and their 
accuracy should not be better than the younger participants. However, Study Two 
found that among the trials in which explanation I was provided, the Accuracy Score 
still improved with age. This shows that the implicit representation was not replaced 
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in the developmental process. 
6.1.2 Top-down or bottom-up learning 
Examples for top-down and bottom-up development were found in both 
experiments. In the block-balancing experiment, it appeared that correct explanations 
were not the prerequisite for behavioural success in block-balancing. On the other 
hand, in the trials in which correct explanations were provided, all of the 
block-balancing actions were successful. Furthermore, 6 participants were able to 
balance asymmetrical blocks behaviourally, but could not predict this success in the 
Prediction Task. This suggests that behavioural improvement precedes improvement 
in explicit knowledge, which is evidence for the bottom-up direction of development. 
An example of top-down development was found in the second stage development of 
the naive version of the law of torque, in which explicit knowledge appeared to be 
the prerequisite of the behavioural pattern that reflected this knowledge. 
In the probability-estimation experiment, it was found that behavioural 
adherence to the half rule improved earlier than the explicit verbalization of the half 
rule. It was also found that participants' in-trial explanations were generally more 
advanced than their responses to general questions. Moreover, the youngest age 
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group improved in behavioural performance before they discovered more advanced 
computation methods. All of these findings are evidence to suggest a bottom-up 
direction of development for the probability-estimation task. An example of 
top-down development was found in one participant, CFl, who could apply the 
concept of fractions when she tried to solve the probability problem. She told the 
experimenter that her mother had taught her explicit knowledge about fractions. 
6.1.3 Is there a U-shaped performance curve? 
A U-shaped performance curve across age groups was not found in the 
block-balancing task, nor in the probability-estimation task. As indicated in the 
literature review, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) did not say that the U-shaped performance 
curve is an essential for the RR model. Quoted from Karmiloff-Smith (1992, p. 20): 
"The temporary disregard for features of the external environment during phase 2 can 
lead to new errors and inflexibilities. This can, but does not necessarily [italics 
added], give rise to decrease in successful behaviour~a U-shaped performance 
curve." Therefore, an absence of the U-shaped curve does not pose any threat to the 
basic postulates of the RR model. Given the abundant evidence for differences in 
performance between implicit and explicit representation, and the evidence for 
bottom-up learning, this study lends support to the basic postulates of the RR model. 
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6.1.4 Other findings 
In both experiments, it was found that, once discovered, the more advanced 
explanations (explanation T in the block-balancing task, and explanations F and H in 
the probability estimation task) were not applied to all later trials. Siegler and Jenkins 
(1989) found that the repeated use of a more advanced strategy was related to the 
participants' level of insight into that strategy. If the participants were not aware that 
a certain strategy was more advanced, they were less likely to use the newly 
discovered strategy in later trials. 
In the block-balancing task, more advanced explanations were first discovered 
in the more challenging asymmetrical block trials. This may be due to the fact that 
less advanced explanations could not account for the success in balancing the 
asymmetrical blocks. In the probability estimation task, more advanced explanations 
were first found in the easier trials, in which equal numbers of grasses were involved 
in the questions. This may be due to the fact that the concept of “half, is easier to 
master in this type of context, so that the participants were in a better position to 
understand the relation of "half and division or fractions. The different findings of 
the two experiments suggested that the chance of acquiring a more advanced 
explanation depends on the content of the concept and the nature of the task. 
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6.1.5 Summary 
To summarize, the current study provided empirical findings that favour the RR 
model. If the distinction between implicit and explicit representation does not exist in 
the first place, it is unreasonable to suppose that the representation redescription 
process exists, given that the representation redescription process is a process of 
turning implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Evidence was found to suggest a 
distinction between implicit and explicit representation, and also supported the 
existence of a bottom-up direction of development. These are important assumptions 
of the RR model. Affirmation of these assumptions set the stage for the further 
investigation of the core of the RR model: the representation redescription process. 
The RR model had been challenged by some researchers, like Krist et al. (2005), 
who claimed that they had neutralized important evidence for the RR model by 
showing there was no U-shaped performance curve. However, the absence of the 
U-shaped performance curve does not pose a fatal challenge to the validity of the RR 
model. The reason behind the existence of the U-shaped performance curve in the 
block-balancing task is the geometric-centre theory, which captures some 
commonalities about balancing, but overgeneralization of this theory to the 
asymmetrical blocks led to a decline in block-balancing performance. The current 
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study proved the existence of the implicit geometric-centre theory. Since the effect of 
this implicit theory was not limited to the block-balancing behaviour, but also the 
performance in the Prediction Task, the geometric-centre theory should be 
represented at level-El. This provided evidence for the existence of the El level and 
helped the RR model to regain its plausibility. The postulation and validation of the 
El representation level, which breaks the commonly assumed implicit/explicit 
dichotomy, is a unique contribution of the RR model. 
The current study also provided a new piece of evidence for supporting the RR 
model as a domain-general developmental process. The predictions made by the RR 
model were confirmed in both the block-balancing experiment and the probability 
estimation experiment. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first time the 
RR model has been successfully applied in a probability task. 
6.2 Implications 
The rich findings of the current study strongly suggest that the explicit-implicit 
dimension is a useful dimension for understanding conceptual development. The 
owner of a concept may first own the knowledge without awareness of its presence, 
and the awareness and flexibility of the knowledge increases as a result of 
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development. The opposite may also happen, because loss of conscious control and 
increase of efficiency may also be the effect of development. By applying the 
explicit-implicit dimension to other areas, further interesting or insightful findings 
may be obtained. 
The current study has shown that the RR model has good empirical support, and 
it is a useful model for understanding conceptual development. The application of the 
model has been extended to the probability domain. The RR model can act as a 
bridge for integrating the findings of developmental psychology and cognitive 
psychology, so that both subfields in psychology can be enriched, and their 
application area and explanation power can be extended. 
The findings of the current study also have implications for experimental design. 
The behavioural performance and verbal explanations should not be viewed as two 
sides of the same coin. The two may develop at a different pace. In some 
experiments, correctness of an item does not only require children to make a correct 
choice, but also requires a correct explanation. If the task involves bottom-up 
development, this kind of experimental design risks underestimating the children's 
ability. Other than that, it may not be appropriate to view children's verbal 
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explanation as a complete and accurate reflection of the knowledge that they possess. 
Even if a child cannot give a correct explanation, it does not mean that the child must 
be totally ignorant of the topic. The knowledge that the child possesses may be 
represented at El or level-I, which needs to be observed by a means other than a 
verbal report. 
The findings of the present study also have implications for teaching and 
learning. In this study, it was found that even if the participants could verbally give a 
correct explanation, this did not mean the participant had finished the learning or the 
development process. The participant might fail to use the correct knowledge in 
similar situations, and an incorrect concept might coexist with a correct concept. 
More importantly, the participants might not understand to what extent their concepts 
were correct. While students should be encouraged to reflect on their own concepts 
and their own thinking process, the teacher should help students to identify 
assumptions that the students might not be aware of, and help them to gain fuller 
insights into their own concepts and knowledge. This can help students to 
consolidate their knowledge, and help them to gain greater flexibility in the 
application of their knowledge. 
2 3 6 
Findings about the implicit and explicit levels of representation that illustrated 
conceptual understanding shed light on the methods of instruction. The teachers' role 
is not limited to presenting well organized, explicit knowledge. In the process of 
solving a problem, or when students are trying to construct their concepts, they may 
go through a phase in which their ideas are at a representation level that is 
unavailable to conscious access or a verbal report. Students cannot be fiilly aware of 
what is in their minds, and cannot verbalize their ideas. At this moment, telling 
students some explicit knowledge may not help much, and may cause them even 
more confusion. A teacher's role should be that of a facilitator at this phase. The 
teacher needs to be very sensitive, actively understand what is in the students' minds, 
and actively organize meaning from the students' seemingly meaningless and 
unorganized speech. Students may already have a partial understanding of a subject, 
and further learning will be most effective if the teacher can help the students to be 
aware of what they know and to build on the ideas that they already have. 
Such findings should also help teachers to review their students' methods in the 
assessment of their learning. A paper-and-pencil test is the most common kind of test 
that is used for accessing student's understanding. However, for some subjects, this 
may not be the ideal way to access their conceptual understanding. For example, if a 
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teacher wants to assess whether students know how to diagnose and fix computer 
problems, it may not be appropriate to use a paper-and-pencil test only. Students may 
be able to perform the task successfully, but not be able to present their conceptual 
understanding by using pen and paper. The reverse can also be true, students may be 
able to remember the text from a textbook, but be unable to apply what they 
remember when they face a dysfunctional computer. A practical test cannot be 
replaced by a paper-and-pencil test in a practical subject such as this. 
6,3 Limitations 
This study aimed to investigate the change of implicit conceptual representation 
to explicit conceptual representation. To find out how children's representations were 
changed, it was necessary to analyse their verbal explanations in detail, so 
trial-by-trial examination of the children's explanations was thus carried out. 
Combining all of the participants' changes into one age group would lose 
information about developmental trajectory, so to find out the commonality of 
development patterns in this study, the changes of each participant were traced 
individually. Given the limited manpower and the workload involved, the number of 
participants in each age group could not be too large. This was an unavoidable 
trade-off between higher temporal clarity and individuality, against the expense of 
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capturing a more generalized picture. 
To find out the content of children's explicit representation, it was necessary to 
ask questions to elicit verbal reports of their understanding. The dilemma that arose 
from this questioning was that asking more questions elicited more verbal reports 
and provided more information to help understand what was in the children's minds: 
however, the questions unavoidably gave hints or sensitized the children's attention 
to the important features of the concepts. The questions were intended to be a tool for 
understanding the children's concepts, not the source of change in the experimental 
design. This balance is difficult to achieve. In this study, questions that went to a 
greater depth and would have more effect on the children's conceptual understanding 
were asked at the end of experiment. Although this placement of questions was to 
avoid an undesired influence on the developmental pattern, this might have scarified 
a deeper understanding of the children's minds in earlier trials. 
In the probability task, it was found that fractions with different numerators and 
denominators had an effect on the accuracy score. In this experiment, the author had 
tried her best to use questions of similar types in the pretest and posttest sections. 
Better control could be achieved if the questions in the pretest and the posttest were 
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similar in accuracy score (i.e., similar in difficulty). To the best of the author's 
knowledge, the accuracy score obtained by using a similar paradigm was not 
available. Moreover, this control could be quite difficult to achieve across age groups, 
because the difficulty of the questions varied with age, which is exemplified by the 
finding that the best and worst questions were different among the age groups in this 
study. 
Due to the limited resource involved, only one school having both primary and 
kindergarten sections was invited to participate in the experiment. Most of the 
students in this school have a middle-class background, so the results may not be 
applicable to another population. 
6.4 Suggestions for further studies 
The RR model is intended to be a domain-general model. Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) had applied the RR model to the domains of language, physics, mathematics, 
theory of mind, and notation in her book Beyond Modularity. To the best of the 
author's knowledge, this is the first time that the RR model has been applied to the 
study of the concept of probability, and this application has brought meaningful 
findings in the current study. It is suggested that the RR model could be further 
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applied to the study of conceptual development in new domains. For instance, the 
model could be applied to study the development of the concept of "justice". It is 
observed that many people have a very strong sense of "just" versus "unjust," but 
many of them cannot articulate their own theory of justice. Tasks could be designed 
to obtain children's behavioural performance with respect to the concept of justice, 
such as by making choices between several alternatives. Verbal explanations should 
also be obtained in the tasks, so that the children's explicit understanding could be 
analyzed. 
In the probability-estimation task of the current study, it is difficult to tell 
whether the implicit knowledge was represented at level-I or the El-level. A new 
experiment could be designed to further classify this knowledge into a more precise 
representation type. 
For both the block-balancing task and the probability-estimation task, the age 
groups involved may be further expanded to gain a more complete picture of 
cross-age development. For the block-balancing task, younger participants may be 
included to investigate when the geometric-centre theory begins to emerge. An 
experiment could be designed, for a probability-estimation task, to obtain an 
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accuracy score that is free of the practice effect, by randomizing the questions, and 
by the removal of feedback in the form of correct answers. 
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